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EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	
Existing	research	shows	consistently	high	levels	of	concern	among	people	in	the	UK	over	the	scale	of	
immigration	and	its	impact	on	jobs,	wages	and	services.	At	the	same	time,	that	same	body	of	
research	does	not	provide	much	in	the	way	of	detail	about	the	nature	of	these	concerns.	This	is	
partly	because	much	of	the	data	is	from	opinion	polls	which	say	little	about	the	priorities	and	
perspectives	that	underlie	the	aggregate	numbers.	Moreover,	very	little	research	has	been	carried	
out	on	what	new	immigration	policies	the	British	public	would	like	to	see	once	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	
and	free	movement	ends.	Our	research	for	this	report	aims	to	fill	these	gaps	by	providing	evidence	
about	how	people	use	and	understand	information	about	economic	impacts	of	immigration,	and	
what	they	might	wish	to	see	from	new,	post-Brexit,	policies.	
OUR	METHODS	
We	used	a	range	of	methods	to	test	a	number	of	hypotheses	about	the	role	of	evidence	in	
formation,	and	change,	of	immigration	attitudes.	These	methods	were	applied	to	a	purposive	
sample	of	105	participants	in	a	Leave	voting	area	of	the	UK	and	with	relatively	high	levels	of	concern	
about	immigration.	Our	purpose	was	to	test	out	ways	of	getting	people	to	consider	the	economic	
evidence	by	doing	a	number	of	exercises	with	the	participants	to	encourage	alternative	view-points,	
counteract	in-group	favouritism,	and	ensure	that	participants	felt	listened	to,	before	screening	a	
commissioned	video	summing	up	the	existing	evidence	on	the	economic	impact	of	EU	immigration	
on	the	UK.	We	also	used	surveys	to	measure	immigration	attitudes	at	various	points.	
Our	findings	should	be	interpreted	with	two	considerations	in	mind:	Firstly,	we	encouraged	our	
research	participants	to	discuss	the	economic	impacts	of	migration	–	on	wages,	jobs	and	services	–	
not	their	views	about	immigration	more	generally,	although	discussions	naturally	led	to	these	as	
well.	Secondly,	it	was	not	our	intention	to	achieve	a	representative	sample,	but	to	understand	a	
particular	set	of	perspectives	on	immigration	that	lie	behind	the	option	polls.	Because	of	this,	we	
chose	to	carry	out	the	research	in	a	Leave	voting	area	where	immigration	issues	might	be	seen	to	
have	played	a	role	in	the	outcome.	With	policy	makers	now	wishing	to	take	account	of	public	
attitudes	in	forming	new	immigration	policy,	it	is	important	that	these	are	understood.	
OUR	FINDINGS	
1.	Immigration	attitudes	are	resistant	to	statistical	evidence	about	impact	
We	saw	no	significant	shifts	in	attitudes	in	our	participants	over	time,	compared	to	a	control	group.	
As	such,	our	results	are	consistent	with	existing	research	suggesting	that	immigration	attitudes	are	
deeply	embedded.	However,	our	research	does	give	some	indication	of	why	participants	might	not	
have	changed	their	attitudes.	Our	qualitative	data	suggests	participants	were	working	with	a	clear	
hierarchy	of	evidence,	in	which	personal	experiences	and	anecdotes	are	viewed	as	more	credible	
sources	of	information	than	either	media	stories	or	statistical	data.	Moreover,	discussions	in	the	
focus	groups	tended	to	be	framed	negatively,	with	the	consequence	that	positive	perspectives	on	
the	impact	of	immigration,	presented	for	example	in	our	video,	were	viewed	to	an	extent	with	
mistrust.	Combined	with	a	lack	of	trust	in	the	media,	many	of	our	participants	concluded	that	it	is	
best	to	rely	on	your	own	evidence,	drawn	from	experiences	and	the	accounts	of	people	you	know.	
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2.	It	is	recognised	that	EU	immigration	has	economic	benefits		
While	participants	saw	highly	skilled	migration	as	valuable,	they	also	saw	low-skilled	migration	as	
having	an	important	role	to	play.	In	particular,	focus	group	participants	readily	acknowledged	that	
low-skilled	migrants	meet	labour	shortages	in	sectors	such	as	social	care,	and	often	perform	jobs	
considered	too	unattractive	by	British	people.	While	recognising	the	need	for	immigration	more	
generally,	participants	also	felt	that	young	British	people	are	not	given	sufficient	opportunity	to	
acquire	skills.		
The	main	concern	about	EU	immigration	is	its	perceived	impact	on	services,	and	some	participants	
believed	that	migrants	are	a	net	drain	on	the	public	finances	and	even	achieve	priority	access.	They	
did	not	argue	that	EU	migrants	should	not	be	able	to	access	services	such	as	health	and	education,	
but	they	believed	that	they	should	be	in	the	UK	to	work	and	should	be	net	contributors	through	
employment	and	taxation.		
Cultural	concerns	are	not	prominent	in	debates	about	EU	migration,	although	such	issues	were	
frequently	raised	in	the	focus	groups.	However,	they	were	largely	voiced	in	relation	to	settled	ethnic	
minority	communities,	and	involved	issues	of	integration,	extremism	and	crime.	This	is	in	line	with	
existing	evidence	that	different	groups	are	associated	with	different	threat	perceptions,	with	EU	
migrants	perceived	in	economic	terms	and	Muslim	ethnic	minorities	and	migrants	in	cultural	and	
security	terms.		
3.		Control	is	more	important	than	numbers	
When	surveyed,	our	participants	said	they	wanted	the	Government	to	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	
to	reduce	the	number	of	EU	migrants	coming	to	Britain.	However,	whenever	that	preference	was	
discussed	in	the	focus	groups,	it	was	framed	in	terms	of	a	desire	to	screen	out	(perceived)	low-
quality	migrants.	The	distinction	between	low-	and	high-quality	migrants	was	not	conceived	in	
relation	to	qualifications	and	skills,	but	more	widely	in	terms	of	economic	need	and,	most	
importantly,	contribution.	Control	was	seen	as	important	to	help	ensure	that	people	come	to	
contribute	(e.g.,	work	or	study),	rather	than	to	claim	benefits	or	to	commit	crime.	Participants	
expressed	varying	opinions	on	whether	future	policy	should	favour	EU	migrants.	
4.	Public	attitudes	can	be	reconciled	with	the	needs	of	the	economy	and	employers	
In	drawing	conclusions	from	our	findings,	we	look	at	whether	public	attitudes	can	be	reconciled	with	
the	needs	of	the	economy	and	employers.	It	could	be	assumed	that	the	public	and	employers	have	
opposing	values	and	priorities	when	it	comes	to	immigration.	Our	focus	group	findings	suggest	that	
this	might	not	be	so.	Participants	expressed	a	desire	for	immigration	to	benefit	the	UK	economically	
and	in	other	ways,	while	also	wanting	British	workers	to	have	opportunities	to	work,	for	young	
people	to	have	training	opportunities,	and	for	jobs	to	be	of	good	quality.	None	of	these	is	
incompatible	with	employers’	perspectives	or	with	policy,	which	allow	employers	to	continue	to	
recruit	migrants.	Our	focus	group	participants	recognised	this.		
Employers	and	the	public	also	show	some	recognition	that,	if	we	want	to	see	EU	migration	continue,	
we	have	to	consider	the	preferences	of	EU	migrants	themselves.	Developing	policy	to	address	the	
needs	and	preferences	of	all	three	major	stakeholders:	the	public,	employers	and	EU	migrants,	will	
be	challenging	but	there	is	at	least	some	shared	ground	on	which	policy	can	be	built.		
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1.	INTRODUCTION	
1.1.	Background	to	the	research	
In	June	2016,	the	UK	voted	to	leave	the	EU,	and	it	is	clear	that	anti-immigration	sentiments	played	a	
decisive	role	in	the	minds	of	many	voters.	As	opinion	research	consistently	shows,	a	large	part	of	the	
UK	population	sees	immigration	as	one	of	the	most	important	issues	facing	the	country	(Ipsos	MORI,	
2018),	and	while	the	public	at	large	are	getting	more	positive	about	the	impacts	of	immigration,	they	
are	also	increasingly	divided	along	generational,	educational	and	social	lines,	with	a	large	proportion	
of	Britons	becoming	increasingly	worried	about	immigration	(Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017).			
What	factors	are	driving	people’s	negative	perceptions	of	immigration?	Some	have	argued	that	it	is	
driven	by	cultural	concerns	about	the	impact	on	national	identity	and	the	traditional	‘way	of	life’	
caused	by	the	influx	of	foreigners	with	different	cultural	values	and	customs.	Others	focus	on	how	
attitudes	are	driven	by	economic	concerns	about	the	impact	on	jobs,	wages	and	public	services.	
These	considerations	can	be	based	on	a	perceived	threat	to	one’s	own	well-being,	or	they	can	be	
socially-minded	in	the	sense	that	they	reflect	a	concern	about	the	impact	on	the	broader	population,	
or	on	the	country	as	a	whole	(Hainmueller	and	Hopkins,	2014).			
Focusing	in	on	the	economic	considerations,	the	problem	is	that	the	belief	that	immigration	is	costly	
and	has	a	substantial	negative	effect	on	the	economy	is	not	supported	by	the	evidence.	Economists	
find	impacts	on	wages	to	be	very	small	(Dustmann	et	al.,	2005,	2013;	Nickell	and	Saleheen	2008;	
Manacorda	et	al.,	2011;	MAC,	2014)	and	there	is	no	evidence	that	immigration	has	reduced	natives’	
job	prospects	(Lucchino	et	al.,	2012;	MAC,	2012;	Devlin	et	al.,	2014;	Wadsworth	et	al.,	2016).	
Impacts	on	public	finances	have	been	found	to	be	positive	through	increased	tax	revenue	(Dustmann	
and	Frattini,	2014)	and	broader	concerns	about	potential	negative	impacts	on	public	services	appear	
to	be	largely	unsubstantiated	(Portes,	2018).	These	conclusions	were	recently	backed	up	by	the	
Migration	Advisory	Committee	report	on	the	impact	of	EU	migration	(MAC,	2018)		
Given	this	disconnect	between	public	opinion	and	the	weight	of	evidence	on	the	economic	impacts	
of	migration,	the	UK	Government	faces	a	dilemma	in	negotiating	the	UK’s	post-Brexit	relationship	
with	the	EU.	On	the	one	hand,	it	can	design	immigration	policies	that	enable	the	UK	to	continue	
benefitting	economically	from	immigration,	but	in	so	doing	fail	to	meet	public	expectations	for	a	
new,	more	restrictive	immigration	policy,	possibly	exacerbating	social	divisions	and	hostility	towards	
migrants.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Government	can	meet	the	expectations	of	a	sizeable	proportion	of	
the	electorate	for	more	controlled	immigration	into	the	UK,	but	at	a	large	economic	cost,	which	is	
likely	to	impact	most	on	lower	income	groups	who	support	greater	controls	(Armstrong	et	al.,	2016).	
Precisely	how	this	dilemma	can	be	addressed,	through	both	policy	and	public	debate,	depends	on	
understanding	public	perceptions	better	than	is	currently	the	case.		
1.2.	The	limitations	of	existing	research	evidence	
Appendix	1	of	this	report	summarises	the	literature	on	the	economic	impacts	of	immigration	in	the	
UK,	while	section	2	explores	the	existing	evidence	on	British	attitudes	to	immigration.	Given	the	
apparent	mismatch	between	economic	evidence	and	public	perceptions	of	the	economic	impacts	of	
immigration,	our	review	of	the	evidence	explores	how	informational	factors	influence	immigration	
attitudes.	The	evidence	shows	that	people	are	highly	misinformed	about	the	migrant	population	and	
immigration	policies	(Blinder,	2015;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	Misconceptions	about	levels	of	
immigration	are	typically	correlated	with	higher	perceptions	of	threat	and	negative	attitudes	
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towards	the	immigrant	population,	though	it	is	unclear	whether	people’s	misconceptions	drive	
negative	attitudes	or	vice	versa	(Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007).	Experimental	survey	
studies	have	shown	that	correcting	misinformation	does	reduce	misperceptions	about	the	
immigration	population	but	fails	to	change	attitudes	and	policy	preferences	(Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	
Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Grigorieff,	2016).	One	limitation	of	these	studies	is	that	the	intervention	to	
correct	misperceptions	typically	only	focuses	on	correcting	one	small	element	of	misinformation	
related	to	the	number	of	immigrants.	
At	the	same	time,	an	argument	can	be	made	that	public	attitudes	to	immigration	are	still	fairly	
poorly	understood.	Existing	research	rely	mostly	on	survey/polling	data	and	analysis,	and	it	is	only	in	
recent	years	that	research	has	emerged	based	on	focus	groups	methods	(see	for	instance	Rutter	and	
Carter,	2018;	Rolfe	et	al.,	2016;	Gaston,	2018;	Newman	et	al.,	2017),	experimental	surveys	(see	
recent	examples	in	Kaufmann,	2017a;	Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Blinder	and	Markaki,	2018)	and	
deliberative	democracy	exercises	(Renwick	et	al.,	2017).	While	polling	data	are	instrumental	in	
mapping	out	attitudes	and	divisions,	and	exploring	these	over	time,	other	research	methods	are	
equally	important	to	provide	complementary	data	to	assist	interpretation,	especially	about	what	
causal	processes	drive	immigration	attitudes.		
For	instance,	survey	studies	rely	on	questions	about	‘immigrants’	and	‘immigration’,	terms	which	are	
often	vaguely	defined	and	likely	to	be	understood	differently	by	different	respondents	(Blinder,	
2015).	As	such,	survey	studies	often	fail	to	capture	people’s	multifaceted	perceptions	of	the	
immigrant	population	(Blinder,	2015;	Verkuyten	et	al.,	2018).	Similarly,	focus	group	studies	have	
complemented	the	interpretation	of	specific	survey	findings.	For	example,	people’s	preference	for	
high-skilled	migrants	seem	to	reflect	their	perceived	economic	contribution	and	their	role	in	filling	
skill	gaps,	the	latter	of	which	is	also	relevant	to	low-skilled	occupations	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	
Another	example	is	the	interpretation	of	to	what	extent	the	public	is	divided.	Recent	focus	group	
studies	show	that	a	large	proportion	of	the	population	can	be	considered	‘balancers’	in	the	sense	
that	they	are	neither	located	squarely	in	the	pro-	or	anti-immigration	camp,	in	that	they	
acknowledge	the	positive	impacts	of	immigrants	through	filling	skill	gaps	and	paying	taxes	(ibid.).								
1.3.	Objectives	
The	key	to	addressing	public	concerns	without	damaging	the	economy	lies	in	understanding	the	
apparent	mismatch	between	evidence	and	perceptions	of	the	economic	effects	of	immigration.	
Importantly,	this	is	unlikely	to	simply	be	a	matter	of	informing	the	public	of	available	evidence,	since	
policy	preferences	tend	to	remain	in	the	face	of	corrected	misconceptions	(Grigorieff	et	al.,	2016;	
Katwala	et	al.	2014).	Our	two	central	research	questions	were	therefore:	
Q1.	Why	do	people	not	change	their	negative	views	on	immigration	when	faced	with	
evidence	of	its	economic	benefits?	
Q2.	If	simply	providing	the	economic	evidence	is	not	enough,	how	is	it	possible	to	foster	less	
negative	views	on	immigration?	
To	answer	Q1,	we	used	focus	groups	to	test	the	three	most	prominent	hypotheses	in	the	
psychological	literature	(explained	below)	about	why	people	do	not	integrate	information	about	the	
economic	effects	of	immigration.	In	particular,	we	aimed	to	understand	the	processes	and	moral	
considerations	at	work	in	potentially	making	views	resistant	to	change.		
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To	answer	Q2,	we	hoped	to	identify	effective	ways	of	communicating	about	immigration	to	help	
ensure	that,	whatever	people’s	views	on	immigration	might	be	at	the	end	of	the	day,	they	will	at	
least	have	taken	account	of	its	economic	impacts.	
1.4.	Research	methods		
Our	methods	consisted	of	a	review	of	available	evidence	and	new	empirical	research.	As	already	
noted,	the	experimental	literature	on	immigration	attitudes	is	small,	and	the	subset	concerned	with	
the	extent	to	which	it	is	possible	to	move	preferences	through	information	interventions	smaller	
still.	In	light	of	this,	we	ran	an	experimental	focus	group	study	to	investigate	whether	policy	
preferences	could	be	moved	if	participants	were	informed	about	the	economic	impact	of	
immigration	following	interventions	controlling	for	well-known	biases.	The	focus	group	format	
inevitably	reduced	the	potential	sample	size	compared	to	alternative	approaches	(such	as	
experimental	online	surveys).	However,	it	was	required	by	the	nature	of	the	interventions,	which	
required	face-to-face	interaction	with	the	participants.	
1.4.1.	The	research	locality		
The	research	took	place	in	the	town	of	Sittingbourne	in	Kent	and	participants	were	recruited	locally.	
Sittingbourne	is	in	the	local	government	district	of	Swale,	which	had	a	Leave	proportion	of	62.5%	in	
the	2016	referendum.	As	such,	the	district	falls	about	halfway	between	the	national	result	(51.9%)	
and	the	highest	Leave	proportion	of	75.6%	(in	Boston).	We	chose	Sittingbourne	as	the	location	to	
carry	out	the	focus	groups	because	it	has	a	number	of	features	which	make	the	views	of	its	
population	of	interest.	Swale	is	a	Leave	voting	area	with	slightly	higher	levels	of	unemployment	and	
lower	levels	of	economic	activity	than	average.	It	is	ranked	the	second	most	deprived	area	of	Kent	
(out	of	12)	and	nationally	77th	(out	of	376)	and	child	poverty	is	higher	than	elsewhere	in	in	Kent	and	
England	taken	as	a	whole.	Its	skill	profile	is	towards	the	lower	end	with	a	greater	than	average	
proportion	of	residents	employed	as	process	plant	machine	operatives	and	in	elementary	
occupations.	Hourly	rates	of	pay	are	lower	than	in	the	rest	of	the	UK,	at	£12.37	compared	to	£13.99.	
In	July	2018	2.8%	of	Swale’s	population	were	receiving	out	of	work	benefits,	compared	to	1.3%	of	
the	South	East.	These	features	make	Swale,	and	the	town	of	Sittingbourne,	deprived	relative	to	the	
rest	of	the	South	East	and	to	England	as	a	whole	and	therefore	one	which	might	be	considered	an	
area	‘left	behind’	by	those	wishing	to	explain	patterns	of	Leave	voting	in	those	terms	(Ford	and	
Goodwin,	2014;	Goodwin	and	Heath,	2016).	
With	regard	to	migration	and	ethnicity,	2011	census	data	finds	96.6%	of	the	population	to	be	White,	
compared	to	85.4%	of	England	as	a	whole.	Areas	adjacent	to	Swale	have	a	much	higher	proportion	
of	Black	and	Minority	Ethnic	(BME)	residents,	including	Medway	(10.36%)	and	Gravesend	(17.2%).	
Like	the	rest	of	Kent	and	England,	Swale	has	seen	an	increase	in	the	proportion	of	its	population	
born	outside	the	UK	and,	in	2017	net	migration	accounted	for	the	majority	of	its	total	population	
growth.	Employment	is	the	main	reason	for	inward	migration	and,	compared	to	the	rest	of	Kent,	
Swale	has	a	consistently	high	proportion	of	short-term	migrants	seeking	employment,	as	opposed	to	
arriving	to	study.	More	detailed	data	on	the	characteristics	of	migrants	to	Swale	is	provided	in	
Appendix	3.	
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1.4.2.	The	research	participants	
We	wanted	our	sample	to	include	a	mix	of	people	according	to	their	attitudes	towards	immigration	
and	support	for	leaving	or	remaining	in	the	EU.	In	this	section,	we	describe	our	recruitment	methods	
and	the	profile	we	achieved	in	terms	of	basic	characteristics	and	attitudes	towards	EU	immigration.	
A	total	of	105	participants	were	recruited,	92	through	a	recruitment	company	recruiting	participants	
on	Sittingbourne	High	Street	and	13	through	a	local	Facebook	group.	Standard	demographic	
information	including	gender	and	age	was	collected	at	the	point	of	recruitment.	In	addition,	each	
potential	participant	filled	out	a	survey	(see	Appendix	5)	asking	them	about	their	feelings	about	EU	
immigrants—both	overall	and	for	specific	groups	(e.g.,	high-skilled	and	low-skilled);	their	concerns	
about	EU	immigration;	their	beliefs	about	the	impact,	both	cultural	and	economic,	of	such	
immigration;	their	immigration	policy	preferences;	and	whether	they	would	be	willing	to	pay	to	
reduce	immigration.	The	first	question	on	the	questionnaire	was	designed	to	capture	respondents’	
overall	feeling	about	EU	immigration	as	follows:	
‘On	a	scale	of	1-10,	do	you	think	EU	migration	has	had	a	positive	or	negative	
impact	on	Britain?’	
We	also	used	this	question	to	screen	out	respondents	scoring	at	the	furthest	ends,	responding	with	a	
1	or	2,	or	a	9	or	10.	This	was	to	ensure	receptivity	to	the	terms	of	the	discussion,	as	well	as	room	for	
moving	preferences	in	a	positive	direction1.	Prior	to	any	analysis,	eight	participants	were	excluded	
on	account	of	not	complying	with	the	exercises	in	the	experimental	conditions.	These	conditions,	as	
well	as	criteria	for	exclusion,	are	discussed	below.	For	the	remaining	97	participants,	the	median	
response	was	5,	distributed	as	follows:	
	
Figure	1.	Frequency	distribution	of	participants’	responses	on	the	question:	‘On	a	scale	of	1-
10,	do	you	think	EU	migration	has	had	a	positive	or	negative	impact	on	Britain?’	(1	=	Very	
negative;	10	=	Very	positive;	respondents	answering	1,	2,	9,	or	10	were	screened	out)	
As	can	be	seen	from	Figure	1,	most	participants	gave	a	neutral	response,	with	smaller	and	equally	
sized	groups	giving	negative	and	positive	responses,	respectively.		
																																								 																				
1	This	screening	method	has	been	used	in	other	recent	focus	group	research	for	the	same	reasons	(Rutter	and	
Carter,	2018).	
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The	gender	breakdown	of	participants	was	55%	(53)	female	and	45%	(44)	male.	Mid-2017	
population	estimates	suggest	49.5%	(72,500)	of	Swale	residents	are	male	and	50.5%	(74,200)	are	
female.	Men	were	therefore	slightly	under-represented	in	our	sample	(Kent	County	Council,	2018).	
The	age	distribution	in	our	sample	was	as	follows:	
	
Figure	2.	Age	distribution	of	participants	
Comparisons	with	mid-year	2017	Swale	population	estimates	suggest	both	18-24	year	olds	and	
those	aged	65+	were	under-represented	in	our	sample	(Kent	County	Council,	2018).2	
The	breakdown	in	terms	of	EU	referendum	vote	was	35%	(34)	Remain,	53%	(51)	Leave,	and	12%	(12)	
non-voters.	As	such,	the	profile	of	focus	group	participants	matched	that	of	the	area	of	Swale	
closely.	If	we	take	out	non-voters,	our	sample	consisted	of	60%	who	voted	Leave	and	40%	who	voted	
Remain,	compared	to	the	referendum	vote	which	was	62.5%	vs.	37.5%	in	favour	of	Leave.		Since	the	
turnout	in	Sittingbourne	was	74.2%,	the	proportion	of	non-voters	in	our	sample	(12%)	was	lower	
compared	to	what	would	be	representative.			
It	is	clear	both	from	our	choice	of	location	for	the	focus	groups	and	our	selection	methods	that	our	
sample	is	not	representative	of	the	UK	as	a	whole.	However,	it	was	not	our	intention	to	achieve	a	
representative	sample,	but	to	understand	perspectives	on	immigration	which	lie	behind	the	opinion	
polls.	That	is	why	we	chose	to	carry	out	the	research	in	Sittingbourne,	a	Leave	voting	area	where	
immigration	issues	might	be	seen	to	have	played	a	particularly	prominent	role	in	the	outcome.	With	
policy	makers	now	wishing	to	take	account	of	public	attitudes	in	forming	new	immigration	policy,	it	
is	important	that	these	perspectives	are	understood.	
1.4.3.	Focus	group	design	
Each	participant	was	allocated	to	one	of	twelve	focus	groups	of	an	average	of	eight	people,	such	that	
each	group	had	a	similar	demographic	and	referendum	vote	profile3.	These	groups	were	in	turn	
allocated	to	one	of	four	conditions:	three	treatment	conditions,	and	one	control	condition.	Each	
condition	was	attended	by	two	members	of	the	research	team,	who	started	the	group	by	
introducing	themselves,	saying	that	they	were	looking	to	better	understand	people’s	concerns	about	
																																								 																				
2	Mid-Year	2017	Age	Population	estimates	for	Swale:	11%	aged	18-24;	16%	aged	25-34;	15%	aged	35-44;	18%	
aged	45-54;	16%	aged	55-64;	65+	24%.	
3	Although	this	principle	was	followed	in	allocating	registered	participants	to	groups,	a	higher	no-show	rate	by	
Remain	voters	resulted	in	an	imbalance	towards	Leave	voters	in	many	of	the	focus	groups.	
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the	impact	of	EU	immigration	on	Britain,	and	then	asking	each	participant	around	the	table	to	
introduce	themselves	and	saying	a	few	words	about	why	they	had	decided	to	attend.	The	groups	in	a	
treatment	condition	then	proceeded	as	follows:	
In	the	listening	condition,	we	wanted	to	test	the	hypothesis	that	people	fail	to	change	their	
preferences	because,	when	we	are	‘just	giving	people	the	facts,’	they	feel	lectured	to,	and	stop	
listening	as	a	result	(Katwala	et	al.,	2014).	The	expectation	on	this	hypothesis	was	that	we	would	see	
greater	receptivity	to	the	evidence,	as	measured	by	changes	in	responses	in	surveys	responses,	
following	an	intervention	that	makes	people	feel	listened	to,	since	people	are	more	prone	to	listen	
to	people	who	are	listening	in	turn	(Ahlstrom-Vij,	2014;	Tyler,	2006).	The	experimental	intervention	
in	this	condition	involved	asking	the	participants	about	their	main	concerns	about	EU	immigration	to	
the	UK,	and	then	for	the	members	of	the	research	team	to	look	the	participants	in	the	eye,	affirm	
them	through	body	language	and	verbally,	and	asking	follow-up	questions	that	show	an	interest	in	
their	position	and	validate	rather	than	challenge	them.		
In	the	devil’s	advocate	condition,	we	were	looking	to	test	whether	people	fail	to	change	their	
preferences	because	they	tend	to	accept	confirming	evidence	while	disregarding	disconfirming	
evidence	(e.g.,	Lord	et	al.,	1979,	Mercier	and	Sperber,	2011).	Our	expectation	was	that	we	would	see	
greater	receptivity	to	evidence	following	an	intervention	that	reduces	biased	assimilation	of	
evidence.	For	this	intervention,	we	again	asked	participants	about	their	concerns	about	the	
economic	impact	of	EU	immigration	on	Britain.	For	the	first	three	concerns	that	came	up,	we	wrote	
them	on	a	whiteboard	and	then	asked	each	participant,	for	each	concern	that	they	shared,	to	write	
down	at	least	three	reasons	for	why	they	might	be	mistaken,	thereby	playing	devil’s	advocate	with	
their	concerns.4	Each	participant	also	wrote	down	their	name	on	each	sheet,	to	enable	us	to	exclude	
from	subsequent	analysis	anyone	who	didn’t	follow	the	instruction5.	Only	two	participants	were	
deemed	non-compliant	and	were	therefore	excluded	from	analysis.6	
In	the	proposal	defence	condition,	we	wanted	to	test	whether	people	fail	to	change	their	
preferences	on	account	of	favouring	those	they	consider	to	be	of	their	own	group	over	others,	in	this	
case	immigrants.	Our	expectation	was	that	we	would	see	greater	receptivity	to	evidence	following	
an	intervention	that	reduces	in-group	favouritism.	For	this	intervention,	we	handed	out	a	piece	of	
paper	to	each	participant	and,	asked	them	to	defend	a	hypothetical	proposal	for	EU	citizens	
currently	in	the	UK	to	receive	a	free	legal	advice	telephone	service	on	their	right	to	stay	in	the	
country	post-Brexit.	The	proposal	was	designed	in	such	a	way	that	it	would	clearly	be	costly	to	the	
public	purse,	and	there	would	be	no	obvious	benefit	for	anyone	except	for	EU	migrants.	The	exercise	
was	designed	to	help	participants	feel	that	their	defence	of	the	proposal	was	written	voluntarily,	and	
that	it	was	to	some	degree	public:	they	were	asked	to	write	their	name	on	the	paper	and	told	that	
their	argument	would	be	considered	by	a	working	group.	These	measures	were	important	because	
																																								 																				
4	Early	versions	of	this	type	of	intervention	can	be	found	in	Experiment	1	in	Lord	et	al.	(1984)	and	Experiment	2	
in	 Koriat	 et	 al.	 (1980).	 The	 particular	 formulation	 we	 used	 most	 closely	 models	 the	 one	 in	 Study	 1	 in	
Mussweiler	et	al.	(2000),	adapted	to	apply	to	biased	assimilation	of	evidence	as	opposed	to	anchoring	effects.	
5	Compliance	 for	 purposes	of	 inclusion	 in	 subsequent	 analysis	was	defined	narrowly:	 if	 a	 respondent	 at	 any	
point	during	his	or	her	answer	demonstrated	any	reflection	on	why	their	concerns	might	have	been	wrong,	it	
was	recorded	as	compliant.	
6	See	Appendix	8	for	an	analysis	of	the	responses	to	the	devil’s	advocate	exercise	
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the	point	of	the	exercise	was	to	induce	cognitive	dissonance	in	cases	where	the	proposal	ran	counter	
to	participants’	views,	and	that	dissonance	would	be	resolved	by	taking	a	more	positive	view	of	EU	
migrants7.	Six	participants	did	not	comply,	either	by	not	writing	an	answer	or	arguing	the	case	to	
either	deport	migrants	or	spending	the	money	on	UK	public	services	instead8.	
Three	of	the	focus	groups	were	carried	out	as	a	control	condition	with	no	intervention.		
Following	these	interventions,	or	none	in	the	case	of	the	control	group,	all	participants	were	
exposed	to	the	same	‘evidence’	in	the	form	of	a	commissioned	video	that,	on	the	basis	of	the	
evidence	review	in	Appendix	1	and	review	protocol	in	Appendix	2,	summed	up	the	data	on	the	
economic	(including	fiscal)	impact	of	EU	immigration	to	the	UK.	The	video	covered	questions	such	as	
the	following:	
• Does	EU	migration	drive	down	wages?	
• Why	can’t	British	workers	just	do	the	jobs	that	EU	migrants	are	doing?	
• Do	EU	migrants	take	jobs	from	British	workers?	
• Do	EU	migrants	put	pressure	on	public	services	like	health	and	education?	
The	script	of	the	video	was	written	with	reference	to	research	evidence,	referenced	in	the	final	
scene.	The	video	was	designed	by	a	professional	animator.		
After	having	seen	the	video,	every	participant	filled	out	the	same	survey	they	filled	out	at	
recruitment.	Then,	we	engaged	the	participants	in	a	discussion	that	lasted	for	about	an	hour.	We	
started	out	the	discussion	by	asking	participants	what	they	felt	about	the	video.	Beyond	that,	we	let	
the	direction	of	the	discussion	be	guided	by	the	participants.	Each	focus	group	was	audio	recorded	
and	transcribed.	These	transcripts	make	up	our	qualitative	data.	Two	weeks	after	the	focus	groups,	
the	participants	filled	out	a	survey	which	contained	all	of	the	survey	questions	from	before,	together	
with	a	couple	of	questions	about	how	they	experienced	the	focus	groups.	
Participants	were	given	£35	for	taking	part	in	the	focus	group	and	an	additional	£10	for	completing	
the	follow-up	survey.	This	additional	sum	was	given	in	order	to	encourage	survey	participation	and	
to	therefore	have	a	set	of	attitudinal	data	at	three	points	of	the	research.	
		
	 	
																																								 																				
7	The	exercise	was	modelled	on	the	one	found	in	Experiment	1	(high-choice,	high-publicity	condition)	in	Leippe	
and	 Eisenstadt	 (1994)	 in	 turn	 building	 on	 Baumeister	 and	 Tice	 (1984),	 both	 of	 which	 concerned	 racial	 in-
group/out-group	attitudes.	
8	See	Appendix	8	for	an	analysis	of	the	responses	to	the	defence	treatment	exercise.	
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2.	EVIDENCE	REVIEW	ON	ATTITUDES	TOWARDS	IMMIGRATION	AND	EU	
IMMIGRATION	
This	section	reviews	findings	of	analysis	of	survey	and	polling	data	and	other	studies,	mainly	but	not	
exclusively	from	the	UK,	that	have	explored	public	attitudes	towards	immigration	and	EU	
immigration.	The	historical	data	and	papers	on	UK	public	attitudes	on	immigration	is	not	as	
comprehensive	as	one	might	expect	(Ford	et	al.,	2014).	The	main	sources	are	survey	studies	
including	the	British	Social	Attitudes	survey	(BSA)	and	the	British	Election	Study	as	well	as	
commercial	pollsters	such	as	Gallup,	Ipsos	MORI	and	YouGov.	However,	even	for	these	sources,	
survey	questions	on	immigration	attitudes	have	been	infrequent	and	irregular	without	a	consistent	
wording	over	an	extended	period	(ibid.).	However,	this	has	been	a	growing	field	in	recent	years,	with	
an	increasing	use	of	experimental	survey	studies	as	well	as	focus	group	research	giving	more	
detailed	insights	into	certain	aspects	of	public	opinion.	
The	first	section	presents	the	available	evidence	on	the	salience	and	attitudes	towards	immigration,	
explaining	how	the	public	are	predominantly	negative	towards	immigration	and	how	attitudes	have	
developed	historically,	and	then	outlines	the	substantial	divisions	in	attitudes	across	social,	
education	and	generational	lines.	The	subsequent	sections	review	the	evidence	on	why	people	hold	
or	develop	anti-immigrant	attitudes,	which	is	dominated	by	the	debate	in	the	literature	between	
economic	and	cultural	factors.	The	review	will	also	explore	the	role	of	evidence	and	information	in	
shaping	people’s	opinions,	and	it	will	discuss	the	failure	in	much	of	the	literature	to	distinguish	
between	different	types	of	migrants.	Our	review	methodology	is	outlined	in	Appendix	2.		
2.1	Salience	
Coinciding	with	an	unprecedented	increase	in	net	migration	in	the	past	two	decades,	immigration	
has	become	a	highly	salient	political	issue	in	the	UK	in	recent	years,	according	to	survey	data	by	
pollster	such	as	Ipsos	MORI,	Gallup	and	YouGov	(see	Figure	3).	
	
Figure	3.	Net	migration	(ONS,	2018)	and	proportion	of	respondents	who	see	immigration	as	
one	of	the	most	important	issues	facing	the	UK	(Ipsos	MORI,	2018)	
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For	most	of	the	1980s	and	1990s,	the	salience	of	immigration	was	close	to	zero	(Ford	et	al.,	2014).	
Since	then	the	salience	has	increased	and	immigration	has	been	continuously	rated	as	one	of	the	
most	important	issues	facing	the	UK	reaching	a	first	high	of	over	20%	in	2007	and	then	more	than	
50%	in	2015	(see	Figure	4	below).	The	increase	in	salience	is	also	reflected	in	data	of	MP	caseload	
which	shows	an	increase	in	constituents	contacting	their	MPs	about	immigration,	refugees	and	
asylum	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014;	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016).	In	recent	years	the	salience	of	
immigration	first	declined	during	the	economic	crisis	and	then	increased	during	the	economic	
recovery	as	economic	concerns	dominated	and	then	subsided	(Ford	et	al.,	2014;	Ipsos	MORI,	2014).	
Following	the	Brexit	referendum,	the	salience	of	immigration	has	again	declined	(Ford,	2018).	This	is	
likely	to	be,	at	least	partly,	due	to	an	increase	in	related	topics	such	as	EU/Brexit	(see	Figure	4	
below).	
	
Figure	4.	Salience	of	EU/Brexit	and	immigration	(1982-2018).	Proportion	of	respondents	
who	mention	it	as	one	of	most	important	issues	facing	the	UK	(Ipsos	MORI,	2018)	
	
The	increased	importance	of	the	topic	of	immigration	means	the	debate	has	spilt	into	other	policy	
areas	such	as	EU	membership	(Ford	and	Goodwin,	2014)	and	the	welfare	state	(Alesina	and	Glaeser,	
2004).	Immigration	concerns	have	impacted	on	party	politics,	in	particularly	by	fuelling	the	rise	of	
UKIP	(Food	and	Goodwin,	2014).	In	recent	years,	the	immigration	debate	has	exposed	the	frictions	
between	public	opinion	and	the	constraints	on	public	policymaking	(Ford	et	al.,	2014).	The	public	has	
consistently	demanded	restrictions	on	immigration	inflows	and	the	Conservative	Party	responded	to	
this	by	famously	committing	themselves	to	reducing	net	migration	to	the	‘tens	of	thousands’	ahead	
of	the	2010	general	election.		
However,	in	reality,	policymakers	have	faced	significant	constraints	in	responding	to	public	concerns,	
primarily	due	to	the	inability	to	change	EU	migration	policy	and	freedom	of	movement	in	particular.	
Instead	the	government	has	pursued	a	range	of	restrictive	reforms	against	more	economically	
valuable	and	socially	acceptable	migrant	streams	to	achieve	their	immigration	target	(Ford	et	al.,	
2014).	This	has	included	changes	to	rules	on	student	migration,	family	reunion	migration	and	to	
labour	migration,	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	the	‘hostile	environment	policy’	(Cangiano,	2016;	
Gower	and	Hawkins,	2013;	Robinson,	2013).	Ultimately,	the	vote	to	leave	the	EU	is	often	attributed	
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to	immigration	concerns	(Harding,	2017;	Ford	and	Goodwin,	2014;	Clarke	et	al.,	2017)	and	the	vote	
can	be	interpreted	as	the	natural	consequence	of	this	consistent	friction	between	public	opinion	and	
the	constraints	on	policymaking.		
2.2	Britain’s	attitudes	towards	immigration	
Analyses	of	data	have	consistently	shown	that	public	opposition	to	immigration	is	widespread	in	the	
UK	(Ivarsflaten,	2005;	McLaren	and	Johnson,	2007;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	BSA,	2017;	Ipsos	MORI,	
2017).	Historically,	British	public	attitudes	towards	migration	became	less	negative	during	the	1980s	
and	1990s,	then	turned	increasingly	negative	at	the	end	of	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	before	finally	
becoming	more	positive,	particularly	in	the	most	recent	polling	conducted	after	the	Brexit	
referendum	(Curtice	and	Tipping,	2018;	Ipsos	MORI,	2018;	Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017,	Ford	et	
al.,	2014,	Ipsos	MORI,	2017;	Ford,	2018;	Ford	and	Heath,	2014).	This	positive	change	has	occurred	in	
regard	to	both	people’s	attitudes	to	economic	impacts	as	well	as	cultural	impacts	(Curtice	and	
Tipping,	2018).	In	a	European	context,	the	upward	trend	in	attitudes	towards	immigration	means	
that	the	UK	is	now	mid-ranking	in	terms	of	how	immigration	is	viewed	for	the	economy	though	the	
UK	is	still	among	the	most	negative	countries	regarding	the	cultural	impacts	(Ford	and	
Lymperopoulou,	2017).	This	contrasts	with	earlier	studies	that	highlighted	the	British	public	as	
particularly	ill-disposed	towards	immigration	in	a	comparative	context	(Ford,	2012).	However,	even	
though	preferences	are	now	more	similar	to	other	countries,	Hatton	(2017)	noted	that	what	sets	the	
UK	apart	is	that	the	product	of	‘saliences’	and	‘preferences’	are	consistently	high	in	the	UK	compared	
to	other	countries,	with	the	implication	that	for	the	people	who	are	predominantly	negative	about	
immigration,	this	is	a	very	important	issue.	
The	positive	change	in	people’s	attitudes	to	the	impact	of	migration,	as	reported	by	survey	studies,	
represents	something	of	a	paradox,	particularly	considering	the	most	recent	BSA	figures	show	an	
increase	in	support	for	leaving	the	EU	compared	to	before	the	referendum	campaign	(Curtice	and	
Tipping,	2018).	The	positive	change	following	the	Brexit	referendum	may	reflect	a	galvanising	effect	
from	the	Brexit	vote	on	those	who	already	held	positive	views	about	the	impact	of	immigration,	or	a	
sense	of	reassurance	among	those	with	negative	views	that	immigration	will	be	dealt	with	as	part	of	
the	deal	to	leave	the	EU	(Ipsos	MORI,	2017;	Ford,	2018).	With	regard	to	the	latter,	however,	the	
most	recent	polling	from	the	BSA	survey	show	that	the	British	public	(including	those	in	favour	of	
leaving	the	EU)	are	not	expecting	any	substantial	changes	to	the	level	of	migration	as	a	result	of	
leaving	the	EU	(Curtice	and	Tipping,	2018).	Instead,	the	study	shows	that	the	question	of	British	
identity	has	seemingly	come	to	play	an	increasingly	central	role	in	people’s	attitudes	toward	Brexit,	
particularly	among	people	in	favour	of	leaving	(ibid.).	This	is	also	reflected	in	a	much	greater	increase	
in	support	of	leaving	the	EU	among	those	who	feel	British	cultural	life	has	been	undermined	by	
immigration	than	those	who	feels	it	has	been	enriched.	Meanwhile,	there	is	no	systemic	evidence	
that	voters’	perceptions	of	the	economic	impacts	of	immigration	has	been	salient	in	driving	opinion	
towards	EU	membership	(ibid.).							
According	to	survey	studies,	British	attitudes	towards	whether	there	should	be	more	or	less	
restrictions	on	migration	has	remained	fairly	constant	over	the	years	(Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	
2017).	While	the	salience	and	actual	levels	of	immigration	have	changed,	and	while	British	people	
have	changed	their	overall	attitudes	towards	the	impact	of	immigration	on	Britain’s	economy	and	
culture,	the	British	public	(typically	in	excess	of	60%)	consistently	report	in	survey	and	public	polling	
that	there	are	too	many	immigrants	in	the	UK	and	that	they	would	like	to	see	immigration	levels	
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reduced	(Ipsos	MORI,	2018;	Ford	and	Heath,	2014;	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	
2014;	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016).	However,	Figure	5	below	shows	that	recent	survey	findings	suggest	
that	this	may	also	have	experienced	in	reduction	in	recent	years	following	the	EU	referendum	
(Blinder	and	Richards,	2018).	In	addition,	people	have	become	more	selective	in	who	to	let	in,	with	
significant	and	increasing	majorities	believing	that	important	criteria	for	selecting	migrants	should	be	
the	ability	to	speak	English,	a	commitment	to	the	British	way	of	life	and	possessing	needed	skills	
(Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017).		
	
Figure	5.	Too	many	immigrants	(polling	from	1964-2018),	British	Election	Study	and	Ipsos	MORI.9		
While	the	headline	aggregate	findings	now	suggest	that	the	UK	public	has	a	fairly	balanced	view	on	
the	economic	impacts	of	immigration,	most	people	don’t	actual	hold	this	balanced	view	(Ford	and	
Lymperopoulou,	2017).	In	practice,	polling	data	and	survey	studies	show	that	people	in	the	UK	are	
either	positive	or	negative	about	the	economic	impacts	of	immigration.	In	fact,	in	a	comparative	
perspective	Britain	is	the	most	divided	country	in	Europe,	and	these	divisions	are	growing	(Ford	and	
Lymperopoulou,	2017).	These	persistent	and	deepening	divides	may	also	help	to	explain	why	
immigration	has	become	more	politically	contentious	at	the	same	time	as	the	overall	public	attitudes	
have	become	more	positive	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	While	some	groups	do	not	see	
immigration	as	an	important	issue,	other	groups	see	immigration	as	an	increasingly	important	issue	
which	is	ever	more	central	to	their	voting	decisions.	This	may	have	contributed	to	creating	the	
impression	of	a	‘population-wide	backlash	against	immigration’	(Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017).	
Similar	to	the	friction	between	the	high	salience	and	the	constraints	in	public	policymaking,	the	
immigration	divide	means	that	a	centrist	compromise	policy,	which	would	match	the	overall	average	
of	public	opinion,	may	backfire	as	it	is	likely	to	satisfy	few	voters	(ibid.).		
																																								 																				
9	Adapted	and	updated	from	Migration	Observatory	Briefing	Paper	(Blinder	and	Richards,	2018).	Sources:	British	Election	
Studies	1964,	1966,	1979,	2015	(Do	you	think	that	too	many	immigrants	have	been	let	into	this	country	or	not?	Yes/	no),	
1983,	1987	(Do	you	think	that	immigration	has	gone	too	far?	Yes/	no);	Ipsos	MORI	1989-2017	(How	much	do	you	agree	or	
disagree	with	the	following	statement?	 ‘There	are	too	many	 immigrants	 in	Britain’	5-point	scale	from	‘strongly	agree’	to	
‘strongly	disagree’).	Ipsos	MORI	allowed	a	‘neither’	response	in	some	years	but	not	others.	
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In	contrast	to	survey	studies	describing	a	deep	divide	in	the	UK	public,	British	Future	has	argued	that	
‘balancers’	represent	the	majority	of	the	British	public.	This	is	reported	in	a	number	of	papers	based	
on	polls	and	focus	groups	with	the	public	(Katwala	et	al.,	2017;	Rutter	and	Carter,	2018;	Katwala	et	
al.,	2014).	While	not	directly	contradicting	the	findings	above	as	British	Future	recognises	that	
around	half	the	population	consist	of	‘rejectionists’	and	‘migration	liberals’	at	either	end	of	the	
immigration	spectrum,	British	Future	also	found	that	a	majority	of	the	British	public	hold	more	
nuanced	views	on	immigration,	capable	of	seeing	both	the	positive	and	negative	aspects	of	
immigration.	Their	reports	also	recognise	that	immigration	is	not	a	politically	salient	issue	for	the	
‘balancers’	which	means	they	are	often	not	heard	in	the	immigration	debate	despite	forming	a	
majority	group.				
2.3	How	are	Britain’s	attitudes	divided?	
Survey	research	shows	that	not	only	are	British	attitudes	on	immigration	divided,	they	are	divided	
along	specific	lines.	Research	analysing	BSA	and	ESS	data	(Ford	et	al.,	2012,	Ford	and	Heath,	2015;	
Heath	and	Richard,	2016;	Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017)	shows	strong	divisions	by	age,	education	
and	social	class.	And	similar	to	the	overall	divide	in	attitudes,	these	divisions	have	been	growing	
since	2002	(Ford	and	Lymperopoulou,	2017).	In	particular	there	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	
between	education	and	pro-immigration	attitudes	(Card	et	al.	2005;	Braakman	et	al.	2017,	
Ivarsflaten	2005)	and	the	likelihood	of	expressing	prejudice	or	discriminate	against	ethnic	minorities	
(Coenders	and	Scheepers	2003;	Vogt	1997).		
In	addition,	there	is	a	strong	generational	divide	over	immigration,	with	older	generations	holding	
more	anti-immigrant	views	than	younger	generations	(Ford,	2011,	2012;	Ford	and	Lymperopoulou	
2017;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014;	Ipsos	MORI,	2014).	Comparative	studies	show	that	the	UK	
generational	divide	is	larger	than	in	other	countries	(Ford,	2012;	Ford	and	Lymperopoulou	2017).	
Longitudinal	survey	studies	show	that	the	generational	gap	didn’t	exist	until	the	mid-1990s	where	
each	generation	was	equally	unconcerned	about	immigration,	but	then	all	generations	increasingly	
started	expressing	concern	about	immigration,	but	at	varying	rates	in	strict	generational	order,	with	
the	concern	of	the	oldest	generations	increasing	most	quickly	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	Other	
analyses	shows	the	generational	differences	may	work	in	parallel	with	a	lifecycle	effect	where	
concern	increases	with	age	(Ipsos	MORI,	2014;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	For	instance,	analysis	
of	the	ESS	and	BSA	found	that	baby	boomers	went	from	being	the	most	positive	generation	in	2002	
to	the	most	negative	ten	years	later	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).		
2.4	What	drives	immigration	attitudes:	Economic	or	cultural	factors?	
There	is	a	large	body	of	academic	literature	examining	the	determinants	of	people’s	attitudes	
towards	immigration.	In	particular,	researchers	have	asked	whether	anti-immigration	attitudes	are	
driven	by	economic	factors	or	socio-cultural	factors,	or	some	combination	of	the	two.	The	debate	
between	economic	and	cultural	factors	can	also	be	framed	as	being	between	interests	and	identities.	
In	both	theories,	a	sense	of	threat	is	a	prior	condition	to	forming	anti-immigration	attitudes;	what	
differs	is	the	nature	of	the	threat,	and	particularly	whether	the	origin	of	the	treat	lies	in	economic	
conditions	or	in	cultural	and	ethnic	factors	(Sides	and	Citrin,	2007).	Other	determinants	that	will	be	
explored	is	whether	and	to	what	extent	contextual	or	informational	factors	affect	attitudes	towards	
immigration.		
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From	the	economic	perspective,	the	opposition	to	immigration	is	rooted	in	economic	considerations.	
Attitudes	are	shaped	by	people’s	concerns	about	the	ethnic	competition	over	scarce	resources,		and	
particularly	that	natives	may	lose	out	due	to	the	higher	immigration	population	(see	Sides	and	Citrin,	
2007;	Citrin	et	al.	1997;	Esses,	Jackson	&	Armstrong,	1998;	Sniderman	et	al.	2004;	Dancygier	and	
Donnely,	2013;	Dustmann	and	Preston,	2006;	Hanson,	Scheve	and	Slaughter,	2007;	Facchini	and	
Mayda,	2009;	Facchini	and	Mayda,	2012;	Malhotra,	Margalit	and	Mo,	2013).	This	concern	can	be	
self-interested	(e.g.	attitudes	are	driven	by	the	perceived	threat	to	one’s	own	material	well-being	
through	loss	of	jobs,	wages,	welfare	benefits	etc.)	or	socially-minded	(e.g.	attitudes	are	driven	by	the	
concern	about	the	impact	on	the	broader	population,	or	on	the	country	and	its	economy)	(Nakata,	
2017;	Citrin	et	al.,	1997;	Hainmueller	and	Hopkins,	2014;	Dustmann	et	al.,	2013).	
As	any	negative	economic	effects	on	the	broader	population	are	very	modest	at	best	(see	previous	
chapter),	it	can	be	difficult	to	explain	why	economic	considerations	produces	such	strength	of	feeling	
about	immigration	among	the	public	(Battison	et	al.,	2014).	However,	all	that	matters	for	generating	
public	attitudes	is	the	perceived	impact	and	in	particular	perceived	localised	and	individual	impacts,	
and	the	evidence	of	the	aggregate	economic	impacts	may	not	feed	into	what	people	perceive	
(Strabac,	2011;	Cornelius	and	Rosenblum,	2005).	Subsequent	sections	in	this	review	and	in	the	
primary	analysis	will	examine	in	more	detail	how	people	perceive	immigration	impacts,	and	how	this	
is	affected	by	information	sources,	evidence	and	media	portrayal.		
The	existing	literature	often	argues	that	people	have	a	very	personalised	understandings	of	what	the	
impact	of	immigration	is	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018;	Katwala	et	al.,	2014).	Focus	group	studies	in	the	
UK	have	shown	that	detailed	and	abstract	economic	arguments	about	fiscal	and	economic	impacts,	
such	as	describing	the	macroeconomic	contribution	migrants	make	to	the	UK,	did	not	resonate	with	
research	participants.	Instead,	it	was	observed	that	economic	impact	is	seen	through	what	they	call	
a	‘common	sense	fiscal	lens’,	in	which	migrants	contribute	positively	if	they	are	in	work	and	pay	
taxes,	and	negatively	if	they	work	off	the	books,	send	money	back	home	to	their	family	or	are	
perceived	as	coming	to	claim	benefits	(ibid.),	and	immigration	is	often	used	as	a	proxy	for	
globalisation	as	the	immigrant	inflows	are	the	most	visible	aspect	of	globalisation	(Brady	et	al.,	
2016).	There	is	also	evidence	to	suggest	to	people	respond	more	strongly	to	information	conveyed	
through	personal	narratives	rather	than	through	statistical	data	and	economic	evidence	(Perloff,	
2010).	As	such,	there	is	not	necessarily	a	contradiction	between	the	lack	of	evidence	on	adverse	
economic	impacts	and	the	literature	that	argues	that	the	economic	threat	drives	anti-immigrant	
attitudes.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	majority	of	the	literature,	which	will	be	reviewed	
below,	does	focus	on	actual	impacts	through	the	focus	on	high	and	low	skilled	workers.				
Following	Borjas	(1999),	a	number	of	studies	have	explored	the	validity	of	this	theory	empirically,	by	
testing	predictions	of	various	models	of	labour	market	competition	and	use	of	public	services.	
However,	the	literature	mostly	tests	the	theory	of	labour	market	competition	in	the	self-interested	
sense,	e.g.	the	prediction	that	individuals	will	oppose	immigration	of	workers	with	similar	skill	levels	
to	their	own	(as	they	compete	directly	in	the	labour	market)	but	support	inflows	of	immigrant	
workers	with	different	skills	levels	(as	they	complement	their	skills	in	the	labour	market)	(Mayda,	
2006).	In	the	pioneering	article	for	this	approach,	Scheve	and	Slaughter	(2001)	found	that	unskilled	
workers	in	the	US	were	more	likely	than	skilled	workers	to	oppose	immigration.	This	is	interpreted	as	
consistent	with	the	labour	market	hypothesis	as	US	immigration	is	predominantly	unskilled.	
Similarly,	in	a	cross-country	study,	Mayda	(2006)	found	that	the	positive	association	between	
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natives’	skill	levels	and	their	support	for	immigration	is	more	pronounced	in	countries	where	natives	
are	more	highly	skilled	compared	to	immigrants,	i.e.	in	countries	where	the	high-skilled	population	
stand	to	benefit	more	from	low-skilled	immigrant	inflows	(O’Rourke	and	Sinnott,	2006).	Both	studies	
show	that	the	skill	effect	only	works	for	people	in	the	labour	force,	which	they	interpret	as	evidence	
for	the	labour	market	hypothesis	(Scheve	and	Slaughter,	2001;	Mayda,	2006).		
Survey	studies	in	the	UK	have	found	correlations	between	anti-immigration	attitudes	and	economic	
vulnerability	and	lower	levels	of	economic	satisfaction,	which	may	indicate	that	economically	
insecure	people	may	worry	more	about	the	competition	from	migrants	(Ford	et	al.,	2012;	Ford	and	
Lymperopoulou,	2017;	Hainmueller	and	Hopkins,	2014;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	Some	studies	
find	that	concerns	about	fiscal	impacts	and	the	effect	on	the	welfare	state	are	more	important	in	
driving	immigration	attitudes	than	labour	market	concerns	(see	Braakman	et	al	2017;	Campbell	et	al.	
2006;	Card	et	al.	2012;	Rustenbach	2010;	Dustmann	and	Preston	2007;	Facchini	and	Mayda,	2007).	
However,	there	is	a	large	literature	that	criticise	these	studies,	both	on	empirical	and	theoretical	
grounds.	Hainmueller	and	Hiscox	(2007)	argue	that	previous	studies	only	indirectly	test	the	labour	
market	hypothesis.	They	argue	that	studies	such	as	the	pioneering	Scheve	and	Slaughter	(2001)	and	
Mayda	(2006)	do	not	really	differentiate	between	low-	and	high-skilled	immigration	but	only	implies	
this	at	a	country	level	as	a	low-or-high	skill	dominant	immigrant	workforce.	Using	the	2003	ESS	data,	
they	show	that	natives	with	higher	skills	are	supportive	of	all	types	of	immigration	regardless	of	their	
skill	level	and	regardless	of	how	they	affect	the	individual’s	exposure	to	labour	market	competition.	
This	is	reinforced	by	a	later	paper	by	Hainmueller	and	Hiscox	(2010)	who	found	no	evidence	that	US	
natives	are	more	likely	to	oppose	immigrants	with	similar	skills	to	their	own,	but	instead	found	
evidence	that	higher	educational	levels	among	natives	is	correlated	with	higher	support	for	both	
high-	and	low-skilled	immigration.	This	finding	is	replicated	among	a	number	of	studies	in	Britain	
(Ford	et	al.,	2012).		
These	findings	point	towards	potential	problems	with	identifying	causality	in	previous	studies,	
arising	from	the	fact	that	education	and	skill-levels	are	closely	related	with	many	other	variables.	
There	are	many	possible	interpretations	for	why	evidence	strongly	shows	that	higher	educational	
levels	are	positively	correlated	with	immigration	attitudes.	One	interpretation	is	the	one	offered	by	
the	economic	literature	that	more	educated	people	are	less	vulnerable	to	labour	market	
competition	(Scheve	and	Slaughter,	2001;	Mayda	2006;	O’Rourke	and	Sinnott,	2006).	Another	
interpretation,	based	on	the	Hainmueller	and	Hiscox	(2007,	2010)	findings,	is	that	people	with	higher	
education	tend	to	be	more	positive	about	the	cultural	impacts	of	immigration	since	they	value	ethnic	
and	cultural		diversity,	and	are	more	tolerant	towards	ethnic	minorities.		
This	interpretation	is	the	basis	for	the	cultural	literature	which	emphasises	the	importance	of	non-
economic	drivers,	and	in	particular	cultural	factors.	According	to	this	perspective,	opposition	to	
immigration	is	driven	by	the	perceived	cultural	threats	caused	by	the	influx	of	foreigners	with	
different	cultural	values	and	customs	(see	Citrin	et	al.,	1997;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Hainmueller	and	
Hiscox,	2007;	Dustmann	and	Preston	2007;	McLaren	2003).	According	to	the	framework	by	Helllwig	
and	Sinno	(2016),	these	are	perceived	threats	to	‘national	identity’	(Sniderman	et	al.,	2004),	religion	
(McDaniel	et	al.,	2011),	values	and	beliefs	(Hainmueller	and	Hiscox,	2007),	ethnic	differences	(Brader	
et	al.,	2008),	and	the	perceived	increase	in	security	threats	and	crime	(McLaren	and	Johnson,	2007;	
Carl,	2016).	In	contrast	to	this,	recent	focus	group	studies	have	found	that	economic	contribution	
dominates	people’s	evaluation	of	migrants	(see	Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	Kaufmann	(2018)	has	
22	|	Post-Brexit	Immigration	Policy:	Reconciling	Public	Perceptions	with	Economic	Evidence	
National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	
argued	that	this	is	people’s	way	of	rationalising	cultural	fears	that	are	often	not	deemed	socially	
appropriate	in	a	focus	group	setting,	though	this	fails	to	explain	why	recent	focus	group	studies	have	
found	a	strong	cultural	theme	especially	focusing	on	anti-Muslim	sentiment	(Rutter	and	Carter,	
2018).		
Other	studies	focusing	on	the	sectoral	perspective	also	provide	support	for	the	cultural	
interpretation.	These	studies	found	that	natives	with	different	skill	levels	working	in	a	wide	variety	of	
sectors	with	different	characteristics	and	migrant	composition	share	similar	immigration	
preferences,	in	particular	the	tendency	to	support	high-skilled	immigration	more	than	low-skilled	
immigration	(Hainmueller	et	al.,	2011).	The	authors	conclude	that	this	finding	is	difficult	to	square	
with	the	labour	market	hypothesis	as	people’s	labour	market	position	does	not	seem	to	be	a	
powerful	predictor	for	immigration	preferences	(ibid.).	Instead,	this	literature	often	finds	that	
people’s	perception	of	cultural	threats	are	more	important	in	driving	their	immigration	attitudes.	
However,	equally,	one	could	argue	that	this	finding	is	consistent	with	the	economic	literature	when	
this	is	framed	in	terms	of	people’s	perception	about	how	migrants	affect	the	country	as	a	whole	
rather	than	the	individual	(Nakata,	2017;	Citrin	et	al.,	1997;	Hainmueller	and	Hopkins,	2014).	
People’s	perception	that	high	skilled	migrants	contribute	more	to	the	country’s	economy	and	public	
services	than	low	skilled	migrants	would	be	an	economic	interpretation	of	this	finding,	and	it	would	
be	aligned	with	the	strong	theme	of	migrants’	contribution	in	recent	focus	group	studies	(Rutter	and	
Carter,	2018).		
To	conclude	this	debate,	although	scholars	have	often	worked	on	the	assumption	that	either	the	
perceived	economic	threat	or	the	perceived	cultural	threat	drives	immigration	attitudes,	it	is	likely	
that	both	types	of	evaluations	are	present	synonymously,	together	affecting	an	individual’s	attitude	
towards	migrants	(Maxwell,	2012,	2013;	Facchini	et	al.,	2010).	Indeed,	British	Future’s	recent	
National	Conversation	report	found	that	while	economic	contribution	was	key	in	people’s	evaluation	
of	migrants,	people	also	attached	importance	to	perceived	social	and	cultural	contribution	including	
whether	immigrants	spoke	English,	and	the	research	identified	a	widespread	anti-Muslim	sentiment	
(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).				
2.5	Informational	factors	
Another	factor	which	can	influence	attitudes	towards	immigration	is	informational	factors.	The	
literature	examines	people’s	knowledge	or	lack	of	knowledge	about	immigration,	and	explore	how	
any	misperceptions	influences	attitudes	towards	immigration,	and	whether	correcting	
misperceptions	affect	opinions.	Furthermore,	the	section	will	also	discuss	where	the	British	public	
get	their	information	on	immigration	from,	and	in	particularly	what	impact	the	media	have	on	
driving	anti-immigration	attitudes.				
2.5.1	Lack	of	knowledge	and	tendency	to	overestimate	
The	main	robust	finding	in	the	literature	is	that	people	are	highly	misinformed	about	immigration.	
Large	misconceptions	exist	about	the	level	and	composition	of	the	immigrant	population,	such	as	by	
country	of	origin,	religion,	reliance	on	welfare	state,	employment	situation,	and	level	of	education	
(Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Blinder,	2015;	Citrin	and	Sides,	2008;	Ipsos	MORI,	2014;	Grigorieff,	2016).	In	
particular,	people	tend	to	overestimate	the	proportion	of	immigration	populations	both	at	the	
national	and	local	level	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Citrin	and	Sides,	2008;	Hopkins,	
Sides	and	Citrin,	2016)	and	even	within	neighbourhoods	(Wong,	2007;	Wong	et	al.,	2012).	The	2009	
BSA	survey	found	that	respondents	overestimated	non-Western	migrants	as	representing	25%	of	the	
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UK	population	compared	to	the	actual	11%	at	the	time	(Blinder,	2015).	While	British	people	are	not	
alone	in	overestimating	the	proportion	of	the	immigration	population,	comparative	studies	have	
found	that	British	people	tend	to	overestimate	more	wildly	than	most	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Ford,	
2012;	Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	In	addition,	people	often	lack	basic	knowledge	about	
immigration	policies	and	trends,	such	as	the	numerical	cap	on	skilled	non-EU	workers	and	the	trends	
in	asylum	applications	(Blinder,	2015).		
The	evidence	suggest	that	people	with	higher	educational	qualifications	tend	to	have	less	biased	
beliefs	about	immigration	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Grigorieff,	2016),	which	is	consistent	with	the	
broader	evidence	base	on	the	relation	between	education	and	misconceptions	(d’Hombres	and	
Nunziata,	2016).	A	recent	paper	also	found	that	people	with	an	immigrant	parent,	the	young	and	
women	were	more	likely	to	overestimate	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018).	In	addition,	research	has	shown	that	
people	who	live	in	areas	with	higher	migrant	shares	and	low-skilled	workers	in	migrant-dominated	
sectors	tend	to	have	more	biased	beliefs,	though	people	who	know	a	migrant	personally	have	less	
biased	perceptions	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018;	Grigorieff,	2016).	These	findings	suggest	that	people’s	
attitudes	are	heavily	affected	by	their	experiences	at	the	local	level	(ibid.).	Some	authors	argue	that	
public	attitudes	are	formed	by	personally	or	social	constructed	conceptions	of	immigration,	and	as	a	
result	framed	by	everyday	experiences	of	integration	at	the	local	level	(Cornelius	and	Rosenblum,	
2005;	Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	Other	literature	argue	that	it	is	not	the	level	of	migration	in	the	local	
area,	but	instead	anti-immigrant	sentiments	are	generated	by	rapid	changes	in	migration	levels	
which	are	more	visible	to	the	local	population	(Hopkins,	2010;	Kaufmann,	2017b).	On	the	other	
hand,	British	survey	studies	have	found	that	people	are	more	likely	to	view	immigration	as	a	
problem	at	the	national	rather	than	the	local	level,	suggesting	that	anti-immigrant	sentiments	are	
generated	by	narratives	and	frameworks	from	the	media	rather	than	local	experiences	(Duffy	and	
Frere-Smith,	2014).		
2.5.2	Relation	between	misconceptions	and	attitudes	
Having	established	that	people	lack	knowledge	and	accurate	information	about	immigration,	some	
studies	have	examined	whether	there	is	a	correlation	between	misconceptions	and	anti-immigration	
attitudes.	Broadly,	a	recent	experimental	survey	study	found	that	simply	making	respondents	think	
about	immigration	ahead	of	answering	questions	about	their	attitudes	causes	attitudes	to	be	more	
negative	(Alesina	et	al.,	2018).	On	an	individual	level,	studies	have	found	that	misconceptions	about	
the	levels	of	immigration	are	correlated	positively	with	perceptions	of	threat	and	negatively	with	
attitudes	towards	the	immigrant	population	(Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Wong,	2007;	Wong	et	al.,	2012;	
Semyonov	et	al.,	2004,	2008).		
However,	these	findings	cannot	establish	whether	the	misconceptions	drive	anti-immigrant	
attitudes.	It	could	be	a	spurious	relationship	in	which	a	third	factor	causes	both	misconceptions	and	
anti-immigration	attitudes,	or	alternatively	there	could	be	reverse	causality	where	people	who	
develop	anti-immigrant	attitudes	report	higher	estimates	of	immigration	levels	to	rationalise	and	
justify	their	attitudes	(Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	Herda,	2010).	This	criticism	is	backed	up	by	several	
experimental	survey	studies	which	found	that	correcting	misinformation	reduces	misperceptions	
about	the	immigration	population	but	fails	to	change	attitudes	towards	immigration	and	policy	
preferences	(Grigorieff,	2016;	Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Lawrence	and	Sides,	
2014).		
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Overall,	there	are	mixed	findings	in	the	broader	literature	on	whether	correcting	misconceptions	
changes	factual	perceptions	and	related	attitudes.	This	literature	can	be	divided	into	three	strands	
(Nyhan	and	Reifler):	the	motivated	resistance	account	in	which	people	resist	the	information	
provided	to	them,	sometimes	even	strengthening	their	misconceptions,	referred	to	as	a	‘backfire	
effect’	(Nyhan	and	Reifler,	2010);	the	belief	updating	account	in	which	people	accept	the	
information	provided	and	update	their	beliefs	(Weeks,	2015;	Wood	and	Porter);	and	finally	the	
interpretations	account	in	which	people	update	their	perception	of	the	factual	information	but	then	
adapt	new	interpretations	to	make	their	existing	attitudes	and	policy	preferences	consistent	with	
the	factual	information	(Nyhan	and	Reifler,	2010;	Kuklinski	et	al.,	2000;	Swire	et	al.,	2017).		
The	existing	literature,	though	it	is	limited,	suggest	that	immigration	attitudes	fall	into	the	third	
account	in	which	people	update	their	beliefs	about	the	factual	information	but	interpret	these	in	a	
manner	consistent	with	their	anti-immigrant	attitudes	(Grigorieff,	2016;	Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	Sides	
and	Citrin,	2007;	Lawrence	and	Sides,	2014).	This	has	a	number	of	implications.	First,	it	directly	
challenges	group	threat	theories	in	which	anti-immigration	attitudes	are	understood	as	a	reaction	to	
the	perception	of	the	level	of	immigration	or	the	accelerating	level	(Sides	and	Citrin,	2007).	Second,	
it	suggests	that	immigration	attitudes	are	grounded	in	stable	psychological	predispositions	which	
enable	people	to	resist	information	that	challenges	their	beliefs	(Sides	and	Citrin,	2007;	Hainmueller	
and	Hopkins,	2014).	A	recent	survey	by	Ipsos	MORI	followed	up	with	people	who	had	significantly	
overestimated	the	size	of	the	immigrant	population	and	asked	them	why	they	thought	they	had	
overestimated	in	order	to	understand	their	conscious	justifications.	The	two	most	common	
responses	both	rejected	the	validity	of	the	official	data	while	other	common	reasons	evolved	around	
the	higher	proportion	of	immigrants	in	their	local	areas,	highlighting	people’s	tendency	to	generalise	
from	personal	experiences	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith,	2014).	
Finally,	this	literature	implicitly	provides	a	major	criticism	to	much	of	the	existing	survey	and	polling	
data	which	is	flawed	in	the	sense	that	it	explores	attitudes	towards	immigration	without	controlling	
for	people’s	knowledge	of	the	issue.		Blinder	(2015)	argues	that	the	evidence	base	from	surveys	and	
polls	is	most	useful	to	understand	how	people	respond	to	immigration	when	talked	about	in	general,	
but	is	less	useful	as	a	guide	to	public	preferences.	This	point	will	be	made	more	elaborate	in	the	
following	sections	about	different	types	of	migrants,	and	people’s	different	perceptions	of	who	the	
migrant	population	compose.			
2.5.3	Sources	of	information	
There	are	many	sources	of	information	on	immigration.	The	first	is	personal	experience,	through	
everyday	contact	with	immigrants	themselves,	or	through	hearing	stories	from	friends	and	
colleagues	(see	Meltzer	et	al.,	2017).	There	is	a	large	literature	on	the	contact	hypothesis	which	
argues	that	interaction	between	different	racial	groups	reduces	social	distances,	and	improves	
perceptions	and	reduces	intergroup	prejudices	(Allport,	1954).	The	alternative	theory	is	known	as	
the	conflict	or	threat	theory	which	argues	that	interactions	are	more	likely	to	lead	to	negative	
attitudes	as	it	activates	a	sense	of	anxiety	among	the	minority	group	(Campbell	1965;	Putnam,	
2007).	People	may	also	be	affected	by	the	opinion	of	other	fellow	citizens.	While	current	polling	data	
suggest	that	British	attitudes	to	immigration	are	softening,	respondents	themselves	report	that	they	
believe	fellow	citizens’	attitudes	are	in	fact	hardening	(Ipsos	MORI,	2017)	which	may	create	a	
bandwagon	effect.	The	second	source	of	information	is	government	policy	which	sets	the	contexts	in	
which	immigration	is	discussed	(Demster	and	Hargrave,	2017).	The	most	obvious	example	is	the	
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target	to	reduce	net	immigration	to	the	‘tens	of	thousands’	which	has	shaped	the	immigration	
debate	towards	a	focus	on	numbers,	and	the	subsequent	inability	to	meet	the	target	may	have	
contributed	to	cementing	the	public	belief	that	immigration	is	out	of	control.	Another	source	of	
information	are	various	interest	groups,	such	as	non-governmental	organisations,	trade	unions,	
employer	associations	and	political	parties,	who	through	narratives	attempt	to	create	a	story	about	
the	impact	of	immigration	often	by	linking	it	to	economic,	security	and	cultural	issues	(Esses	et	al.,	
2017;	Demster	and	Hargrave,	2017;	Hericourt	and	Spielvogel,	2010).	The	main	question	concerning	
the	influence	of	political	narratives	and	government	policy	is	to	what	extent	this	relationship	is	bi-
directional,	e.g.	while	they	set	the	backdrop	for	the	formation	of	public	attitudes,	the	narratives	are	
themselves	often	influenced	by	existing	public	attitudes	on	immigration	(McHugh-Dillion,	2015;	
Demster	and	Hargrave,	2017).	
The	other	main	source	of	information	is	the	media.	A	growing	body	of	work	has	explored	media	
coverage	of	immigration	in	European	countries	and	in	the	UK.	The	literature	highlights	how	
descriptions	and	framing	of	migrant	population	and	movement	are	often	negative	rather	than	
stressing	positive	aspects	of	immigration	(see	Igartua	and	Cheng,	2009).	For	instance,	it	has	been	
described	as	dehumanising	and	creating	a	false	sense	of	social	crisis,	by	describing	refugees	and	
migrants	as	‘swarms’,	‘cockroaches’	and	a	‘plague	of	feral	humans’,	and	by	failing	to	provide	the	
migrant	or	refugee	perspective	(Esses	et	al.,	2017;	Threagold,	2009;	Crawley	et	al.,	2016).	Media	
portrayals	may	be	important	in	reinforcing	or	cultivating	the	cultural	and	economic	story	of	
immigration	threats	(Meltzer	et	al.,	2017;	Boomgaarden	and	de	Vreese,	2007;	Esses	et	al.,	2013).	
Media	publicity	has	focused	on	rise	in	crime	rates	and	security	threat	(Vicol	and	Allen,	2014;	Arendt,	
2010;	Stephan	et	al.,	2005)	and	the	impact	on	social	welfare	and	public	services	such	as	education,	
housing	and	the	NHS	(Berry	et	al.,	2015;	Crawley	and	McMahon,	2016;	Jordan	and	Brown,	2006).	In	
addition,	there	is	a	growing	focus	on	the	scale	of	migration	and	the	lack	of	ability	to	control	those	
numbers	amid	the	Conservative	pledge	to	reduce	net	migration	(Allen,	2016;	Allen	and	Blinder,	
2013;	Threagold,	2009).		
In	addition,	media	portrayal	may	contribute	to	misperceptions	about	migrant	characteristics.	For	
instance,	there	is	a	growing	focus	on	EU	and	Eastern	European	migrants	over	other	geographical	
areas	though	non-EU	nationals	continue	to	clearly	outnumber	EU	migrants	in	the	population	
statistics	(Allen	and	Blinder,	2013).	Similarly,	the	most	common	descriptor	of	the	term	migrants	in	
the	UK	media	is	‘illegal’	across	all	types	of	newspaper	types,	though	immigrants	with	legal	status	far	
outnumber	those	without	legal	status	according	to	population	estimates	(ibid.).	Some	papers	note	
that	the	negative	or	biased	media	environment	has	been	sustained	over	a	long	time,	therefore	
potentially	cumulatively	‘cultivating’	negative	attitudes	on	immigration	(Domke,	2001).			
While	it	is	clear	that	migrants	are	negatively	portrayed	in	the	UK	media	landscape,	it	is	harder	to	
provide	evidence	of	the	link	between	media	portrayals	and	public	attitudes.	It	is	often	observed	that	
the	press	is	good	at	setting	the	agenda,	i.e.	choosing	what	stories	and	themes	the	public	should	think	
about	it,	and	how	they	should	think	about	them	by	linking	them	together	to	specific	narratives	
(Allen,	2016;	Chong	and	Druckman,	2007).	But	as	pointed	out	earlier,	it	is	harder	to	determine	to	
what	extent	this	is	bi-directional,	i.e.	that	people’s	attitudes	determine	what	stories	the	media	cover.	
However,	there	is	a	growing	literature	suggesting	that	media	affects	people’s	political	attitudes	and	
specifically	on	immigration	(see	review	in	Meltzer	et	al.,	2017).				
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2.6	Attitudes	towards	different	types	of	migrants	
Another	similar	criticism	of	most	of	the	reviewed	literature	is	that	it	typically	examines	attitudes	
towards	immigrants	or	immigration	as	a	whole,	and	fails	to	take	into	account	what	people	
understand	by	the	term	‘immigrant’	(Blinder,	2015;	Ford,	2011).’10	Each	survey	respondent	answers	
on	the	basis	of	their	(unstated/unknown)	understanding	of	what	immigration	is	and	who	
‘immigrants’	are.	This	is	a	problem	because	many	people	lack	knowledge	about	the	composition	of	
different	types	of	migrants	in	the	population	(Blinder,	2015),	and	more	fundamentally,	surveys	fail	to	
capture	the	public’s	multifaceted	perception	of	what	an	immigrant	is	and	what	type	of	migrant	is	
most	valued	(Verkuyten	et	al.,	2018).	In	particular,	when	asked	about	the	value	of	immigration,	the	
public	often	have	specific	types	of	immigrants	in	mind;	for	instance	they	tend	to	focus	on	asylum	
seekers	and	permanent	arrivals	while	ignoring	international	students	and	temporary	arrivals	
(Blinder,	2015;	Blinder	et	al.,	2011).	Particularly	in	a	media	environment	where	refugees,	asylum	
seekers	and	migrants	are	conflated,	public	attitudes	as	expressed	in	surveys	may	only	reflect	each	
respondent’s	opinion	on	a	subset	of	migrants	in	the	UK	(Baker	et	al.,	2008).	This	highlights	that	the	
public	may	perceive	‘immigration’	very	differently	than	the	government	and	official	statistics	do	
(Blinder,	2015).	Blinder	(2015)	argues	that	while	the	government	sees	immigration	through	a	
statistical	lens,	the	public	constructs	their	opinions	from	a	varied	set	of	sources	including	by	
interpreting	their	social	and	political	surroundings.	This	is	what	Blinder	(2015)	terms	‘imagined	
immigration.’			
This	difference	in	perceptions	about	immigration	is	a	problem	because	evidence	shows	that	public	
attitudes	vary	substantially	towards	different	types	of	immigrants,	with	some	being	regarded	as	
‘desired’	or	‘acceptable’	and	vice	versa.		Studies	show	that	the	perceived	level	of	acceptability	or	
desirability	vary	by	different	types	of	migrants	(Brader	et	al.,	2008;	Adida	et	al.,	2016;	Ford	2011;	
Hainmueller	and	Hangartner,	2013).	Furthermore,	attitudes	vary	by	the	migrant’s	race,	ethnicity,	
class,	skill-level,	region	and	country	of	origin	etc.	(Blinder,	2015;	Ford,	2011;	Sniderman	et	al.,	2004;	
Hainmueller	and	Hopkins,	2015;	McLaren	and	Johnson,	2007;	Adida	et	al.,	2016;	Brader	et	al.,	2008;	
Strabac	and	Listhaug,	2008;).	As	an	example,	Blinder	et	al.	(2011)	explored	the	large	majority	of	
British	people	who	favour	reducing	the	level	of	immigration	to	the	UK,	and	found	that	opposition	
particularly	centred	on	illegal	immigration,	asylum	seekers,	refugees,	extended	family	members	and	
low-skilled	workers,	while	other	groups	were	not	as	prevalent	in	driving	this	view,	in	particular	high-
skilled	workers,	immediate	family	members	and	students	(ibid.).					
One	of	the	most	clear	distinctions	found	in	the	literature	is	the	higher	acceptance	of	high-skilled	
workers	and	occupations	compared	to	low-skilled	(Hainmueller	and	Hiscox,	2010;	Crawley,	2005;	
Ford,	2011,	2012;	Blinder	et	al.,	2011;	Katwala	et	al.,	2017;	Blinder,	2016;	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016).	
Recent	research	shows	that	people	attach	greater	importance	to	skill-level	which	overrides	concerns	
related	to	other	factors	such	as	country	of	origin	and	religion	(Blinder	&	Markaki,	2018;	Heath	and	
Richards,	2018).	The	importance	of	skill-level	is	thought	to	be	related	to	the	perceived	economic	
benefits	of	welcoming	high-skilled	migrants	due	to	their	ability	to	support	themselves	or	to	
contribute	to	specific	parts	of	the	welfare	state	such	as	healthcare.	As	a	consequence,	while	there	is	
																																								 																				
10	Furthermore,	it	is	unclear	in	many	surveys	and	polls	how	immigration	is	defined	(Crawley,	2005).	Even	where	
surveys	 have	 defined	 the	 term,	 such	 as	 the	 BSA	 definition	 of	 immigrants	 as	 ‘permanent	 settlers’,	 this	 have	
contradicted	the	UN	definition	that	they	UK	government	uses	which	defines	anyone	who	stays	for	more	than	
12	months	as	an	immigrant	(Blinder,	2015).	
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majority	support	for	reducing	immigration	for	low-skilled	workers,	only	a	minority	of	the	UK	public	
supports	reducing	immigration	of	high-skilled	workers	(Blinder	et	al.,	2011).	But	there	is	a	lack	of	
evidence	on	how	survey	respondents	understand	the	definitions	of	high-	and	low-skilled	workers.		
There	might	be	a	fairly	large	discrepancy	between	how	government	authorities	define	skill-level	and	
how	the	public	perceives	it.	For	instance,	existing	non-EEA	immigration	policy	defines	high-skills	
based	on	a	salary	threshold	of	£30,000,	which	excludes	many	professions,	particularly	public	roles	
such	as	nursing	and	teaching,	which	are	highly	valued	among	the	public	(see	discussion	in	Home	
Affairs	Committee,	2018).	It	is	possible	that	low-skill	workers	(which	are	often	described	as	low-paid	
workers	in	surveys)	are	seen	as	a	proxy	for	low-contributors.							
Another	clear	distinction	is	by	immigrants’	country	of	origin,	which	may	be	understood	as	a	proxy	for	
other	factors	such	as	religion,	language	and	cultural	factors.	Survey	studies	show	a	clear	pattern	
where	British	people	are	more	accepting	of	white,	English-speaking,	European	and	Christian	
countries	compared	to	non-white,	non-Europeans	and	Muslim	countries	(Carl,	Richards	and	Heath,	
2018).	This	has	been	described	as	an	‘ethnic	hierarchy’	in	the	literature	(Ford,	2011).	Widespread	
opposition	to	migrants	from	Romania	is	often	highlighted	as	an	interesting	anomaly	from	this	
pattern,	and	thought	to	be	caused	by	an	association	with	Roma	(Vicol	and	Allen,	2014;	Blinder	and	
Richards,	2018).	The	literature	is	surprisingly	sparse	regarding	public	attitudes	to	EU	versus	non-EU	
migration,	but	a	recent	European	study	found	that	not	only	do	few	Europeans	register	a	preference	
for	EU	migrants,	they	also	attach	greater	importance	to	high-skilled	migrants	regardless	of	whether	
they	are	from	the	EU	or	not	(Blinder	and	Markaki,	2018).										
Ford	and	Heath	(2014)	explored	people’s	views	of	four	different	types	of	migrants:	student	migrants,	
EU	working	migrants,	non-EU	working	migrants,	and	spousal	reunions,	and	found	that	assessments	
of	student	migrants	were	more	positive	and	spousal	reunions	most	negative,	irrespective	of	a	
person’s	overall	views	of	immigration.	The	2011	BSA	examined	this	further	with	a	series	of	
randomised	survey	experiments,	and	found	that	skill	level,	educational	quality,	time	in	the	country	
and	reason	for	migration	all	had	substantial	effects	on	the	perception	of	the	migrants	(Ford	et	al.,	
2012).	They	also	found	interaction	effects:	for	instance,	the	influence	of	origin	region	were	largest	
for	views	on	family	reunion	and	low-skilled	migrants	and	smallest	for	high-skilled	workers	and	
students.	In	other	words,	where	a	migrant	comes	from	seem	to	matter	less	when	they	have	
something	to	offer	economically	(ibid.).		
This	observation	is	backed	up	by	the	emerging	focus	group	literature,	in	which	the	perceived	
contribution	of	migrants	is	found	to	be	a	central	theme	in	people’s	attitudes	towards	immigration	
(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018;	Gaston,	2018;		Newman	et	al.,	2017).	Often,	the	distinction	is	made	
between	migrants	who	are	self-supporting	through	employment	and	paying	taxes,	and	migrants	
who	claim	benefits,	send	money	home	and	rely	on	the	welfare	state	without	giving	anything	in	
return	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018;	Gaston,	2018).	Related	to	this,	focus	group	research	finds	that	the	
concept	of	ensuring	that	there	are	appropriate	controls	to	make	sure	that	migrants	make	a	positive	
contribution,	often	outweighing	the	concern	over	numbers	(Newman	et	al.,	2017).	This	is	often	
reflected	in	a	support	of	an	Australian-style	points	based	system,	which	British	Future	found	
appeared	to	be	‘a	shorthand	for	a	controlled	and	selective	immigration	system	that	meets	the	
economy’s	needs’	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	This	literature	also	provides	another	perspective	to	the	
sharp	distinction	between	high	and	low-skilled	migration.	Focus	group	research	shows	that	public	
support	centres	more	around	migration	that	is	economically	beneficial	and	socially	useful	rather	
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than	necessarily	high-skilled	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018;	Gaston,	2018,	Newman	et	al.,	2017).	This	is	
demonstrated	by	high	ratings	and	support	for	immigrants	with	jobs	offers	or	skills	in	area	of	skill	
shortages	even	if	these	by	definition	are	low-skilled	(Newman	et	al.,	2017).	People	also	tend	to	
support	low-skilled	immigrants	more	when	questions	are	asked	specifically	about	their	job,	such	as	
fruit-picking,	rather	than	in	generic	terms	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	Generally,	the	literature	
suggests	that	people	have	a	different	perspective	of	the	definition	of	low	and	high-skilled	work	(see	
Home	Affairs	Committee,	2018).					
Considering	the	evidence	that	people’s	attitudes	vary	by	different	migrant	characteristics,	it	is	no	
surprise	that	there	is	also	evidence	that	people’s	‘imagined	immigration’,	i.e.	their	beliefs	about	the	
composition	of	migrants	in	the	UK	population,	is	strongly	associated	with	their	attitudes	(Blinder,	
2013,	2015).	Those	who	view	immigrants	as	asylum	seekers	and	permanent	immigrants	are	more	
likely	to	support	reductions	in	immigration	levels	(ibid.).	Similarly	to	previously	discussed	theories	
about	correcting	misperceptions	about	levels	of	migration,	this	misperception	about	migration	
composition	may	in	itself	be	the	driver	of	anti-immigration	attitudes,	or	alternatively	people’s	anti-
immigration	attitude	lead	them	to	overestimate	their	assumptions	about	the	levels	of	‘undesired’	
migrants	to	internally	justify	and	rationalise	their	attitude.		
Some	evidence	also	suggests	that	different	migrants	are	associated	with	different	immigration	
concerns.	An	experimental	survey	study	in	Britain	by	Hellwig	and	Sinno	(2016),	in	which	respondents	
were	randomly	assigned	to	three	groups	(Muslims,	Eastern	Europeans	or	a	control	group	with	no	
specific	group	label),	found	that	an	issue	context	can	diminished	support	for	one	type	of	immigrant	
and	boost	it	for	another.	For	instance,	framing	immigration	in	terms	of	security	concerns	or	cultural	
threat	negatively	affected	attitudes	towards	Muslim	migrants	while	framing	in	terms	of	economic	
concerns	or	crime	threat	negatively	affected	attitudes	towards	Eastern	Europeans	(ibid.).	A	recent	
paper	also	explored	threat	perceptions	of	migrants	in	Britain,	examining	attitudes	towards	EU	and	
non-EU	migrants	(Stansfield	and	Stone,	2018).	They	also	found	differences	in	the	threat	perception	
between	migrants,	with	criminal	threat	eliciting	a	greater	support	for	reducing	the	rights	of	EU	
migrants,	compared	to	when	framing	in	terms	of	economic	concerns	(ibid.).	These	papers	link	back	
to	the	debate	about	whether	it	is	economic	or	cultural	considerations	that	drive	immigration	
attitudes.	They	suggest	that	it	may	be	both,	but	this	may	vary	for	different	groups	of	migrants.			
The	evidence	points	to	the	importance	of	migrant	motivations	as	one	of	the	underlying	reasons	for	
the	different	preferences	between	different	types	of	migrants.	Recent	poll	data	shows	that	
respondents	had	very	different	reactions	to	migrants	depending	on	their	original	motivation	to	
migrate	(Migration	Observatory,	2011;	Ford	and	Heath	2014).	The	motivations	of	migrants	can	be	
divided	into	‘voluntary’	and	‘involuntary’	motivations,	which	are	found	to	be	directly	affected	with	
who	people	perceived	to	be	‘deserving’	and	‘undeserving’	migrants.	An	experimental	vignette	study	
among	15	European	countries	including	the	UK	found	that	migrants	who	immigrate	for	economic	
reasons	are	less	accepted	than	those	who	faced	political	or	religion	persecution	in	their	home	
country	(Bansak	et	al.,	2016).	Similarly,	a	study	in	the	Netherlands	found	that	people	expressed	more	
empathy	and	support	for	the	rights	of	newly	arrived	migrants	when	they	had	been	forced	to	leave	
their	country	of	origin	(Verkuyten	et	al.,	2018).	In	contrast,	people	expressed	less	support	and	more	
feelings	of	anger	towards	migrants	who	were	described	as	being	responsible	for	their	own	situation	
(ibid.).	This	distinction	is	also	made	in	the	literature	on	refugees	where	public	debate	often	centres	
around	‘real	refugees’	compared	to	‘fortune	seekers’	and	‘bogus	refugees’	(Verkuyten,	2014).		
29	|	Post-Brexit	Immigration	Policy:	Reconciling	Public	Perceptions	with	Economic	Evidence	
National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	
2.7.	Attitudes	of	immigrants	themselves	
The	body	of	literature	examining	attitudes	of	immigrants	themselves	is	still	limited	but	is	potentially	
interesting	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	the	evidence	shows	that	it	is	often	immigrants	themselves	who	
are	under	more	threat	economically	as	they	tend	to	have	more	similar	skills	to	incoming	immigrants	
and	as	such	may	be	more	likely	to	express	concerns	about	immigration	on	the	basis	of	self-
interested	economic	concerns.	On	the	other	hand,	migrants	may	be	less	prone	to	cultural	concerns	
as	they	may	share	the	cultural	traits	of	immigrants	or	be	more	supportive	of	multiculturalism.	
Broadly,	the	literature	shows	that	earlier	and	more	recent	immigrants	differ	in	their	views	about	
immigration	(Braakmann	et	al.,	2017).	A	recent	study	on	immigrants	in	England	and	Wales	show	that	
immigrants	who	have	been	in	the	UK	for	longer	are	similar	to	natives	in	their	opposition	to	
immigration	while	those	who	have	recently	arrived	tend	to	be	more	pro-immigration	(ibid.).	This	
may	reflect	some	interesting	time	effects	as	migrated	people	integrate	into	their	new	country	and	
become	more	similar	in	terms	of	cultural	and	economic	characteristics.	In	turn,	as	more	studies	in	
this	field	emerge,	this	may	be	able	to	make	significant	contributions	to	the	literature	on	the	drivers	
of	anti-immigration	attitudes.	
2.7.	Summary	
This	section	has	outlined	existing	evidence	on	public	attitudes	to	immigration	in	the	UK.	It	shows	
how	opposition	to	immigration	have	been	widespread	in	the	UK,	though	the	public	has	turned	more	
positive	in	recent	years	and	particularly	after	the	Brexit	referendum.	At	the	same	time,	survey	and	
polling	data	shows	that	the	British	public	are	divided	according	to	generational,	educational	and	
social	lines,	and	that	these	divisions	are	growing.	The	section	also	explored	the	existing	evidence	on	
what	drives	immigration	attitudes	including	the	prominent	debate	as	to	whether	it	is	cultural	and	
economic	factors	that	drive	anti-immigration	sentiments.	
Given	the	inconsistencies	between	the	economic	evidence	(see	Appendix	1)	and	public	opinion	on	
immigration	impacts,	our	review	of	the	literature	then	explored	how	informational	factors	influence	
immigration	attitudes.	The	evidence	shows	that	people	are	highly	misinformed	about	the	migrant	
population	and	immigration	policies,	and	that	misconceptions	about	levels	of	immigration	are	
typically	correlated	with	more	negative	attitudes	towards	the	immigrant	population,	though	it	is	
unclear	whether	people’s	misconceptions	drive	negative	attitudes	or	vice	versa.	Experimental	survey	
studies	have	shown	that	correcting	misinformation	does	reduce	misperceptions	about	the	
immigration	population	but	fails	to	change	attitudes	and	policy	preferences.		
The	review	identifies	one	limitation	of	these	studies.	Typically,	the	intervention	that	corrects	
misperceptions	only	focuses	on	correcting	one	small	element	of	misinformation	related	to	the	
number	of	immigrants,	and	this	piece	of	information	is	provided	as	part	of	the	survey.	Our	study	
focuses	on	the	misperception	of	the	economic	impacts	of	immigration,	and	provides	this	information	
through	a	video	at	a	focus-group	setting,	after	subjects	are	exposed	to	different	treatments	that	are	
meant	to	control	for	well-known	biases.	This	will	be	explained	in	more	detail	in	the	following	
sections.			 	
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3.	SURVEY	FINDINGS	
This	section	and	the	next	present	the	findings	of	our	empirical	research.	In	this	section,	we	explain	
our	analysis	of	the	survey	data	and	our	hypotheses,	and	why	we	believe	our	approach	did	not	bring	
about	a	change	in	immigration	attitudes.	We	then	present	the	main	focus	group	findings	
thematically.	Finally,	we	draw	some	conclusions,	focused	particularly	on	how	the	nature	of	the	
debate	on	immigration	might	be	improved	through	a	greater	understanding	of	the	drivers	of	opinion	
and	use	of	evidence.		
3.1.	Survey	questions	and	experimental	design		
The	data	collected	through	the	surveys	and	focus	groups	were	analysed	quantitatively	and	
qualitatively.	Our	quantitative	analysis	focused	on	changes	in	responses	on	the	different	questions	
between	the	three	points	at	which	participants	filled	out	survey:	at	recruitment,	immediately	after	
having	watched	the	video	in	the	focus	group,	and	then	again	two	weeks	after	the	focus	group.	In	
what	follows,	we	will	refer	to	these	time-points	as	pre,	post,	and	follow-up,	respectively.	All	
reliability	estimates	are	provided	at	the	initial	time-point	(pre).	
Several	of	the	items	on	the	questionnaire	were	combined	into	scales.	Specifically,	three	questions	
gauging	participants’	agreement	with	statements	to	the	effect	that	EU	migrants	take	jobs	from	
British	workers,	drive	down	wages	for	British	workers,	and	have	helped	create	jobs	in	the	UK	were	
combined	(after	reverse	scoring	items	where	necessary)	to	construct	a	scale	for	economic	
perceptions,	with	higher	scorers	being	more	positive	about	the	economic	impact	of	EU	immigration	
(alpha	=	0.76).	Four	questions	gauging	participants’	agreement	with	statements	to	the	effect	that	EU	
migrants	contribute	more	in	taxes	than	they	spend	on	public	services,	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	
NHS,	have	a	negative	impact	on	schools,	and	have	a	negative	impact	on	housing,	were	combined	
(again,	after	having	reverse	scored	items	where	necessary)	to	construct	a	scale	for	fiscal	perceptions,	
with	higher	scores	being	more	positive	about	the	fiscal	impact	of	EU	immigration	on	the	UK	(alpha	=	
0.86).		
The	primary	form	of	analysis	was	non-parametric,	given	the	ordinal	nature	of	the	items	and	scales.	
Specifically,	overall	longitudinal	changes	(ignoring	experimental	conditions)	were	analysed	by	way	of	
Wilcoxon	signed	rank	tests	with	continuity	correction.	The	effects	of	individual	experimental	
conditions	were	analysed	by	calculating	the	difference	in	response	between	pre	and	post,	
representing	short-term	effects,	and	separately	for	post	and	follow-up,	representing	longer-term	
effects,	and	then	running	a	Kruskal-Wallis	rank	sum	test	to	identify	any	significant	differences	
between	any	of	the	conditions,	with	a	Dunn’s	multiple	comparison	test	for	any	post	hoc	analysis.	
As	noted	at	the	outset,	our	main	aim	was	to	investigate	whether	policy	preferences	could	be	moved	
if	participants	were	informed	about	the	economic	impact	of	immigration	following	interventions	
controlling	for	well-known	biases.	This	meant	that,	in	addition	to	aforementioned	scales	of	fiscal	and	
economic	perceptions,	one	item	was	of	particular	interest	to	us,	namely:	‘The	Government	should	
use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	EU	immigration’	(1	=	Strongly	disagree;	2	=	Disagree;	3	=	
Neither	agree	nor	disagree;	4	=	Agree;	5	=	Strongly	agree).	This	was	our	main	policy	item,	which	also	
can	be	expected	to	tap	into	the	sentiments	that	crop	up	in	large-scale	surveys	regarding	the	desire	
on	the	part	of	people	in	the	UK	to	reduce	the	number	of	immigrants.	As	such,	we	can	formulate	the	
following	hypotheses:	
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Listening	Hypothesis:	Following	an	intervention	designed	to	make	people	feel	listened	to	and	
the	subsequent	provision	of	information	about	the	economic	and	fiscal	impact	of	EU	
immigration	on	the	UK,	we	should	see	significant	movement	(i)	in	a	positive	direction	in	
regards	to	economic	and	fiscal	perceptions,	and	(ii)	away	from	agreement	with	the	statement	
that	the	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	EU	immigration,	
compared	to	the	control	group.	
Biased	Assimilation	Hypothesis:	Following	an	intervention	designed	to	reduce	biased	
assimilation	of	evidence	and	the	subsequent	provision	of	information	about	the	economic	and	
fiscal	impact	of	EU	immigration	on	the	UK,	we	should	see	significant	movement	(i)	in	a	positive	
direction	in	regards	to	economic	and	fiscal	perceptions,	and	(ii)	away	from	agreement	with	the	
statement	that	the	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	EU	
immigration,	compared	to	the	control	group.	
In-group	Favouritism	Hypothesis:	Following	an	intervention	designed	to	reduce	in-group	bias	
and	the	subsequent	provision	of	information	about	the	economic	and	fiscal	impact	of	EU	
immigration	on	the	UK,	we	should	see	significant	movement	(i)	in	a	positive	direction	in	
regards	to	economic	and	fiscal	perceptions,	and	(ii)	away	from	agreement	with	the	statement	
that	the	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	EU	immigration,	
compared	to	the	control	group.	
3.2.	Survey	results			
As	we	explained	above,	we	surveyed	focus	group	participants	at	three	points	in	the	research:	pre,	
post,	and	follow-up.	In	this	section,	we	present	the	findings	of	the	survey	carried	out	at	the	pre	
stage.	The	next	section	will	then	discuss	any	changes	to	the	post	and	follow-up	stage.	
As	indicated	by	our	two	policy	survey	items,	participants	wanted	to	see	the	Government	use	Brexit	
as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	on	EU	immigration	(median	response	of	4;	1	=	Strongly	Disagree,	2	=	
Agree,	3	=	Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree,	4	=	Agree,	5	=	Strongly	Agree)	and	for	the	UK	to	rely	on	its	
own	skill	rather	than	on	EU	immigration	(median	response	of	4).		
Our	scales	for	economic	and	financial	perceptions	suggested	fairly	neutral	views	on	the	economic	
impact	of	EU	immigration	(median	score	of	3	on	a	scale	from	1	to	5,	with	higher	numbers	being	more	
positive)	and	slightly	more	negative	perceptions	on	fiscal	impact	(median	score	of	2.5).		
There	were	some	concerns	about	there	being	too	many	EU	immigrants	in	the	UK	(median	response	
of	4;	1	=	Strongly	Disagree,	2	=	Agree,	3	=	Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree,	4	=	Agree,	5	=	Strongly	Agree).	
Interestingly,	participants	seemed	less	concerned	when	asked	whether	there	were	too	many	EU	
immigrants	in	their	local	area	(median	response	of	3).	
The	survey	did	not	suggest	that	participants	were	particularly	concerned	about	there	being	too	
many	cultures	coming	into	the	country	(median	response	of	3;	1	=	Strongly	Disagree,	2	=	Agree,	3	=	
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree,	4	=	Agree,	5	=	Strongly	Agree).	
3.3.	Movements	in	responses	over	time			
We	looked	for	any	changes	in	responses	over	time	that	might	indicate	that	the	focus	group	methods	
and	discussions	had	an	impact	on	participants’	attitudes.	A	summary	of	changes	in	responses	over	
time	for	the	main	items	and	scales	can	be	found	in	Appendix	4.	As	the	data	is	ordinal,	we	are	
32	|	Post-Brexit	Immigration	Policy:	Reconciling	Public	Perceptions	with	Economic	Evidence	
National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	
reporting	responses	at	the	pre-stage	in	terms	of	the	median	response.	However,	we	have	reported	
changes	in	responses	across	time	in	terms	of	means11.		
The	first	thing	to	note	is	that	we	see	a	statistically	significant	movement	in	a	positive	direction	from	
pre	(i.e.,	at	recruitment)	to	post	(i.e.,	after	the	participants	had	seen	the	video)	on	our	scales	for	
economic	and	fiscal	perceptions,	together	with	a	significant	negative	movement,	signifying	a	
movement	away	from	agreement	with	the	statement	that	the	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	
opportunity	to	cut	down	on	immigration.	This	is	consistent	with	the	participants	having	been	moved	
in	a	positive	direction	as	a	result	of	the	information	provided	in	the	video,	and	consequently	
experiencing	a	shift	in	their	policy	preferences	regarding	numbers.	This	shift	then	waned	in	the	
period	from	post	video	to	the	follow-up	survey	two	weeks	later.	However,	it	is	not	possible	to	
ascribe	these	changes	to	participation	in	the	focus	groups	since	we	lack	a	control	group	of	people	
who	did	not	attend.		
The	second	thing	to	note	is	that	we	found	no	statistically	significant	differences	in	movements	in	
attitudes	between	participants	in	the	different	focus	group	conditions,	compared	to	the	control	
group.	Figure	6	offers	an	illustrative	and	representative	example	of	the	degree	of	similarity	we	saw	
across	conditions	with	respect	to	any	movements	in	responses	on	our	main	policy	item,	in	this	case	
from	pre	to	post.	
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Figure	6.	Change	in	participants’	agreement	with	the	statement	‘The	Government	should	
use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	on	immigration’	from	recruitment	(pre)	to	after	
having	watched	the	video	(post).	
																																								 																				
11	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 changes	 are	 small,	 and	would	 tend	 to	be	obscured	 if	 reported	 in	 terms	of	
changes	in	medians.	For	that	reason,	means	offer	a	better	sense	of	the	central	tendency	of	movements	across	
time,	although	their	exact	magnitude	of	course	should	be	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt,	given	the	ordinal	nature	of	
the	responses.	Note,	moreover,	that	none	of	the	statistical	tests	have	been	performed	on	mean	values—again,	
respecting	the	fact	that	our	data	is	ordinal.	
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Given	the	absence	of	any	statistically	significant	differences	across	conditions,	we	are	unable	to	
reject	the	null	hypotheses	corresponding	to	our	three	hypotheses	above	(Section	3.1.).	It	is	possible	
that	this	is	due	to	the	relatively	small	samples	and	resulting	lack	of	power.	Alternatively,	the	
interventions	did	not	make	any	difference.	While	our	experiment	doesn’t	settle	the	matter,	existing	
evidence	suggests	that	the	latter	is	the	more	likely	possibility	between	the	two.	In	other	words,	
given	that	attempts	prior	to	ours	to	move	people’s	policy	preferences	by	providing	information	
about	its	fiscal,	and	more	generally	economic,	impact	have	failed	to	do	so,	one	might	reasonably	
look	at	our	results	as	another	instance	of	this	happening.	
At	the	same	time,	the	focus	groups	generated	rich	and	detailed	qualitative	data	on	the	opinions,	
views	and	perspectives	of	a	set	of	people	on	a	major	policy	question	at	an	historic	point	in	time	for	
the	UK.	In	this	respect,	the	focus	group	discussions	go	beyond	much	existing	research	by	potentially	
offering	explanations	for	why	people	hold	particular	views,	rather	than	simply	describing	the	views	
that	they	hold.	The	findings	also	suggest	ways	in	which	public	understanding	about	immigration	
might	be	improved	and	how	concerns	and	misconceptions	might	be	addressed.	We	now	turn	to	
these	findings.		
4.	FOCUS	GROUP	FINDINGS		
4.1.	Introduction		
Focus	group	discussions	were	wide	ranging.	While	we	used	a	topic	guide	which	varied	according	to	
the	experimental	condition,	this	guide	was	used	in	a	semi-structured	way	so	that	discussions	were	
guided	by	the	group	around	the	following	core	questions:		
• What	evidence	should	be	considered	when	assessing	the	impacts	of	immigration?	
• What	measures	is	the	Government	going	to	take	on	immigration	post	Brexit?	
• What	evidence	would	you	be	looking	for	to	be	reassured	that	the	Government	delivers	
what	you	would	like	it	to	do	on	immigration?		
• What	is	more	important	to	you:	control	or	numbers?			
As	we	explained	earlier,	we	commissioned	a	short	video	presenting	the	evidence	on	the	impact	of	
immigration	on	jobs	and	wages	and	showed	this	to	all	focus	groups	before	the	main	discussion.	
Questions	on	evidence	were	therefore	designed	to	relate	to	the	evidence	summarised	in	the	video.	
Participants	in	the	‘devil’s	advocate’	and	‘listening’	conditions	were	asked	what	their	main	concerns	
were	about	the	economic	impacts	of	EU	migration	on	Britain.	In	effect,	however,	all	groups	covered	
this	issue	since	it	was	also	the	main	subject	of	the	video.	Those	in	the	‘listening’	groups	were	also	
asked	whether	people	ever	ask	for	their	views	on	immigration,	who	these	people	are,	and	whether	
participants	wish	people	would	ask	for	their	views	more	often.	
Our	analysis	of	the	interview	transcripts	found	a	number	of	key	themes	in	responses	across	focus	
groups12.	This	included:		
• the	labour	market	impacts	of	migration,	focusing	on	jobs,	skills	and	wages;		
																																								 																				
12	Focus	 groups	 were	 analysed	 using	 a	 framework	 approach	 in	 NVivo.	 This	 process	 comprises	 of	 coding	
responses	 and	 identifying	 themes	 from	 the	 accounts,	 explanations,	 views	 and	 perspectives	 of	 research	
participants.		
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• impact	on	public	services,	with	discussion	around	entitlement	and	contribution;		
• culture	 and	 integration,	 exploring	 ideas	 around	enrichment	 and	 the	perceived	 cultural	
threat	of	migrant	communities;	and		
• concerns	about	crime.		
Our	presentation	of	evidence	is	structured	around	these	key	themes,	starting	with	perceptions	of	
the	impacts	of	immigration.	We	then	look	at	sources	of	evidence	which	influence	perceptions	before	
looking	at	what	participants	would	like	to	see	from	new,	post-Brexit	immigration	policies.	
4.2.	Perceptions	of	the	impacts	of	immigration		
In	keeping	with	the	aims	and	objectives	of	the	project,	discussions	within	the	focus	groups	were	
wide-ranging	but	focused	strongly	on	economic	impacts.	In	presenting	the	findings	of	the	discussions	
we	divide	the	issues	covered	into	three	thematic	areas:	jobs	and	skills;	entitlement	and	contribution;	
and	culture	and	integration.	While	largely	presenting	focus	group	discussion	data,	we	also	refer	to	
participants’	responses	to	the	three	surveys	on	their	immigration	views.	This	serves	as	a	reminder	
that	our	sample	has	particular	characteristics,	that	they	are	not	representative	of	the	public	more	
widely,	although	their	views	are	affecting	the	direction	of	policy.		
4.2.1.	Impact	on	Jobs	and	Skills	
As	we	described	above,	participants	were	surveyed	for	their	views	on	the	impacts	of	immigration,	
with	questions	focused	on	the	economic	impacts.	Participants	were	asked	whether	the	following	
groups	of	migrants	are	good	or	bad	for	the	UK	economy:	
• High-skilled	EU	migrants	
• Low-skilled	EU	migrants	
• Students	from	the	EU	
• Asylum	seekers	and	refugees				
As	can	be	seen	from	Figure	7	below,	participants	tended	to	view	high-skilled	immigrants	as	good	for	
the	UK	economy.	Participants’	views	on	low-skilled	immigrants	were	more	or	less	evenly	split,	with	a	
third	feeling	they	are	bad,	a	third	being	neutral,	and	a	third	feeling	they	were	good	for	the	economy.	
Views	of	students	were	more	positive	than	of	low-skilled	migrants,	with	almost	half	seeing	students	
as	good	for	the	economy.	Views	on	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	were	negative,	with	almost	half	of	
participants	viewing	them	as	bad	for	the	UK	economy.	
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Figure	7.	Distribution	at	pre	stage	of	participants’	responses	to	the	question:	‘To	what	
extent	do	you	think	the	following	groups	of	EU	migrants	are	good	or	bad	for	the	UK	
economy?’		
In	focus	groups	participants	described	the	benefits	of	migration	via	the	skills	that	migrants	bring	to	
the	UK,	and	the	jobs	that	they	fill.	Reflecting	the	survey	findings,	the	majority	of	participants	
expressed	a	preference	for	high-skilled	over	low-skilled	migrants;	recognising	greater	overall	
economic	benefits	in	their	skills,	contributions	and	ability	to	support	themselves	financially.	Many	
discussions	centred	on	the	positive	contribution	of	highly	skilled	migrants,	particularly	in	the	public	
sector	and	often	in	the	health	service.	Participants	saw	benefit	in	migrants	filling	gaps	in	worker	
supply,	helping	sustain	important	services	and	making	a	positive	contribution	to	the	UK	economy.	
‘We’re	struggling	in	the	NHS	sector	so	I	guess	that’s	why	you	get	people	coming	over	from	
different	countries	to	make	our	hospitals	better’	
‘In	terms	of	the	positives	you’re	expanding	your	economy,	and	you’re	expanding	the	
workforce,	you’re	getting	more	taxes,	more	national	insurance’	
While	many	participants	saw	benefit	from	migrants	working	in	high-skilled	occupations,	concerns	
around	British	workers	being	displaced	were	common.	Some	participants	felt	recruiting	high-skilled	
migrants	substituted	for	British	workers	whose	education	and	skills	were	being	under-utilised:		
‘There’s	a	positive	on	the	NHS	in	that	the	staff	coming	in	are	working	providing	they’re	not	
taking	a	job	that	there	is	someone	already	qualified	for	that	job	who	is	already	in	that	
country’	
‘Why	would	you	spend	years	going	to	college	and	university	when	there’s	no	job	at	the	end	of	
it?	Why	aren’t	there	any	jobs,	because	they’re	bringing	people	in	who	already	have	the	skills?	
Why	not	wait	until	the	people	here	get	the	jobs.’	
There	was	widespread	agreement	that	British	young	people	are	not	given	sufficient	opportunity	to	
acquire	skills,	in	particular	through	vocational	training	routes.	This	also	showed	up	in	the	survey,	in	
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relation	to	the	question	of	whether	‘the	UK	should	grow	its	own	skills	rather	than	rely	on	EU	
immigration’.	Participants	tended	to	agree	with	this	statement	(median	response	of	413).	
In	the	focus	groups	some	participants	argued	that	too	many	young	people	go	to	University,	creating	
a	shortage	in	supply	of	British	people	into	skilled	manual	trades.	Young	people	were	also	seen	to	lack	
experience,	and	that	programmes	such	as	school	work	experience	were	essential	in	equipping	young	
people	for	work	and	helping	them	to	compete	in	the	labour	market.		
Concerns	around	displacement	were	also	raised	in	regard	to	low-paid	jobs,	where	migrant	workers	
were	thought	to	squeeze	British	workers	out	of	the	labour	market.	
‘For	the	youngsters	that	are	coming	out	of	permanent	education,	because	they’re	not	
academic-trained,	you	know,	academically	able	to	do	better	jobs.	And	the	lower-paid	jobs	
are	being	taken	by	Eastern	Europeans’	
The	survey	findings	show	some	degree	of	concern	about	displacement	of	British	workers	and	also	
about	effects	of	wages.	The	surveys	asked	participants	for	their	views	on	whether	EU	migrants	jobs	
away	from	British	workers,	EU	migrants	drive	down	wages	of	British	workers,	and,	more	positively,	
whether	‘EU	immigration	has	helped	to	create	jobs	in	the	UK’.	
As	can	be	seen	from	Figure	8	below,	about	as	many	participants	disagreed	as	agreed	with	the	claim	
that	EU	migrants	take	away	jobs	from	British	workers.	By	contrast,	more	people	agreed	than	
disagreed	with	the	statement	that	EU	migrants	drive	down	wages	for	British	workers.	Finally,	more	
people	disagreed	than	agreed	with	the	statement	that	EU	immigration	has	created	jobs	in	the	UK.	
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Figure	8.	Distribution	at	pre	stage	of	participants’	responses	to	whether	they	agreed	with	
the	statements	‘EU	migrants	take	jobs	away	from	British	workers’,	‘EU	migrants	drive	down	
the	wages	of	British	workers’,	and	‘EU	immigration	has	helped	to	create	jobs	in	the	UK’.	
																																								 																				
13	1	=	Strongly	disagree.	2	=	Disagree.	3	=	Neither	agree,	nor	disagree.	4	=	Agree.	5	=	Strongly	agree.	
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In	keeping	with	our	survey	findings,	many	the	of	concerns	about	labour	market	impacts	discussed	in	
the	focus	groups	centred	on	the	idea	that	migrant	workers	were	driving	down	wages.	This	was	often	
underpinned	by	the	assumption	that	migrants	had	minimal	outgoings,	and	could	therefore	afford	to	
take	work	at	or	below	the	minimum	wage,	and	that	migrant	workers	had	high	tolerance	for	low-pay	
in	the	UK	because	it	is	higher	than	for	equivalent	jobs	in	their	countries	of	origin.	This,	in	turn,	was	
thought	to	drive	down	pressure	to	increase	low	wages,	to	the	detriment	of	British	workers.	
‘It’s	the	fact	that	these	people	are	coming	in	and	trying	to	push	everyone	who’s	British	out	
their	jobs,	because	they	can	do	it	for	twice	as	less	money	as	we	do’	
	‘Some	[British]	people	can't	take	a	£6.50	job	an	hour	because	they	can't	pay	their	bills	on	
that.	And	[migrants]	are	probably	getting	more	on	benefits,	and	getting	their	housing,	and	
they	can	afford	to	work	for	£4	a	hour,	can't	they?	Because	that’s	just	their	tea	money’	
‘EU	workers	are	coming	over	and	grateful	for	it	but	that	might	be	pushing	down	the	wages.	It	
glossed	over	the	bit	where	it	says	that	minimum	wages	at	the	very	bottom	is	not	going	up	as	
much	as	it	should’	
It	was	therefore	seen	as	important	that	migrants’	pay	levels	are	increased	to	ensure	fairer	access	to	
work	for	British	workers,	and	especially	to	encourage	British	workers	out	of	unemployment:	
‘….if	they	were	paid	the	same	wage	as	British	people	then	it	might	encourage	British	people	
to	maybe	start	going	back	to	work’	
The	reluctance	of	British,	and	particularly	young	workers,	to	engage	in	perceived	low-skilled,	low-
paid	work	was	a	common	theme	in	the	focus	groups.	Unattractive	jobs	were	identified	across	high	
and	low-skilled	sectors,	and	were	characterised	by	their	low	pay,	long	hours	and	lack	of	a	work-life	
balance.	Many	participants	were	familiar	with	agricultural	work	and	this	was	described	as	
particularly	unattractive	to	young	British	workers:		
‘If	we’re	talking	about	distribution	of	work	in	low	skilled	areas,	a	lot	of	kids	don’t	want	to	go	
on	work	on	farms	and	stuff	like	that.	They	don’t	want	to	do	those	things	because	they’re	not	
good	enough	jobs	for	them’	
Consequently,	even	participants	who	expressed	the	most	negative	views	toward	migrant	workers	
accepted	a	need	for	their	employment	in	the	agriculture	sector.	This	was,	however,	often	caveated	
with	an	explicit	preference	for	migrants	to	work	on	a	seasonal	basis	rather	than	work	in	permanent	
posts	in	the	sector.	Therefore,	discussing	new	immigration	policy,	one	participant	argued:			
‘As	a	Brexit	voter	I	have	no	problem	at	all	with	people	coming	in	from	Europe	to	do	jobs	on	
farms,	living	in	temporary	accommodation	provided	by	the	farmer	and	going	back	again,	
that’s	been	going	on	for	years.	I	don’t	have	any	problems	with	that	at	all.’	
Participants	also	explained	the	recruitment	of	migrant	workers	with	reference	to	what	they	saw	as	
the	positive	work	ethic	of	migrants	and	their	strong	performance	in	low	skilled	jobs	compared	to	
British	workers:		
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‘The	hospitality	industry,	[migrants]	are	the	ones	doing	the	job	there,	and	are	forever	smiling	
and	asking	you,	even	if	they’re	worked	a	very	long	shift	they	are	forever	smiling	and	asking	
you	and	doing	what	you	want	them	to	do.	We	don’t	do	it,	we	British	won’t	do	it.’	
While	they	admired	this	work	ethic,	participants	felt	that	more	needs	to	be	done	to	make	low	skilled	
jobs	appeal	to	British	people	rather	than	expect	them	to	change	their	attitude	towards	low	skilled	
work.	Suggestions	included	improving	training,	career	paths	and	turning	unskilled	jobs	into	skilled	
jobs	where	possible.	These	were	put	forward	as	ways	of	improving	opportunities	for	British	workers,	
with	migrants	largely	seen	to	be	useful	as	a	resource	to	fill	gaps.	Participants	therefore	expressed	a	
clear	preference	for	priority	to	be	given	British	people.			
4.2.2.	Entitlement	and	Contribution	to	public	services	
Participants	were	surveyed	on	their	views	on	the	impacts	of	EU	migration	on	services	through	
responses	to	the	following	statements:	
• EU	migrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost	to	public	services	through	the	taxes	they	pay	
• EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	NHS	
• EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	schools	
• EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	housing	
The	survey	results	show	that	people	were	fairly	evenly	split	on	whether	EU	migrants	were	net	
contributors,	when	it	came	to	how	much	taxes	they	paid	and	how	much	they	cost	in	terms	of	public	
services,	with	roughly	one	third	disagreeing,	one	third	being	neutral,	and	one	third	agreeing.	In	
terms	of	the	three	specific	public	services	mentioned—i.e.,	NHS,	schools	and	housing—people	
reported	more	agreement	with	the	idea	that	EU	migrants	had	a	negative	impact	when	it	came	to	
housing,	followed	by	the	NHS	and	schools.	
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Figure	9.	Distribution	at	pre	stage	of	participants’	responses	to	whether	they	agreed	with	
the	statements	‘EU	migrants	contribute	more	than	they	cost	to	public	services	through	the	
taxes	they	pay’,’	EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	NHS’,	‘EU	migrants	have	a	
negative	impact	on	schools’,	and	‘EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	housing’.	
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Concerns	about	public	services	were	a	strong	theme	of	the	focus	group	interviews,	and	arose	in	
relation	to	access	to	local	services	such	as	housing,	and	use	of	health	services.	Within	these	
discussions,	entitlement	and	contribution	to	public	services	was	a	primary	point	of	discussion.	The	
prevailing,	and	strongly	held	view	was	that	making	a	net,	positive	contribution	to	the	UK	economy	
through	taxation	and	National	Insurance	should	be	a	prerequisite	for	entitlement	to	public	services.	
However,	British	citizens	were	commonly	viewed	as	having	greater	entitlement.	This	view	
underpinned	many	discussions	around	public	services.	This	instrumentalist	attitude	towards	
migration	can	be	captured	in	terms	of	two	forms	of	access:	earned	access	and	default	access.	Earned	
access	is	what	immigrants	have:	they	have	access,	so	long	as	they	have	already	paid	in	to	cover	their	
share.	As	one	participant	put	it,		
‘If	you’re	not	putting	anything	into	the	system	you	shouldn’t	be	able	to	take	anything	out	of	
the	system’.		
Default	access,	by	contrast,	is	the	type	of	access	had	by	citizens,	who	can	take	out	even	if	they	have	
not	paid	anything	in.	Therefore,	in	relation	to	welfare	benefits,	participants	made	clear	that,	even	for	
citizens,	it	is	better	to	only	take	out	once	you	have	contributed.	British	people	who	did	not	do	this	
were	viewed	with	disapproval	and	it	was	argued	that	they	need	to	be	‘encouraged’	or	even	‘pushed’	
into	work.	Many	participants	therefore	commented	negatively	on	welfare	dependence	among	
British	people,	often	suggesting	more	should	be	done	to	ensure	they	enter	work	and	are	therefore	
contribute	to	public	resources:	
‘Well	just	stop	[British	unemployed	people’s]	money	if	they’re	not	prepared,	if	they	offer	
them	a	job	and	they	keep	refusing	to	do	it,	no	matter	whether	they	think	it’s	beneath	or	not,	
it’s	still	earning	money	at	the	end	of	the	day.	Instead	of	pushing	them	into	it,	they’re	just	
sitting	back	and	saying,	yeah,	you	don’t	want	to	work,	we’ll	just	carry	on	paying	your	benefit.	
It	was	also	argued	that	the	conditions	for	migrants	should	be	stricter	than	for	British	people	in	
relation	to	access	to	services	and	benefits.	This	was	partly	because	migrants	will	not	have	
contributed	sufficiently	before	‘taking	out’.	There	was	also	a	view	that	migrants	should	be	
committed	to	the	UK	and	be	culturally	integrated.	But	a	number	of	concerns	about	migrants’	access	
to	services	and	benefits	were	raised	in	all	focus	groups.	
It	was	common	for	focus	group	participants	to	express	concerns	that	many	migrants	are	not	making	
sufficient	contribution	through	taxes	and	National	Insurance	to	justify	access	to	services.	Some	
suggested	that	a	significant	proportion	of	migrants	were	in	the	country	illegally,	were	unemployed,	
working	cash-in-hand	or	sending	wages	home	through	remittance.	They	were	therefore	viewed	as	
not	entitled	to	make	use	of	otherwise	universal	public	services.	Furthermore,	a	number	of	
participants	raised	concerns	regarding	migrants’	dependents,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	were	
entitled	to	public	services	given	their	non-contributory	status.	Similarly,	participants	regularly	raised	
concerns	around	‘welfare	tourism’,	suggesting	migrants	intentionally	target	the	UK	for	cash	benefits,	
free	health	care	and	education.	Therefore,	in	response	to	the	video	message	that	EU	migrants	put	in	
more	than	they	take	out,	one	participant	argued:	
‘I	don’t	disagree	with	that	side	of	it	where	it	says	that	[migrants]	put	in	as	much	as	they	take	
out,	but	there’s	not	just	one	person	that	comes	who	is	working.	There’s	all	the	rest	of	the	
family	who	come	along	with	it	as	well’		
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Some	concern	about	migrants’	access	to	benefits	was	framed	within	the	context	of	austerity,	and	a	
perceived	need	to	control	access	to	ensure	future	provision.	In	line	with	this,	participants	often	saw	
migrants	as	exacerbating,	or	even	being	the	root	cause	of,	strain	on	public	services:	
	‘…	there’s	a	hell	of	a	lot	of	people	on	the	streets	at	the	moment,	and	that	is	all	due	to	the	
fact	that	these	people	from	Europe	or	all	over	the	world	or	whatever,	who	are	coming,	are	
getting	into	houses	and	leaving	our	lot	homeless,	if	you	like’	
This	led	to	some	participants	to	suggest	that	there	should	be	greater	scrutiny	around	the	money	
spent	on	migrants,	as	well	as	their	dependents,	and	a	need	to	directly	prioritise	the	needs	of	British	
people.		
‘That	child	that	came	over	couldn’t	even	speak	a	word	of	English.	Not	being	funny	that’s	why	
he	needed	the	English	lessons,	but	you’re	taking	that	time	from	the	actual	child	that	is	having	
problems	with	speech	and	language,	a	different	skill	altogether	and	you’re	taking	all	that	
resources	on	that.	They’re	putting	money	to	teach	these	immigrants	to	learn	English’	
Related	to	this,	many	participants	thought	that	migrants	were	given	preferential	treatment	when	
accessing	public	services,	raising	concerns	that	British	people	were	being	treated	as	‘second	rate	
citizens’	
‘They	get	hand-outs,	they	do	get	housing,	they	do	get	everything	and	then	it’s	a	knock	effect	
as	you	say	to	education,	housing	and	so	on.	In	a	way	that,	I	could	feel	resentful	and	in	some	
ways	I	do	feel	resentful’		
This	was	a	common	theme	throughout	focus	group	discussions,	with	many	examples	of	perceived	
evidence	of	impact	relating	to	cases	where	migrants	were	seen	to	use	services	before	having	
contributed	or	met	other	conditions,	such	as	cultural	integration.		
4.2.3.	Culture	and	Integration	as	a	positive	and	negative	impact	
The	surveys	asked	participants	about	cultural	concerns	by	asking	to	what	extent	they	agreed	with	
the	statement	‘I	am	concerned	about	too	many	cultures	coming	into	the	country’.	Almost	half	of	the	
participants	disagreed	with	this	statement	(46%	versus	35%	agreeing,	with	the	remaining	19%	
neither	agreeing	nor	disagreeing).	Reflecting	the	survey	findings,	focus	group	participants	discussed	
a	range	of	broadly	‘cultural’	impacts	of	immigration,	and	these	were	both	positive	and	negative.		
Throughout	focus	group	discussions	participants	gave	a	number	of	examples	of	the	positive	impacts	
of	migrants	regarding	cultural	enrichment	and	integration.	Parents,	for	example,	described	the	
benefits	of	their	children	mixing	with	migrant	children	in	schools.		
‘I’ve	got	three	young	children	and	my	own	personal	opinion	is	I	don’t	want	them	growing	up	
that	we	only	live	in	a	world	where	there’s	White	British	people.	I	want	them	to	be	exposed	to	
lots	of	different	cultures	and	lots	of	different	people	that	can	enrich	them	and	teach	them.’	
One	participant	described	how	she	had	welcomed	being	asked	if	her	daughter	could	help	a	new	
migrant	pupil	to	settle	in.	In	another	case,	a	man	told	how	his	young	son	had	been	influenced	by	a	
Muslim	friend:	
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‘My	son’s	praying	to	the	wall	like	the	kid	did	at	his	school	because	he	wants	to	be	like	his	
friend.	I’m	thinking	that’s	a	safe	thing	for	my	son,	that’s	a	good	thing’.		
Participants	speaking	as	parents	or	teachers	also	gave	other	examples	of	how	migrant	children	were	
learning	to	speak	English	very	quickly	and	were	not	placing	undue	demands	on	schools	or	affecting	
the	learning	of	their	British	classmates.	A	few	examples	were	given	of	workforce	integration	with	
some	participants	describing	the	positive	impact	migrant	workers	had	in	the	workplace,	and	the	
benefits	of	learning	about	different	cultures	and	languages:	
‘I	enjoy	working	where	I	work	and	it’s	nice	to	have	it,	it	adds	a	bit	of	colour	to	the	day	when	
you	meet	people.	I	met	a	Greek	guy	yesterday,	I	don’t	meet	many	Greek	people,	so	it’s	
interesting	to	meet	different	cultures	and	things	like	that.’	
Similarly,	a	warehouse	worker	enjoyed	telling	the	group	how	he	had	learned	how	to	swear	in	Polish	
from	his	co-workers.	At	the	same	time,	one	participant	regretted	that	more	cultural	mixing	does	not	
take	place:	
‘The	worst	thing	that’s	happening	is	that	people	aren’t	mixing	and	being	friendly	to	each	
other	and	it’s	people	that	are	wary	of	each	other	and	that’s	an	underlying	tone	that	I	think	I	
would	hope	would	change’.	
In	fact,	no	examples	of	community	integration	were	given.	Moreover,	despite	the	positive	
sentiments	covered	above,	much	of	the	discussion	framed	migration	as	a	threat.	Although	
participants	were	frequently	reminded	that	the	focus	of	the	research	was	on	EU	migration,	non-EU	
migration	dominated	discussions	around	cultural	impacts.	Integration	was	a	central	theme	of	many	
discussions,	underpinned	by	a	view	that	migrant	communities	are	reluctant	to	integrate	and	exert	
control	over	spaces.	
‘If	they	choose	to	come	to	this	country	then	they	should	choose	to	integrate	with	regard	to	
religion,	education	and	all	these	things	because	we	are	now	getting	more	Muslim	schools,	
Muslim	only	schools.	This	is	awful,	it	sounds	dreadful	but	we	get	coloured	sections	in	school.	
It	doesn’t	need	to	be	like	that.	It	should	be	open	for	everybody	and	people	who	come	here	
should	be	quite	willing	to	mix	because	this	is	our	country’	
‘They’re	all	Indian	or	Pakistani	and	as	soon	as	a	house	goes	up	for	sale	from	a	British	person,	
they’re	in	there	and	they	put	in	their	families	and	it’s	just	taking	over.	That’s	how	these	
areas,	as	you	say,	are	ghettos	or	whatever	you	want	to	call	it,	get	set	up	and	they	won’t	
integrate,	and	this	is	where	we	do	need	people,	welcome	people	to	come	to	the	country	but	
they	do	have	go	to	our	schools,	don’t	set	out	their	own	areas.	I	don’t	think	that’s	fair’	
For	some	participants	the	presence	of	migrant	communities	was	seen	in	itself	as	a	direct	threat	to	
British	culture	and	identity.	The	nature	of	this	threat	was	by	and	large	non-specific.	Some	
participants,	however,	did	talk	about	preserving	British	values,	and	make	specific	reference	to	
symbols	of	British	life,	such	as	flags	and	public	holidays.	
‘Why	are	other	countries	allowed	to	fly	theirs	and	we’re	not	allowed	to	fly	ours	because	it’s	
racist?		It’s	wrong’	
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‘I	think	that’s	the	problem	you’re	not	allowed	to	fly	your	flag	now	are	you,	in	your	garden	you	
get	told	to	put	it	down.	Christmas	isn’t	Christmas,	Easter	can’t	be	Easter	and	it’s	those	sort	of	
things	that	are	causing	the	problems.’	
‘I	do	believe	that	if	[migrant]	want	to	come	to	Britain	then	they	should	also	integrate	into	
British	life,	so	that	we	don’t	lose	our	British	values	as	well’	
Some	participants	expressed	feelings	of	threat	in	more	direct	ways,	expressing	concern	around	
foreign	languages	being	spoken	in	public,	and	increasingly	feeling	like	a	minority.	Others,	however,	
directly	opposed	these	ideas,	suggesting	that	they	did	not	feel	British	culture/identity	were	under	
threat.	
‘I	don’t	feel	any	of	that,	I	don’t	feel	that	anyone’s	ever	told	me	that	I	can’t	have	Christmas	or	I	
can’t	fly	a	flag	or	I	can’t	do	this,	I’ve	never,	I’m	not	saying	it	doesn’t	happen,	I’m	just	saying…’	
Much	of	the	opposition	to	immigration	was	expressed	in	relation	to	‘illegal’	immigration,	asylum	
seekers,	and	refugees.	These	groups	were	frequently	attributed	to	Africa	and	Middle	East,	and	were	
considered	to	present	the	most	criminal	and	cultural	threat.	
‘I	disagree,	I	think	Afghan	and	a	lot	of	the	African	countries	that	are	coming	over,	I’m	not	
racist	at	all	but	I	think	there’s	a	lot	coming	over	from	Africa,	there’s	a	lot	coming	over	from	
Afghanistan…’	
Cultural	proximity	was	a	key	determinant	of	the	value	and	level	of	threat	perceived	by	different	
migrant	groups.	This	manifested	in	reluctance	amongst	participants	to	accept	the	presence	of	
certain	languages	or	cultural	practices,	underpinned	by	a	sense	of	threat	to	British	way	of	life.	The	
vast	majority	of	the	negative	views	around	the	perceived	cultural	threat	of	migrants	were	directed	
toward	Muslim	migrants,	who	were	often	associated	with	terrorism	and	unspecified	threat	from	
Sharia	law.		
‘There	needs	to	be	a	commitment	to	this	country.	And	there	needs	to	be	the	integration.	The	
language,	for	me,	is	an	issue.	I	find	it	incredibly	rude,	and	I	also	find	it	incredibly,	we	don’t	
deal	with	it	down	here	very	much,	but	the	sort	of	Muslims	that	wear	that,	it’s	nothing	to	do	
with	their	religion	or	anything	like	that.	I	wouldn’t	dream	of	letting	my	son	walk	in	the	bank	
with	a	balaclava	on	his	head.’	
In	line	with	this,	EU	migrants	were	often,	collectively,	considered	the	safer	of	migrant	populations,	
due	to	being	more	culturally	proximate	to	British	values.	
‘I	think	it’s	different	types	of	immigrants	as	well	aren’t	there,	there’s	EU	immigrants	and	
there’s	other	immigrants	from	elsewhere	who	don’t	really	care	about	what	they	do.’	
That	being	said,	some	participants	disaggregated	further,	perceiving	specific	threat,	from	particular	
groups,	often	due	to	specific	incidences	of	crime.	
‘The	Lithuanians	are	the	worst	people	and	the	Romanians	a	little	bit,	but	the	Polish	think	
they’re	all	really	bad,	so	the	Polish	are	not	too	bad.’	
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The	value	placed	on	integration	and	cultural	proximity	was	demonstrated	by	participants’	
discussions	around	other	migrant	groups	who	were	thought	to	have	proven	their	willingness	to	
cultural	assimilate.	
‘You’ve	got	this	Windrush	thing	which	is	in	the	press	at	the	moment.	These	people	have	
integrated	with	us,	so	therefore	we	consider	that	they	are	part	of	us,	which	is	why	so	many	
people	are	upset	about	it’	
‘The	Pakistanis	and	that	were	very	accepting	of	our	region	when	they	came	in	the	80s	and	
had	the	corner	shops	and	they	integrated,	and	you	don’t	hear	them	complaining	about	
anything’	
These	groups’	integration	into	British	society	was	presented	by	participants	as	almost	entirely	
problematic,	characterised	by	a	positive	contribution	to	the	UK	economy,	and	a	distinct	sense	of	
inoffensive	assimilation.	
4.2.4.	Crime	as	a	negative	contribution	
The	relationship	between	migration	and	crime	was	a	common	theme	in	discussions	around	culture	
and	integration.	The	issues	of	sexual	abuse	and	drug	and	gang-related	crime	were	raised	most	often,	
and	attributed	to	inward	migration	of	migrants	from	cities.	Participants	also	believed	that	the	police	
are	reluctant	to	deal	with	such	behaviour,	fearing	that	they	would	be	accused	of	institutional	racism:	
‘[The	police]	are	finding	more	and	more	immigrants	getting	involved	in	the	drugs	and	gangs	
because	it’s	easy	money.	They	come	over	here,	they’re	on	the	streets,	they	get	offered	money	
to	carry	this,	to	deliver	this	and	that’s	how	it	all	starts	and	the	amount,	and	it’s	not	just	
around	the	cities	anymore,	there’s	huge	gangs	working	the	way	down’	
‘About	all	these	youngsters	that	have	been	mistreated	and	raped	and	God	knows	what	else	
up	[in]	the	north.	The	police	would	not	prosecute	because	they	said	they	thought	it	was	
racist.	They	were	frightened	of	being	called	institutionally	racist.	That’s	just	one	example.	
There’s	loads	of	them’	
Throughout	focus	group	discussions,	participants	clearly	created	and	engaged	with	a	threat	
hierarchy	based	on	the	extent	to	which	different	migrant	groups	were	perceived	to	be	a	risk	because	
of	their	criminal	behaviour	as	well	as	their	culture.	While	some	migrant	groups,	such	as	Eastern	
Europeans,	were	associated	with	a	general	increase	in	crime,	the	greatest	threat	was	associated	with	
Muslims.	Many	of	the	participants	who	engaged	in	this	kind	of	narrative	regularly	assumed	that	to	
be	Muslim	was	to	be	non-British,	and	associated	Muslim	communities	with	terrorism.	Negative	
assumptions	were	also	made	about	Sharia	law.		
‘We	don’t	want	Sharia	law	in	this	country.	We	don’t	think	it	should	be	allowed	to	take	place	
in	this	country	while	we’re	here.	I	mean,	they	can	actually	kill	their	daughters	for	disgracing	
the	family.	What	sort	of	a	law	is	that?’	
‘A	lot	of	it’s	not	from	Europe	though	isn’t	it,	it’s	coming	from	Eastern,	and	I	think	that’s	where	
it’s	coming	from,	and	a	lot	of	people	are	scared	nowadays	but	I	don’t	think	that’s	necessarily	
coming	from	Europe	as	such.	I	think	everyone’s	targeting	Europe	at	the	moment	for	anything	
that’s	going	to	happen.’	
44	|	Post-Brexit	Immigration	Policy:	Reconciling	Public	Perceptions	with	Economic	Evidence	
National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	
Asylum	seekers	were	also	regularly	perceived	as	a	significant	cultural	and	criminal	threat.	While	
participants	expressed	some	sympathy	with	their	situation,	asylum	seekers	were	generally	treated	
with	great	cynicism,	even	amongst	those	with	more	pro-migration	views.	Preventing	entry	of	asylum	
seekers	and	refugees	who	were	seen	not	to	have	a	case	for	settlement	in	the	UK	was	therefore	a	
frequent	point	in	which	the	majority	of	focus	group	participants	agreed.	There	was	therefore	a	
strong	view	that	the	immigration	system	should	seek	to	establish	the	validity	of	claims	for	asylum.	
‘The	actual	immigration	is	a	positive	thing,	but	then	you	get	the	asylum	side	of	things	which	
probably	the	negative	side	of	things.	I’m	not	saying	every	asylum	seeker	is	here	falsely	
because	obviously	we	do	get	genuine	cases	and	I	think	it’s	the	ones	under	the	radar,	who	
come	in	and	also	commit	crimes’	
4.2.5.	Differentiating	migrants	according	to	their	contribution	
The	narratives	constructed	in	our	focus	groups	suggest	participants	did	not	view	all	immigrants	
equally.	Rather	participants	developed	a	largely	consistent	hierarchy	of	preferences	between	
immigrant	groups,	based	on	perceptions	of	economic	and	social	contributions,	and	lack	of	the	
threats	described	above.	
In	general,	focus	group	participants	saw	value	in	migrants	who	were	perceived	to	offer	a	positive	net	
contribution	to	the	UK	economy.	This	contribution	was	broadly	defined	as	migrants	putting	in	more	
than	they	took	out.	These	discussions	were	largely	underpinned	by	an	assumption	that	migrants	
would	be	making	use	of	public	services,	such	as	health,	education	and	housing.	Many	participants	
therefore	perceived	migrants	as	in	an	immediate	deficit,	and	were	therefore	required	to	make	an	
equal,	if	not	positive,	contribution	to	the	economy	through	tax	or	National	insurance.	
‘I	think	that’s	why	there’s	two	types	of	immigration.	You’ve	got	the	ones	that	migrate	and	
want	to	work,	like	in	your	trade	and	people	that	are	really	do	want	to	put	in	the	graft	and	
you’ve	got	others	that,	you	see	them	on	the	news	that	they	get	given	a	house,	they	get	given	
all	this	money	and	a	lot	of	them	are	illegal	immigrants	that	we	know	are	illegal	immigrants’.		
Migrants’	motivations	for	being	in	the	UK	and	subsequent	use	of	public	services	were	discussed	with	
significant	cynicism,	with	participants	constructing	clear	notions	of	‘deserving’	and	‘undeserving’	
immigrants	based	on	the	perceived	likelihood	of	a	migrants’	positive	net	contribution.	In	this	
respect,	highly	skilled	migrants	were	considered	more	valuable	than	lower	skilled	migrants	in	being	
more	likely	to	making	a	more	significant	contribution	to	the	public	purse	and	being	able	to	sustain	
themselves	financially.	Furthermore,	since	highly	skilled	migrants	were,	by	in	large,	positioned	as	
working	in	the	UK	public	sector,	they	were	seen	as	making	an	extra	contribution	through	their	skills	
and	services,	particularly	in	the	NHS.	Although	the	services	of	low-skilled	migrants	were	also	valued	
by	participants,	these	were	often	subject	to	a	sense	of	expiry	in	line	with	seasonal	work	or	the	
temporary	skill	shortage	demands	of	the	UK	labour	market.	
4.3.	The	role	of	evidence	in	informing	attitudes	towards	immigration		
A	key	aim	of	the	research	was	to	explore	how	people	use	evidence	on	immigration	to	form	or	
confirm	their	opinions	on	the	subject.	It	was	apparent	from	the	focus	groups	that	participants	drew	
their	evidence	about	immigration	from	a	variety	of	sources	but	gave	these	varying	amounts	of	
credence.	Here	we	consider	how	they	drew	evidence	from	sources	including	the	media	and	personal	
contacts,	and	the	relative	weight	they	attached	to	statistical	versus	non-statistical	information.	We	
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also	look	at	how	focus	group	participants	responded	to	a	short	video	they	were	shown	on	the	
economic	impacts	of	migration.		
4.3.1.	Sources	of	evidence	on	immigration		
In	the	‘listening’	condition	focus	groups	we	asked	participants	where	they	got	their	information	
about	EU	immigration	from	and	who	they	talked	to	on	the	topic.	Many	participants	said	they	felt	
they	had	few	reliable	sources	of	information	and	felt	that	the	debate	was	polarised	in	a	way	that	
made	it	hard	for	them	to	assess	the	evidence.	While	some	had	discussed	Brexit	with	family	and	
friends,	they	either	felt	their	views	were	not	understood,	or	were	aware	that	they	discussed	it	
largely	with	people	like	themselves.	Aside	from	the	financial	incentive,	the	opportunity	to	hear	the	
views	of	others	on	the	issue	of	EU	immigration	was	the	single	most	common	reason	given	for	
attending	a	focus	group.		
4.3.2.	Media	stories	as	a	source	of	evidence	on	immigration	
We	had	expected	media	stories	to	be	cited	as	evidence	and	to	be	regarded	as	credible	by	some	
participants.	However,	we	found	instead	that	very	few	stories	were	mentioned,	although	a	number	
of	participants	referred	generally	to	the	media	as	an	information	source.	Table	1	presents	the	
examples	of	media	coverage	cited	by	participants,	two	of	which	are	the	same	story.	Of	the	three	
examples	given,	two	concern	the	demands	made	by	immigration	on	the	benefit	system	without	prior	
contribution.	As	we	have	described,	this	was	a	strong	theme	which	emerged	in	all	focus	groups	and	
in	many	of	the	discussions.	The	final	example	is	of	EU	bureaucracy,	discussed	in	the	context	of	
reasons	to	have	voted	to	leave.		
All	of	the	examples	led	to	a	wider	discussion	in	which	some	respondents	agreed	with	the	point	being	
made.	However,	participants	voiced	distrust	about	the	validity	of	media	stories,	either	in	relation	to	
the	first	two	specific	examples	in	the	figure,	or	more	generally.	A	statement	by	one	participant	on	
the	trustworthiness	of	media	reports	had	some	support:	
‘A	lot	of	the	news	even	now	is	all	slanted	at	a	particular	angle.	You’ve	got	to	be	so	careful	
because...	media	sort	of	slides	and	twists	a	little	bit’.	
It	was	also	argued	that	the	media	focuses	on	extreme	examples.	There	was	general	support	for	the	
statements	of	participants	in	one	group	that	the	media	makes	examples	of	extreme	cases	of	
migrants	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	of	British	people.	Lack	of	trust	in	the	media	stories	about	
immigration	appears	to	lead	many	to	rely	on	their	own	experiences,	or	the	direct	and	indirect	
accounts	of	others.	
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Table	1.	Media	stories	cited	by	focus	group	participants	
Example	 Contextual	point	 Response	
The	local	paper	reported	that	a	
group	cleaning	cars	in	a	local	
car	park	were	found	to	be	
irregular	migrants	and	were	
deported	(Group	7).	
Irregular	migrants	do	not	
contribute	through	taxation	
and	are	not	spending	earnings	
in	the	UK.	
Led	to	a	wider	discussion	about	
migrants	accessing	benefits.	
A	television	programme	
showed	how	a	Romanian	gypsy	
set	up	a	rubbish	collection	
business	and,	when	the	
business	failed,	was	able	to	
claim	benefits	and	was	saving	
to	build	a	house	in	his	home	
country	(Group	8).		
General	discussion	about	low	
paid	work	and	claiming	
benefits.	
Agreement	from	others	who	
had	seen	the	programme	but	
some	questioning	of	the	
accuracy	of	the	story	and	how	
common	such	a	case	would	be.	
The	same	example	as	above	
but	with	a	focus	on	the	practice	
of	sending	benefits	to	a	family	
living	overseas	(Group	11).		
Young	British	people	are	not	
able	to	afford	housing	because	
of	immigration.	
No	follow-up	discussion	since	it	
was	an	introductory	statement.	
A	television	programme	
showed	how	white	vans	
delivering	papers	between	
Brussels	and	Strasbourg	for	
European	Parliament	meetings	
were	in	fact	arriving	empty,	as	
a	result	of	fraud	(Group	8).		
Reasons	for	voting	to	leave	the	
EU.		
Led	to	a	wider	discussion	about	
bureaucracy	and	corruption	in	
the	European	Commission	and	
Parliament.	
	
4.3.3.	Personal	experiences	and	second-hand	narratives	
Participants	were	much	more	likely	to	give	examples	from	sources	other	than	the	media	to	illustrate	
points	they	made	on	the	impact	of	EU	immigration,	or	immigration	in	general.	Many,	but	not	all	of	
these,	are	presented	in	Table	2.	These	were	largely	stories	relayed	to	them	by	a	third	party	rather	
than	directly	experienced.		The	stories	vary	in	their	evidential	strength,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	
were	accepted.	However,	as	the	figure	below	shows,	while	some	group	members	did	express	
surprise	in	relation	to	some	cases	the	stories	were	largely	treated	as	credible.	
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Table	2.	Personal	and	third-party	immigration	narratives	
Example	 Response	
Fairness	and	the	principle	of	paying	in	before	you	take	out	
A	participant	accompanying	her	elderly	parent	
for	a	hospital	eye	appointment	spoke	to	an	
Italian	woman	who	told	how	her	mother	had	
moved	to	the	UK	to	claim	a	pension,	for	which	
she	was	not	eligible	in	her	home	country	
(Group	8).	
Other	participants	questioned	when	that	had	
happened	and	one	participant	suggested	it	may	
have	resulted	from	a	reciprocal	arrangement.	
A	participant	waiting	to	see	a	midwife	found	
herself	with	three	other	women,	none	of	whom	
could	speak	English	(Group	4).		
Agreement	from	another	participant	that	‘you	are	
the	odd	one	out	in	your	own	country’.		
A	participant	had	a	Latvian	friend	who	was	
given	social	housing	on	two	separate	occasions	
because	she	had	a	large	family.	The	participant	
herself	had	to	wait	more	than	four	years	for	
Housing	Association	accommodation	(Group	2).		
Agreement	from	respondents	followed	up	by	the	
next	example	in	the	table.	
A	local	supermarket	was	believed	to	have	
bought	housing	near	its	site	for	migrant	
workers	(Group	2).	
Agreement	that	the	local	area	had	not	seen	these	
changes	until	relatively	recently.	
A	participant	who	was	in	need	of	housing	after	
a	divorce	believed	that	that	the	local	authority	
retain	housing	for	refugees	(Group	9).	
Others	gave	examples	of	where	they,	or	relatives,	
had	to	wait	for	housing	or	for	their	benefits	to	be	
reassessed	following	a	change	in	circumstances.		
A	participant	and	her	family	of	six	was	made	
homeless	but	a	newly	arrived	migrant	family	
were	given	priority	for	housing	(Group	1).	
No	follow-up	discussion	since	it	was	an	
introductory	statement.	
Integration	and	social	norms	
On	a	recent	bus	journey	a	participant	found	all	
the	other	passengers	speaking	a	language	other	
than	English	(Group	8).	
Led	to	further	example	from	another	participant	
below.	
The	work	environment	at	a	local	supermarket	is	
‘tribal’	and	‘horrible’	but	no	source	was	given	
for	this	assertion	(Group	8).	
Another	participant	followed	up	with	a	report	
heard	on	radio	and	television	of	fights	between	
immigrants	and	residents	outside	school	gates	
(see	next	item).	
Immigrants	and	residents	have	been	fighting	
outside	school	gates	in	another	part	of	the	UK	
Led	to	wider	discussion	about	decline	of	respect	
with	disagreement	on	the	role	of	immigration	in	
this	process.	This	then	led	to	a	discussion	about	
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(Group	8).	 the	link	between	immigration	and	crime,	and	the	
example	below.	
A	participants’	son	was	chased	across	town	by	a	
gang	of	Ukrainian	men	armed	with	knives	
(Group	8).		
Led	to	a	wider	discussion	about	migrant	crime	
gangs	which	the	police	have	not	controlled.	
The	UK	does	not	have	control	of	its	borders	and	illegal	immigration	
A	participant	claimed	a	woman	driving	from	a	
south	coast	port	to	Eastbourne	found	a	migrant	
stowed	in	the	boot	of	her	car	(Group	10).		
Dialogue	about	under-cutting	of	wages	and	
capacity	of	UK	to	accommodate	further	
immigration.	
Migrants	have	been	seen	coming	out	of	lorries	
on	the	A20	from	the	channel	ports	(Group	7).	
Other	participants	questioned	whether	this	was	a	
direct	experience,	but	another	participant	
confirmed	its	validity,	arguing	‘You	see	the	lorries	
pull	over	and	they	just	pile	on’.		
Legitimate	vs	illegitimate	immigration		
A	friend	of	a	participant’s	daughter	dated	a	
refugee	who	claimed	to	be	16	and	was	given	
access	to	education,	but	was	thought	to	be	
older	on	the	basis	of	his	facial	hair	(Group	7).	
Some	sympathy	was	expressed	for	refugees	but	
also	concern	about	crime	and	that	some	refugees	
are	economic	migrants	rather	than	fleeing	
persecution	or	war.	
A	friend’s	brother	works	for	the	UK	Border	
Agency	in	Greece	and	reported	that	while	many	
are	escaping	from	tyranny,	others	are	economic	
migrants	(Group	9).	
Disagreement	from	a	participant	who	believed	
that	people	who	seek	asylum	must	be	desperate,	
but	agreement	from	others	that	some	claims	are	
not	genuine.	
Labour	market	impacts	
A	participant	had	worked	in	a	distribution	
centre	where	there	were	only	20	English	
employees	in	a	workforce	of	2,500	(Group	7).	
Some	agreement	that	the	availability	of	migrant	
labour	must	reduce	wages	at	the	lower	end.	
	
As	the	table	shows,	many	accounts	related	to	the	theme	of	deservedness	and	paying	into	the	system	
before	you	take	out	in	accessing	benefits.	Most	of	the	examples	concerned	access	to	housing	or	to	
health	services	and	included	an	assumption	that	a	British	citizen	should	have	priority	to	such	services	
over	migrants.	Three	of	the	examples	concerning	integration	and	social	norms	involved	violence	or	
unacceptable	behaviour	on	the	part	of	migrants.	This	was	a	theme	which	was	raised	quite	often	in	
the	focus	groups,	especially	in	relation	to	irregular	migration.		Also	in	line	with	views	expressed	
throughout	the	interviews,	participants	gave	examples	of	ways	in	which	control	over	entry	was	not	
exercised	at	the	border.	Other	examples	were	given	of	migration	which	was	seen	to	be	illegitimate,	
focused	on	the	validity	of	refugee	status.	While	the	workplace	was	mentioned	in	a	few	examples,	
very	few	specific	examples	were	given	of	threats	to	the	wages	of	British	workers,	although	much	was	
said	about	migrants	being	prepared	to	do	jobs	which	British	people	do	not	find	attractive.		
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It	is	also	worthy	of	note	that,	with	the	exception	of	the	examples	of	deservedness,	most	examples	
were	of	second	hand	evidence	rather	than	direct	experience.	As	indicated	in	the	figure,	other	
participants	questioned	the	validity	of	some	examples	and	were	more	reassured	when	the	speaker	
said	they	had	witnessed	the	example	for	themselves.	Of	course,	it	is	possible	that	they	did	not	
believe	the	examples	were	true	but	chose	not	to	challenge	the	speaker.		
4.3.4.	The	divisive	nature	of	the	debate	
The	divisive	nature	of	the	immigration	debate	was	a	prominent	theme	in	many	of	the	focus	groups.	
It	encouraged	some	participants	to	put	more	weight	on	personal	experiences	than	on	evidence	
presented	by	others.	It	also	confirmed	their	suspicions	that	information	is	not	always	accurate	or	
objective	and	that	statistics	can	be	used	to	manipulate	opinion.	
First,	in	relation	to	the	referendum,	participants	felt	that	the	debate	during	the	campaign	period	was	
divisive	and	unconstructive.	Reports	of	confusion	around	who	was	right,	or	wrong,	in	the	assertions	
made	during	the	campaign	were	common.	Some	expressed	feeling	under	pressure	to	make	a	
decision	in	a	short	space	of	time.	One	participant	commented	‘there	were	people	giving	out	leaflets	
in	the	High	Street	with	all	different	points’	which	led	him	to	be	confused	about	validity.	It	was	
common	for	participants	then	to	conclude	that	it	was	best	to	base	their	decision	on	their	own	
experience.	The	importance	of	personal	experience	and	observations	was	raised	frequently	in	the	
focus	groups,	including	in	assessing	the	impact	of	immigration	and	salience	of	it	as	an	issue.		
The	divisive	nature	of	the	campaign	was	then	seen	to	extend	to	the	post-referendum	period	where	
many	participants	had	reflected	on	their	voting	decisions.	Some	reported	negative	comments	on	
their	own	voting	decisions	which	they	had	not	seen	as	especially	controversial.	A	hairdresser	was	
surprised	to	find	clients	objecting	to	her	decision	to	vote	Leave	and	felt	that	this	made	other	people	
scared	to	give	their	opinion.	Another	participant	in	the	same	focus	group	reported	that	her	daughter	
had	called	her	‘racist’	for	voting	Leave,	and	felt	that	this	reflected	the	views	of	teachers	at	her	
school.	More	generally,	some	participants	were	of	the	view	that	it	is	hard	to	talk	about	immigration	
and	race	without	someone	being	offended.		
It	was	also	argued	that	the	debate,	and	particularly	the	media,	uses	extreme	examples,	which	make	
it	difficult	for	real	impacts	of	immigration	to	be	assessed.	These	might	include,	for	example,	a	
migrant	claiming	substantial	state	benefits,	owning	an	expensive	house	or	supporting	a	very	large	
family.	Scepticism	of	media	stories	did	not,	however,	extend	to	all	types	of	evidence:	exaggerated	
depictions	of	migrant	behaviour	were	always	attributed	to	the	media	and	were	not	seen	as	entirely	
credible.	Meanwhile,	information	provided	by	a	personal	contact,	even	at	second	hand,	was	treated	
as	much	more	credible.		
4.3.5.	The	video	as	presentation	of	evidence		
As	part	of	the	focus	groups	we	screened	a	short	video	summarising	the	impact	of	EU	immigration	on	
jobs	and	wages.	This	was	intended	to	stimulate	debate	about	economic	impacts,	to	encourage	
participants	to	consider	the	evidence	and	how	this	might	change	their	attitudes.	In	the	focus	groups,	
we	asked	focus	group	participants	what	they	thought	of	the	video	and	its	messages.	We	also	asked	
for	their	feedback	on	the	video	in	our	follow-up	survey	two	weeks	after	the	focus	groups.		
Most	participants	expressed	limited	interest	in	the	video	and	it	did	not	lead	to	in-depth	discussion	
about	economic	impacts.	There	are	a	number	of	possible	explanations	for	this,	which	include	their	
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keenness	to	discuss	issues	of	more	interest	to	them,	in	particular	of	migrants’	access	to	benefits	and	
the	attraction	of	the	UK	to	migrants	with	interests	in	activities	other	than	employment.		
The	most	commonly	expressed	responses	to	the	video	were:	
• It	was	too	positive	and	ignored	the	negative	side	to	immigration.	
• It	 gave	 an	 overall	 picture	 and	 did	 not	 acknowledge	 differential	 impacts	 on	 areas	 and	
social	groups.	
• It	ignored	specific	negative	impacts	such	as	crime.	
Responses	to	the	survey	question	‘Do	you	think	the	video	presented	the	facts	about	EU	immigration	
in	a	balanced	or	biased	way?’	show	that	more	respondents	found	it	biased	than	balanced	(42%	for	
the	former,	with	26%	for	balanced	and	31%	for	neither	biased	nor	balanced).	On	the	other	hand,	
close	to	half	of	respondents	(48%)	suggested	that	they	either	learned	something	or	a	great	deal	from	
watching	the	video,	and	33%	that	the	video	made	them	more	positive	about	the	impact	of	EU	
immigration	(versus	56%	who	said	it	didn’t	change	their	mind	on	the	matter	and	11%	who	said	it	
made	them	more	negative).	At	the	same	time,	since	a	third	of	participants	in	the	focus	groups	did	
not	fill	out	the	follow-up	survey,	we	cannot	assume	that	these	numbers	are	representative	of	all	
participants.	
In	the	focus	groups	the	main	criticism	of	the	video	was	that	it	ignored	issues	that	the	British	public	
are	concerned	about,	in	particular	increased	immigration	in	their	local	communities.	More	generally,	
there	was	a	mistrust	of	the	video’s	positive	messages:	
‘It’s	just	a	PR	video	to	say	it’s	not	as	bad	as	everyone	thinks.	But	it	is’.		
‘It	was	making	everything	very	positive	and	anyone	that	thinks	otherwise	is	in	the	wrong’.	
‘I	think	it’s	a	propaganda	film.	I	don’t	believe	in	that.	I	really	did.	I	felt	it	was	absolute	junk,	I	
really	did’		
Some	participants	viewed	the	message	and	tone	of	the	video	more	positively	and	welcomed	the	
different	perspective	it	gave,	as	one	participant	stated:	
‘You	have	given	me	a	bit	of	a	different	opinion	now.	Definitely,	definitely…	Because	I	just	felt	
so	negative	but,	watching	that,	yes	you	are	probably	right,	yes	the	video	did	change	the	way	I	
felt	about	some	things,	definitely’	
A	number	of	participants	commented	that	the	video	provided	an	overall	picture,	presenting	the	
average	impacts	of	immigration	and	that,	in	reality,	its	impacts	are	felt	disproportionately	in	some	
areas	of	the	country,	including	Kent,	and	among	some	social	groups,	in	particular	the	low	paid.	It	was	
also	argued	that	areas	like	Kent	have	experienced	a	higher	impact	from	immigration	and	more	
pressure	on	public	services	than	other	areas	of	the	country	and	that	this	was	left	out	of	the	video.	
‘I	think	living	in	Kent	as	I’m	sure	all	of	you	do,	we	got	the	brunt	of	it	as	the	end	closest	to	the	
continent’	
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‘I	think	the	impact	is	very	often	localised.	I	think	if	you	had	this	conversation	somewhere	200	
miles	further	north,	you	probably	wouldn’t	be	having	the	same	level	of	impact	as	we	are	
perhaps	having	here	in	the	South	East’.		
Impacts	that	were	previously	thought	to	be	confined	to	London,	including	segregated	communities,	
were	seen	to	be	gradually	spreading	to	Kent	through	a	process	of	inward	migration	from	both	
London	itself	and	from	outside	the	UK.	A	common	response	was	to	question	the	factual	statements	
in	the	video	in	favour	of	their	own	experiences	of	impact.	This	included,	for	example,	coming	across	
migrants	in	hospital	waiting	rooms.	Some	participants	also	directly	expressed	the	view	that	personal	
experience	is	a	valid	way	of	assessing	migration	impacts:		
‘You	can	only	go	by	your	own	community	can’t	you?	You	can	do	it	based	on	your	own	
experiences’	
‘People	can	only	go	on	their	own	personal	experience	when	they	make	a	decision	[referring	
to	the	referendum]	if	they	have	been	affected	or	what	they	have	seen,	and	certainly	people	
have	been	affected	and	what	they	have	seen	is	why	they	voted	the	way	they	did	[to	leave].’	
The	video	was	also	seen	to	neglect	non-economic	impacts,	in	particular	crime.	One	participant	
expressed	the	view	that	migrants	were	particularly	prone	to	commit	crime	because:	
‘Whereas	if	you	are	new	here	and	you	have	not	got	family,	you	feel	less	responsible	to	the	
community,	so	there	seems	to	be	more	criminal	activity	for	people	that	are	foreign	rather	
than	anything	else’.		
As	we	discussed	above,	the	relationship	between	migration	and	crime,	both	in	relation	to	migrants	
breaching	immigration	controls	and	through	perpetrating	crime,	was	a	common	theme	throughout	
the	focus	group	discussions.	It	featured	in	discussions	about	integration	and	also	about	contribution	
and	deservedness.	As	such,	the	video	was	seen	as	ignoring	what	was	seen	as	an	important	topic	in	
relation	to	immigration.		
4.4.	Preferences	for	post-Brexit	immigration	policy	
In	the	survey	at	the	recruitment	stage	participants	were	asked	whether	they	agreed	with	the	
statement	that	‘the	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	on	EU	migration’.	
As	we	described	in	Section	3.2,	the	median	response	was	4,	with	1	being	‘Strongly	Disagree’	and	5	
being	‘Strongly	Agree’.	This	indicates	a	high	level	of	support	for	new,	more	restrictive	immigration	
policies	to	be	developed	once	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	To	understand	what	participants	might	expect	
from	new	immigration	policies,	their	preferences	and	rationale	for	these,	we	discussed	the	issue	in	
the	focus	groups.				
4.4.1.	Short-term	impacts	of	Brexit	on	immigration	
There	was	some	discussion	in	the	focus	groups	about	the	short-term	impacts	of	Brexit	and	likely	end	
of	free	movement.	First,	on	the	question	of	the	status	of	existing	EU	migrants,	there	was	general	
agreement	that	they	should	be	allowed	to	stay,	but	largely	on	the	condition	that	they	are	
contributing	economically.	Some	participants	expressed	concern	for	the	status	of	friends	or	family	
members,	primarily	cases	involving	partnerships	between	British	and	EU	citizens.	A	small	number	of	
participants	also	expressed	the	view	that	EU	citizens	might	be	less	inclined	to	come	to	the	UK	post-
Brexit	because	of	negative	messages	around	immigration.	Little	concern	was	expressed	for	any	
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implications	of	the	end	of	free	movement	for	British	citizens.	A	common	view	was	that	UK	citizens	
have	benefited	less	from	free	movement	than	those	of	other	EU	member	states.	As	one	participant	
argued:	
‘We	don’t	get	the	same	opportunities	in	other	countries	that	we	do	here.	If	I	wanted	to	pick	
up	sticks	and	move	to	Romania	or	Poland	there’s	nothing	for	me	there’.	
Only	a	small	number	of	focus	group	participants	could	give	examples	of	people	they	knew	who	had	
taken	the	opportunity	to	live	in	other	member	states,	though	some	knew	people	who	had	retired	to	
Spain.	There	was	also	some	discussion	about	the	position	of	British	citizens	living	in	other	member	
states,	particularly	Spain.	There	was	a	view	that	any	measures	which	resulted	in	their	return	to	the	
UK	would	have	a	negative	economic	impact	since	they	were	understood	to	be	older	and	retired.	
4.4.2.	Support	for	stronger	immigration	controls	but	not	necessarily	for	reducing	numbers	
We	asked	focus	group	participants	whether	they	would	like	to	see	new	immigration	policy	exerting	
greater	‘control’	or	reducing	migrant	numbers.	Reflecting	its	salience	to	participants,	the	issue	also	
arose	unprompted	in	discussions.	Whether	prompted	or	not,	the	predominant	view	was	that	new	
immigration	policy	should	exert	greater	control.	The	idea	of	imposing	immigration	controls	in	order	
to	select	for	quality	and	to	try	to	ensure	that	access	to	services	is	earned	through	contribution,	came	
up	in	all	focus	groups.	Other	reasons	for	exerting	control	included	improving	security,	safeguarding	
culture	or	selecting	for	specific	skills,	but	needing	to	ensure	contribution	was	the	most	commonly	
cited	reason	for	control.		
While	control	over	immigration	was	sometimes	seen	as	a	first	step	to	controlling	numbers,	it	was	
more	usually	expressed	as	a	goal	in	its	own	right:	
‘You	get	control	first.	You	can’t	curb	the	numbers	unless	you’ve	got	someone	to	police	it’	
‘Secure	the	borders.	That	would	be	of	big	benefit	to	me	to	know	that	our	borders	are	being	
controlled’.		
The	current	system	was	seen	by	many	to	lack	the	ability	to	control,	or	to	manage,	migration.	Two	
typical	viewpoints	were:	
‘We	are	known	for	a	wide	open	door	aren’t	we?	So	what	we	want	to	do	is	just	shut	the	door	
and	then	say	‘Right.	You	can	come	in,	because	we	have	got	control	and	it’s	uncontrolled	at	
the	moment’.		
‘I	want	to	have	the	right	to	say,	‘yes	we	want	you,	please	come,	thank	you	very	much’….	It’s	
the	being	able	to	come	whether	we	want	them	or	not.’	
But	control	was	not	supported	just	for	its	own	sake:	it	was	seen	as	important	to	control	certain	types	
of	migrant	or	migration.	These	included	the	prevention	of	entry	for	the	following	groups:		
• ‘Illegal’	(irregular)	migrants	who	have	no	legal	right	to	live	in	the	UK	
• Migrants	who	cannot	support	themselves,	including	those	who	will	claim	state	benefits	
• People	who	have	committed	crimes	
• Asylum	seekers	who	are	not	genuinely	seeking	sanctuary		
As	well	as	preventing	entry	of	migrants	who	have	no	legal	right	to	live	in	the	UK,	participants	were	
also	concerned	to	control	irregular	employment	of	migrants.	In	fact,	the	most	common	motivation	
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for	controlling	immigration	was	as	a	tool	for	increasing	the	(perceived)	quality	of	immigrants.	A	high-
quality	migrant	was	seen	to	be	someone	who	is	(a)	immigrating	to	work,	and	(b)	doesn’t	take	out	
more	than	they	put	in	with	respect	to	tax-funded	services	and	benefits,	such	as	the	NHS	and	welfare	
benefits.14	The	two	aspects	are	intertwined:	high-quality	immigrants	benefit	the	UK	by	working,	and	
don’t	cost	the	country	anything,	by	not	being	net	recipients	of	benefits	and	services.		
Among	some	participants,	there	was	a	pronounced	form	of	instrumentalism	underlying	this	
sentiment	about	high-	and	low-quality	migrants	in	the	focus	groups.	For	example,	in	relation	to	
admissions	criteria,	one	participant	asked	‘why	should	we	have	to	accommodate	people	that	we	
don’t	need?’	Other	participants	expressed	a	similar	sentiment:	
‘I	don’t	think	they	should	be	allowed	to	come	into	the	country	unless	they	are	going	to	
benefit	us’.	
‘[…]	you’ve	got	to	show	that	you’ve	got	something	to	contribute	to	the	country’.	
‘Prove	your	worth	and	then	you	can	stay’.	
It	was	also	seen	as	important	to	control	migration	of	people	who	cannot	support	themselves	and	
who	will	potentially	make	demands	on	the	state.	There	was	a	common	view	that	migrants	come	to	
the	UK	to	claim	benefits	and	that	this	should	be	subject	to	strict	control	by	allowing	entry	largely	to	
those	with	a	job.	As	one	participant	stated:	
‘If	they	have	not	got	the	money	to	support	themselves	for	x	period	of	time,	they	can’t	come	
[…]	You	have	got	to	have	a	job	and	the	finance	to	support	yourself’.	
‘It’s	not	necessarily	a	reduction	in	number:	it’s	a	reduction	in	the	people	that	are	just	going	to	
claim	off	the	state’.		
Or	more	positively:	
‘As	long	as	people	are	pulling	their	weight	when	they	come	over	here,	fair	enough,	not	a	
problem’.		
The	idea	of	imposing	controls	for	purposes	of	making	sure	that	immigrants	contribute	was	the	only	
consideration	that	came	up	in	every	single	focus	group	condition,	and	that	moreover	tended	to	
come	up	early	on	in	the	focus	groups.		
Participants	also	expressed	a	desire	that	migrants	should	be	free	of	a	criminal	record	and	that	
immigration	controls	should	screen	such	people	out.	The	association	between	immigration	and	
crime	was	strong	in	many	of	the	focus	groups.	This	was	expressed	both	in	relation	to	irregular	
immigration	and	more	generally.	The	views	of	two	participants	are	typical:	
‘We’ve	let	all	and	sundry	in…	people	come	here	with	criminal	records	and	we	don’t	even	
look’.	
																																								 																				
14	This	 notion	 of	 a	 high-quality	 immigrant	 is	 similar	 to	 what	 Hainmueller	 and	 Hopkins	 (2014)	 refer	 to	 as	 a	
‘preferred	 immigrant’,	 someone	who	 ‘is	well	 educated	 and	 in	 a	 high-status	 occupation,	with	plans	 to	work,	
good	English	skills,	and	no	prior	unauthorized	entries’	(239).	
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‘I’d	like	to	see	background	checks	done…	I	think	there’s	been	a	few	cases	like	them	where	
there’s	been	some	real	serial	offenders,	like	murders,	have	come	into	the	country	and	just	
disappeared’.		
Migration	by	asylum-seekers	and	refugees	was	seen	as	important	to	control,	in	particular	to	ensure	
that	claims	were	genuine	and	were	not	motivated	largely	by	economic	concerns	or	criminal	
intentions.	There	was	also	scepticism	about	the	age	of	child	refugees	and	that	current	checks	are	not	
being	carried	out	correctly.	A	number	of	participants	questioned	why	a	‘genuine’	asylum	seeker	
would	not	aim	to	settle	in	the	first	country	they	arrived	at	rather	than	travel	across	Europe	to	the	
UK.	There	was	a	view	that	such	migrants	are	motivated	by	reports	of	‘easy	money’	in	the	form	of	
benefits.	In	some	focus	groups	a	direct	link	was	made	between	refugees	and	crime.	
4.4.3.	Numbers	are	important	to	some	
In	discussions	about	control	versus	numbers,	some	respondents	argued	that	the	number	of	migrants	
is	less	important	than	establishing	processes	and	criteria.	One	participant	expressed	the	view	of	
others	in	saying	‘I	think	they	need	to	start	with	control	first	and	then	think	about	reducing	numbers’.	
But	despite	this	common	view,	some	participants	also	argued	that	the	number	of	migrants	should	be	
reduced.	Only	a	very	small	number	thought	migration	should	be	stopped,	and	even	these	thought	
this	should	be	a	temporary	measure.	One	suggestion	was	to	balance	in-flows	against	out-flows	on	a	
one	for	one	basis.	
The	main	reason	given	for	needing	to	control	numbers	was	to	reduce	demand	on	services,	especially	
health,	education	and	housing.	While	participants	recognised	the	contribution	of	migrants	to	
services,	in	particular	health,	they	were	concerned	about	the	capacity	of	UK	public	services.	Again,	
participants	worried	most	about	their	use	by	migrants	who	had	not	made	a	financial	contribution:	
‘It’s	not	a	direct	thing	but	they	are	coming	over	here	and	they	are	stretching	our	resources:	
the	ones	that	are	obviously	not	paying	into	the	NHS’.		
Some	participants	argued	more	generally	that	Britain	is	too	full	with	a	participant	in	the	same	group	
arguing:	
‘If	we	keep	on	saturating	our	own	country,	it’s	going	to	reach	a	point	where	it	just	implodes	
and	that’s	it.	There’s	got	to	be	some	control	over	it.’	
Rather	than	for	migrant	numbers	to	be	reduced	overall,	many	participants	wished	to	see	fewer	
migrants	in	certain	categories.	These	were	the	same	groups	as	those	who	should	be	subject	to	
greater	control,	largely	criminals	and	those	attracted	by	the	UK’s	benefit	system.	Therefore,	one	
participant	who	saw	the	UK	as	‘at	full	capacity’	argued	that	this	would	not	be	the	case	‘if	we	shipped	
out	the	ones	that	aren’t	contributing	to	our	society’.		
4.4.4.	Should	new	immigration	policies	prioritise	skilled	workers?	
As	we	discussed	earlier,	there	was	relatively	little	support	for	reducing	the	number	of	skilled	
migrants	and	many	participants	supported	migration	of	doctors,	nurses,	teachers	and	other	skilled	
groups.	The	median	value	at	the	stage	of	recruitment	to	the	focus	groups	to	the	question	‘To	what	
extent	to	do	you	think	high	skilled	EU	migrants	are	good	or	bad	for	the	economy’	was	5	
(representing	‘very	good’).		
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Survey	respondents	were	also	asked	whether	they	thought	there	should	be	changes	the	number	of	
EU	migrants	in	certain	categories.	These	were	Health	and	Social	Care,	Agriculture,	Hotels	and	
Restaurants,	Packing	and	Distribution.	As	can	be	seen	from	Figure	7,	for	each	of	these	sectors,	about	
half	or	more	of	all	of	the	participants	reported	wanting	numbers	to	remain	the	same.	The	largest	
share	of	participants	reporting	wanting	to	see	an	increase	was	for	agriculture	(26%).	The	largest	
share	of	participants	wanting	to	see	a	reduction	in	numbers	was	for	health	and	social	care	(40%).	
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Figure	10.	Distribution	at	pre	stage	of	participants’	responses	to	the	question	‘For	each	of	
these	sectors,	please	tell	us	whether	you	would	prefer	the	number	of	EU	migrants	coming	
to	live	in	the	UK	to	be	increased,	reduced	or	remain	about	the	same’.	
In	focus	group	discussions,	there	was	relatively	little	discussion	about	skill	as	a	basis	for	decisions	
about	the	right	to	live	and	work	in	the	UK.	Instead,	discussions	about	control	centred	on	issues	of	
legality	and	legitimacy.	At	the	same	time,	participants	had	views	about	the	relative	value	of	migrants	
based	on	skills	criteria.	Positive	statements	were	made	about	highly	skilled	migrants,	in	particular	
doctors,	nurses	and	teachers.	But	participants	also	saw	a	need	for	skilled	workers	outside	of	these	
occupations,	to	fill	gaps	in	supply.	Skills	were	broadly	defined	and	included	trades.	The	views	of	the	
following	participant	reflect	others:	
‘Every	single	school	has	got	an	issue	with	vacancies.	There	are	carpenters	that	we’re	
short	of.	There	are	plumbers	that	we’re	short	of.	They	don’t	necessarily	have	to	be	
intelligent,	academic	kind	of	highly	skilled	workers	but	as	long	as	there’s	something	
that	they	can	contribute…	and	not	claim	off	the	state’	
Lower	skilled	migration	was	also	supported	where	shortages	exist,	for	example	in	agriculture.	The	
employment	of	migrants	in	seasonal	work	was	raised	in	ten	out	of	twelve	focus	groups.	It	was	an	
issue	which	generated	discussion	with	many	participants	saying	they	or	their	families	had	carried	out	
seasonal	work.	It	was	generally	agreed	that	the	work	no	longer	attractive	to	British	workers	because	
it	is	now	regulated,	so	that	pay	has	to	be	declared	rather	than	given	by	cash	in	hand,	and	women	are	
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no	longer	allowed	to	take	their	children	to	work.	Wages	were	also	reported	to	have	fallen,	but	the	
seasonality	and	nature	of	the	work	were	seen	as	the	principal	factors	deterring	British	workers.	
Therefore,	it	was	seen	to	be	legitimate	for	farmers	to	be	able	to	recruit	migrants	for	seasonal	work.		
As	stated	above,	for	several	participants,	the	level	of	skill	was	a	less	important	factor	than	the	
contribution	that	a	migrant	makes,	seen	in	broadly	economic	terms.	For	many	participants,	the	main	
criteria	for	entry	was	therefore	that	an	individual	should	make	a	contribution	and	be	able	to	support	
themselves.	This	general	view	is	represented	by	the	following	statement	by	one	participant:	
‘If	they’ve	got	the	means	to	support	themselves,	having	a	skill	and	that	skill	could	be	
landscape	gardening	or	building	a	brick	wall.	I	can’t	do	those	things	but	have	they	got	
something	that	they	can	offer?’	
Some	participants	took	this	further	in	expressing	the	view	that	almost	anyone	should	be	allowed	
into	the	UK	to	work,	and	that	controls	should	be	put	in	place	simply	to	prevent	entry	to	people	who	
come	to	claim	benefits	or	who	have	broken	the	law.	There	was	some	agreement	with	the	statement	
of	one	participant,	referring	to	the	defence	proposal	exercise,	that	‘if	they’re	employed	and	they’re	
in	society	I’d	happily	give	them	the	£200	to	work	out	how	to	stay’.	Her	following	qualification	was	
also	supported	by	the	group:		
‘But	if	they’re	sponging	off	our	system,	if	you’re	not	paying	benefits,	if	you’re	just	living	on	
benefits	and	you’re	living	in	our	accommodation	then	you	don’t	get	it.	You’re	going	home’.		
Cultural	requirements	were	also	mentioned	as	important	in	whether	an	individual	should	be	allowed	
to	settle	in	the	UK,	but	raised	much	less	frequently	than	economic	or	financial	considerations.	
Cultural	requirements	centred	on	the	ability	to	speak	English,	or	willingness	to	learn,	and	to	
integrate	into	British	society.	One	participant	reflected	the	views	of	some	others	in	stating:	
‘When	you	can	agree	that	you	are	going	to	blend	in	and	integrate	with	our	way	of	life	then	
come,	but	if	you	are	going	to	come	over	and	be	arrogant	and	not	learn	English,	just	what	to	
celebrate	your	own	religion	and	make	everyone	else	suffer	for	that,	that	is	English,	then	it	is	
not	fair’.	
The	Australian	points-based	system	was	raised	as	a	model	of	immigration	policy	in	all	of	the	focus	
groups,	though	was	rarely	discussed	in	any	depth.	This	policy	was	designed	specifically	to	target	
migrants	who	have	skills	or	outstanding	abilities	and	to	meet	labour	shortages:	more	than	two-thirds	
of	all	places	are	allocated	to	skilled	migrants	who	have	to	meet	requirements	for	age,	English	
language	competency,	qualifications	and	experience	and	must	either	be	sponsored	by	an	employer	
or	their	occupation	must	be	on	an	approved	list,	with	numerical	caps	(Gower,	2016).	
Public	understanding	of	the	Australian	system	centres	on	its	focus	on	the	skills	needs	of	the	country.	
Participants	referred,	variously,	to	the	requirement	to	have	skills,	a	sponsor	in	the	country	and	a	
reserve	of	money	in	an	Australian	bank.	The	system	was	seen	to	have	the	ability	to	select	migrants	
with	positive	motivations	and	who	will	not	make	demands	on	the	state.	One	participant	explained:	
‘I	don’t	get	why	should	we	try	to	accommodate,	find	jobs	or	have	people	coming	over	
without	jobs	and,	to	put	it	crudely,	taking	benefits	and	obviously	the	tax	payer	paying	
towards	them	for	them	to	sit	around	and	do	nothing.’		
57	|	Post-Brexit	Immigration	Policy:	Reconciling	Public	Perceptions	with	Economic	Evidence	
National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	
Unskilled	migrants	were	seen	as	less	desirable	than	those	with	skills	and	there	was	a	view	that	
Britain	should	supply	its	own	unskilled	labour.	However,	some	participants	made	a	case	for	unskilled	
migration	to	be	continued,	though	subject	to	control	over	numbers.	As	one	participant	argued:	
‘I	would	say	with	regard	to	their	skills	we	do	need	some	unskilled	workers	because	the	people	
that	are	unskilled	in	this	country	won’t	take	[the	jobs].	They’d	rather	have	benefits	because	
it’s	better	for	them.	I	think	that	we	should	have	a	limited	amount	of	different	skills	and	
unskilled.	I	think	that	would	be	fair.	It	wouldn’t	over-burden	the	country’.	
While	the	need	for	lower	skilled	migrants	was	acknowledged,	there	was	also	concern	that	such	
migrants	make	less	contribution	and	are	more	likely	to	be	in	need	of	state	support.		
4.4.5.	Should	new	immigration	policies	prioritise	EU	citizens?	
Some	focus	groups	also	discussed	whether	new	immigration	policy	should	give	priority	to	EU	
citizens,	and	views	on	this	were	mixed.	Some	participants	thought	that	new	immigration	policy	
should	depend	on	trade	and	with	reciprocal	arrangements	with	other	countries,	including	from	
outside	the	EU.	They	believed	there	was	little	justification	for	giving	preferential	terms	to	EU	
migrants	and	that	Brexit	should	create	a	‘level	playing	field’.		
Other	participants	expressed	stronger	support	for	European	migration	than	from	other	countries,	
largely	because	they	regarded	it	as	economic	migration.	But	other	factors	also	meant	that	some	
participants	favoured	European	migration,	with	some	participants	expressing	hostility	towards	
Muslim	migrants	who	they	characterised	as	unwilling	to	integrate	into	British	society.	Economic,	
skills-based,	reasons	were	also	given	for	removing	any	priority	to	EU	citizens.	As	one	participant	
argued:	
‘I	don’t	see	why	we	should	have	any	difference,	once	we’re	out	of	the	EU	when	someone	
from	France	has	got	the	right	skills,	someone	from	Australia,	India,	Uzbekistan.	It	doesn’t	
make	a	difference.	But	it	should	be	based	on	what	gaps	we’ve	got	in	our	economy	and	
employment	as	with	skills’.		
Participants	also	expressed	some	support	for	temporary	migration	where	this	is	necessary	to	meet	
temporary	shortages	or	for	seasonal	work.	At	the	same	time,	there	was	some	concern	that	
temporary	workers	would	fail	to	leave	when	their	visa	expired.	One	participant	worried	that:	
‘You’d	need	to	have	a	whole	police	force	purely	looking	out	where	these	people	are,	tracking	
their	progress,	in	inverted	commas…	They	might	be	sacked	the	next	week	if	they’re	not	very	
good,	or	they	may	seek	a	job	with	more	money	somewhere	else.	They	would	go	running’.		
There	was	particular	concern	that	such	individuals	would	then	fail	to	make	a	contribution.	Questions	
were	also	raised	about	provision	of	housing	and	access	to	health	services:	
‘…	what	happens	in	that	year	if	they’re	taken	ill,	or	have	an	accident?	Do	we	have	to	care	for	
that	as	well?’	
There	were	therefore	mixed	feelings	about	widespread	use	of	temporary	visas.		
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5.	CONCLUSIONS		
Our	research	helps	to	fill	a	gap	in	our	understanding	of	what	lies	behind	headline	opinion-poll	and	
large-scale	survey	findings	on	public	concerns	about	EU	immigration.	It	also	contributes	to	a	more	
detailed	understanding	of	how	people	use	economic	evidence	on	immigration,	and	the	relative	
importance	they	give	to	various	sources	of	information	about	migration	impacts.	Additionally,	in	
more	practical	terms,	our	findings	help	us	understand	what	the	public	would	like	to	see	from	new,	
post-Brexit	immigration	policy,	and	how	these	relate	to	the	needs	of	the	economy	and	employers.		
In	interpreting	our	findings,	we	have	been	mindful	that	our	sample	does	not	reflect	the	profile	of	the	
UK	population	as	a	whole.	We	selected	a	Leave	voting	area	to	carry	out	our	research,	and	our	sample	
was	consistent	with	the	referendum	result	in	the	local	area	in	question.	As	such,	our	participants	
were	more	likely	than	the	general	public	to	be	concerned	about	the	impact	of	EU	migration	and	this	
is	confirmed	by	responses	to	our	recruitment	survey.	At	the	same	time,	given	the	interpretation	of	
the	referendum	vote	as	reflecting	concerns	about	immigration,	our	participants	are	a	group	whose	
opinions	policy-makers	are	seeking	to	take	into	account	in	drawing	up	new	immigration	
arrangements.		
For	this	reason,	it	is	important	that	the	opinions	and	preferences	of	groups	such	as	our	focus	groups	
are	understood.	However,	our	overall	finding	is	that	these	opinions	and	preferences	might	have	
been	misunderstood	or	misinterpreted.	In	particular,	our	results	offer	some	reason	to	believe	that	
these	views	are	fairly	nuanced	on	the	needs	of	the	economy,	and	that	popular	preferences	and	
those	of	employers	are	not	as	far	apart	as	might	be	assumed.		
5.1.	Immigration	attitudes	are	deeply	embedded	and	resistant	to	economic	
evidence	
We	used	a	range	of	methods	and	techniques	to	test	a	number	of	hypotheses	about	the	role	of	
economic	evidence	in	the	formation	of	immigration	attitudes.	Our	aims	were	ambitious	in	using	
focus	groups	to	identify	ways	of	getting	people	to	consider	the	evidence	and	to	find	this	reflected	in	
changes	in	their	reported	attitudes,	including	about	immigration	policy.	We	employed	experimental	
interventions	aimed	at	making	people	feel	listened	to,	promoting	the	consideration	of	alternative	
viewpoints,	and	reducing	in-group	favouritism,	prior	to	screening	a	facts-based	video	that	summed	
up	the	available	evidence	on	the	economic	impact	of	immigration.	However,	we	found	no	evidence	
that	their	stated	policy	preferences	were	responsive	to	these	methods.	This	is	perhaps	not	surprising	
as	it	is	consistent	with	existing	evidence	that,	while	factual	misconceptions	can	be	corrected,	policy	
preferences	are	more	deep-seated,	and	unlikely	to	budge	in	the	face	of	a	simple	re-assessment	of	
the	facts	(Grigorieff	et	al.,	2016;	Hopkins	et	al.,	2016;	Lawrence	and	Sides,	2014).	
5.2.	Personal	experience	and	anecdotes	are	seen	as	more	credible	than	media	
stories	or	economic	evidence			
One	possible	explanation	for	the	absence	of	any	change	in	the	policy	preferences	of	focus	group	
participants	is	that	the	type	of	evidence	offered	in	the	video,	i.e.,	statistical	economic	evidence,	was	
not	one	the	participants	considered	particularly	relevant.	In	particular,	the	kind	of	evidence	invoked	
by	participants	in	our	focus	group	suggested	a	clear	hierarchy,	with	personal	experiences	and	
anecdotes	at	the	top,	and	media	stories	and	statistical	information	at	the	bottom,	in	line	with	recent	
findings	by	British	Future	(Rutter	and	Carter,	2018).	
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Since	the	issue	of	migration	is	frequently	covered	in	the	media,	we	had	expected	media	stories	to	be	
cited	as	evidence	on	immigration	impacts.	However,	few	media	stories	were	brought	up	by	
participants.	When	mentioned,	newspapers	and	on-line	sources	such	as	Facebook	were	typically	
referred	to	as	unreliable	and	as	presenting	extreme	views	and	unrepresentative	cases.	Comparisons	
were	made	with	media	coverage	of	welfare	claimants.		
Instead,	participants	primarily	relied	on	personal	narratives	and	anecdotal	evidence.	Participants	had	
a	store	of	such	evidence	from	the	accounts	of	friends,	family	and	acquaintances,	which	they	used	to	
support	specific	and	popular	themes	around	migration	impacts.	The	most	common	theme	was	the	
principle	of	putting	in	before	you	take	out,	with	examples	frequently	involving	migrants	accessing	
services.	Narratives	based	in	personal	and	local	experiences	undoubtedly	appealed	to	participants	
but	their	preference	for	them	likely	also	stemmed	from	their	stated	mistrust	of	the	media	and	of	
economic	evidence,	which	led	them	to	conclude	that	it	is	best	to	rely	on	your	own	evidence.		
As	mentioned,	our	methods	involved	the	use	of	economic	evidence	in	the	form	of	a	video.	Surveys	of	
our	participants	revealed	considerable	scepticism	about	its	merits,	with	42%	of	participants	believing	
it	to	be	biased	in	its	presentation	of	basic	facts	about	impact.	This	might	in	part	stem	from	public	
understandings	of	aggregate	economic	statistics:	they	believe	that	there	are	many	cases	that	go	
against	the	general	picture	which	make	average	impacts	a	questionable	notion.	Many	of	our	focus	
group	participants	felt	that	their	local	area	was	affected	more	by	immigration	than	other	parts	of	the	
UK,	and	that	the	migrants	they	come	across	are	likely	to	be	taking	out	more	than	they	put	in.	
Therefore,	while	participants	showed	a	basic	understanding	of	the	economics	of	immigration,	and	
felt	it	was	important,	many	did	not	see	that	it	should	change	their	views.	It	is	likely	that	their	
scepticism	about	general	economic	impacts	and	statistical	data	reinforced	their	conclusion	that	it	is	
best	to	rely	on	your	own	assessment	based	on	what	you	see	and	hear.	
5.3.	The	value	of	EU	migrants	is	assessed	by	their	economic	contribution			
Interestingly,	while	participants	as	already	noted	largely	rejected	the	type	of	economic	evidence	
offered	as	part	of	the	focus	groups,	they	did	see	the	main	impact	of	EU	immigration	as	economic,	in	
terms	of	its	impacts	on	jobs,	wages	and	public	services.		
Our	participants	had	mixed	views	on	whether	EU	migration	is	economically	good	or	bad	for	the	UK,	
especially	in	terms	of	jobs.	Consistent	with	existing	polling	data	(Ford,	2012;	Blinder	and	Allen,	2016;	
Heath	and	Richards,	2018),	they	saw	most	value	in	highly	skilled	migration,	with	88%	saying	that	it	is	
good	for	the	UK	economy.	In	particular,	there	were	frequent	mentions	of	the	importance	of	migrant	
doctors	to	the	NHS.	At	the	same	time,	participants	tended	to	agree	with	the	statement	that	‘the	UK	
should	grow	its	own	skills	rather	than	rely	on	EU	immigration’.	There	was	widespread	agreement	
that	British	young	people	are	not	given	sufficient	opportunity	to	acquire	skills,	in	particular	through	
vocational	training	routes.		
Opinion	was	more	divided	on	the	economic	value	of	low	skilled	migration,	with	a	third	saying	that	it	
was	good,	a	third	bad	and	a	third	neutral.	Based	on	existing	survey	findings,	it	is	commonly	assumed	
that	the	public	is	opposed	to	low-skilled	migration	(e.g.,	MAC,	2018).	In	focus	group	discussions,	
however,	many	participants	said	that	low	skilled	migration	played	a	role	in	meeting	labour	
shortages,	and	recognised	that	migrants	are	needed	in	a	wide	range	of	economic	sectors	which	fail	
to	recruit	sufficient	British	workers.	In	keeping	with	their	views	on	highly	skilled	migration,	they	felt	
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that	opportunities	for	British	people	to	acquire	skills	should	be	improved,	and	also	that	the	quality	of	
jobs	and	pay	should	be	increased.		
In	line	with	other	research,	we	found	that	the	impact	on	public	services	was	an	issue	of	considerable	
concern:	many	participants	not	only	believed	that	some	migrants	were	a	net	drain	on	public	
finances,	they	also	believed	that	some	groups	of	migrants,	though	not	necessarily	from	the	EU,	enjoy	
priority	access	to	health	and	housing.	Possibly	reflecting	local	concerns,	they	were	most	concerned	
about	housing,	followed	by	negative	impacts	on	NHS	and	schools.	However,	while	participants	were	
concerned	about	such	impacts,	they	did	not	argue	that	migrants	should	not	be	able	to	access	
services	such	as	health	and	education.	Their	concerns	were	that	the	UK	should	ensure	that	migration	
is	of	high	quality,	typically	constructed	as	someone	who	is	immigrating	to	work	and	is	a	net	
contributor	to	the	public	purse.	
Concerns	about	impacts	on	public	services	were	underlain	by	ideas	of	deservedness	and	the	
principle	that	a	user	of	services	should	be	a	contributor	rather	than	a	burden.		This	principle	was	also	
applied	to	British	people	who	were	also	strongly	criticised	for	claiming	welfare	benefit	in	preference	
to	work.	But	at	the	same	time,	British	people	were	seen	to	have	more	right	to	claim	benefits	in	not	
needing	to	prove	their	entitlement.	For	migrants,	access	to	benefits	was	seen	as	conditional	on	
economic	contribution.	
The	importance	of	contribution	as	a	condition	for	accessing	benefits	or	services	was	a	prominent	
theme	in	focus	group	discussions,	but	within	this,	any	kind	of	economic	contribution	through	formal	
and	regulated	employment,	high	or	low	skilled,	was	viewed	positively.	The	opposite	of	contributing,	
i.e.,	needing	state	support,	was	an	equally	common,	related	theme.	Many	participants	expressed	
concerns	that	migrants,	including	from	the	EU,	are	attracted	to	the	UK	to	claim	benefits	rather	than	
to	work,	or	to	commit	crime.	Beliefs	that	migrants	are	attracted	to	the	UK	for	these	purposes	lead	
some	to	conclude	that	many	migrants	do	not	contribute	to	the	UK,	but	detract	both	economically	
and	in	other	ways,	including	through	making	it	a	less	safe	place	to	live.	Views	on	the	motivations	of	
migrants	to	come	to	the	UK	led	many	participants	to	believe	that	a	reasonable	proportion	of	
migrants	would	not	come	if	they	were	not	able	to	claim	benefits.	This	points	to	the	need	for	greater	
awareness	that	existing	benefit	rules	already	prevent	such	access,	rather	than	a	change	in	welfare	
policy,	and	further	highlights	the	role	of	anecdotes	in	the	formation	of	beliefs	about	immigrants.	
5.4.	Cultural	concerns	are	not	prominent	in	the	debate	about	EU	migration			
The	academic	debate	on	immigration	attitudes	has	seesawed	over	whether	they	are	driven	by	
economic	or	cultural	concerns,	with	some	commentators	arguing	that	economic	concerns	are	
expressed	as	a	more	acceptable	form	of	objection	in	a	focus	group	setting	(Kaufmann,	2018).	We	did	
not	ask	focus	group	participants	directly	about	cultural	concerns	but	they	did	raise	them	and	often	
quite	forcefully.	Participants	were	not	shy	in	expressing	cultural	concerns	about	immigration	even	if	
the	debate	about	economic	contribution	was	the	dominant	theme	in	discussions.	This	suggests	that	
both	economic	and	cultural	concerns	exist,	likely	working	in	tandem	and	likely	with	variations	
between	individuals.		
However,	in	the	case	of	EU	migration,	our	research	seems	to	suggest	that	economic	contribution	
was	seen	as	more	important.	When	participants	did	raise	cultural	concerns,	it	was	largely	with	
reference	to	British	ethnic	minorities,	in	particular	Muslims,	and	in	relation	to	issues	of	dress	and	
crime.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	existing	experimental	survey	evidence	which	shows	that	
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different	migrant	and	ethnic	groups	are	associated	with	different	concerns:	Eastern	European	
migrants	are	associated	with	economic	threat	and	Muslim	ethnic	minorities	and	migrants	with	
security	threat	and	crime	(Hellwig	and	Sinno,	2016;	Stansfield	and	Stone,	2018).	More	generally,	
many	participants	held	the	view	that	the	UK	has	‘too	many	cultures’.	They	argued	that	British	culture	
is	being	demoted,	expressing	this	through	statements	such	as	‘you	can	no	longer	celebrate	
Christmas’	or	fly	the	Union	flag.	Again,	we	have	to	recognise	that	ours	is	not	a	representative	
national	sample	but	rather	one	that	represents	a	specific	vocal	group	of	opinions	within	the	UK.	
Focus	group	participants	said	little	about	integration	more	generally,	although	speaking	English	was	
seen	as	an	important	requirement	of	living	and	working	in	the	UK.	Some	participants	did	value	
cultural	diversity	and	integration,	and	cited	examples	from	their	workplaces	and	from	schools.		
5.5.	Public	preferences	for	new	immigration	policy	emphasise	control	and	the	
quality	of	migrants	
Existing	research	generally	concludes	that	the	public	is	expecting	Brexit	to	result	in	a	reduction	in	
migrant	numbers	and	greater	control	over	entry,	probably	in	tandem	(Ipsos	MORI,	2018).	In	the	
survey,	our	participants	did	say	that	they	did	want	the	Government	to	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	
to	reduce	the	number	of	EU	immigrants	coming	to	the	country.	However,	whenever	that	preference	
was	elaborated	on	in	focus	group	discussion,	it	was	framed	in	terms	of	a	desire	for	high-quality	
migrants,	and	a	reduction	in	those	who	come	for	other	purposes	other	than	to	work	or	study.	In	
relation	to	specific	occupational	groups,	the	survey	found	that	most	respondents	wanted	numbers	
to	remain	the	same	in	agriculture,	hotels	and	restaurants	and	in	packing	and	distribution.	Around	a	
quarter	wanted	numbers	in	these	occupational	areas	reduced,	except	for	health	and	social	care	
where	40%	did	so.	There	was	some	support	for	an	increase	in	some	of	these	occupational	areas,	
particularly	in	agriculture	where	26%	were	in	favour	of	higher	numbers.		
In	exploring	post-Brexit	immigration	principles	in	the	focus	groups,	we	found	stronger	support	for	
achieving	the	objective	of	controlling	immigration	than	for	a	reduction	in	numbers.	Controls	were	
seen	as	important	to	keep	out	people	motivated	by	the	prospect	of	claiming	benefits	and	
committing	crime.	Participants	also	argued	that	new	immigration	systems	should	include	
mechanisms	ensuring	that	migrants	do	not	over-stay	temporary	visa	arrangements.		
It	is	also	commonly	argued	that	the	public	has	a	strong	preference	for	highly	skilled	over	low-skilled	
migration	(see	Blinder	and	Markaki,	2018;	Heath	and	Richards,	2018).	Participants	reported	a	
preference	to	that	effect	in	our	survey,	where	88%	said	high-skilled	migrants	are	good	for	the	UK	
economy.	At	the	same	time,	a	third	of	participants	also	thought	that	low	skilled	migration	is	good	for	
the	economy	and	a	further	third	thought	its	impact	is	neutral.	Recognition	that	migrants	carry	out	
jobs	which	British	workers	are	reluctant	to	do	meant	that	a	case	was	seen	for	some	continuation	in	
supply.	And	here,	financial	contribution	was	important	to	many	participants.	Doubts	about	its	value	
centred	on	its	need	focused	on	the	availability	of	British	workers	and	alternatives	were	identified	in	
encouraging,	or	even	forcing,	benefit	claimants	into	work.	Improving	the	quality	of	jobs	was	also	
seen	as	an	important	step	to	making	vacancies	more	attractive	to	British	workers.	
Existing	literature	suggests	that	British	people	are	more	accepting	of	migrants	of	white,	English-
speaking,	European	and	Christian	origin	(Carl	et	al.,	2018;	Ford,	2011),	but	there	is	mixed	evidence	
whether	they	favour	EU	migrants	to	non-EU	migrants	(Blinder	and	Markaki,	2018;	Hix	et	al.,	2017).	In	
our	focus	groups,	participants’	views	on	whether	future	policy	should	favour	EU	migrants	varied.	
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Some	wished	to	see	ties	with	the	EU	continue,	and	were	concerned	at	the	potential	loss	of	rights	of	
EU	citizens	who	they	knew.	There	was	a	general	view	that	UK	citizens	have	benefited	less	from	free	
movement	than	their	counterparts	in	other	member	states.	Therefore,	in	terms	of	future	policy,	
some	participants	felt	there	was	little	justification	for	giving	preferential	terms	to	EU	citizens.	
However,	others	felt	this	was	valid	since	much	EU	immigration	occurs	for	economic	reasons,	and	was	
therefore	seen	as	legitimate.	Consequently,	our	data	gives	no	strong	indication	of	whether	the	
public	would	support	policies	which	give	EU	citizens	preference.		
5.6.	Implications	of	our	findings	
Our	research	findings	have	implications	for	the	terms	of	the	debate	on	immigration	and	for	new,	
post-Brexit	immigration	policy.	
5.6.1.	Implications	for	the	nature	of	the	debate	
Much	of	the	focus	group	discussion	took	on	a	negative	tone,	although	individual	participants	did	
have	quite	mixed	views.	But,	while	some	participants	did	express	positive	attitudes,	and	told	positive	
stores	involving	integration,	especially	by	children	in	schools,	the	general	thread	was	negative.	
Overall,	immigration	was	discussed	as	if	it	is	a	problem	to	be	dealt	with	and	it	was	clear	that	
participants	were	much	more	familiar	with	negative	than	positive	themes	and	narratives	around	
immigration.		
In	this	context,	the	tone	of	the	video	shown	as	part	of	the	focus	group	discussion	was	viewed	with	
suspicion,	not	necessarily	because	of	its	content	was	disputed	but	because	it	was	seen	as	too	
positive.	At	the	same	time,	around	half	of	participants	who	filled	out	the	follow-up	survey	two	weeks	
after	the	focus	groups	said	that	they	felt	they	had	learned	something	from	the	video.		
Of	course,	immigration	might	not	be	unique	in	being	viewed	within	a	negative	framework.	Bobby	
Duffy	(2018)	finds	more	generally	that	people	are	more	receptive	to	information	presented	
negatively.	This	presents	a	challenge	for	the	immigration	debate	when	there	are	benefits	to	
migration.	Our	research	also	suggests	that	media	stories	are	less	influential	than	personal	narratives	
obtained	in	conversations	with	others.	Of	course,	our	research	may	have	understated	the	influence	
of	the	media,	particularly	in	shaping	the	terms	of	the	debate	rather	than	by	providing	information	
about	immigration.	There	is	evidence	that	the	media	does	indeed	frame	stories	about	immigration	
negatively	(Allen	and	Blinder,	2013),	and	there	is	a	growing	body	of	literature	suggesting	that	media	
affects	people’s	immigration	attitudes,	though	it	is	hard	to	determine	to	what	extent	it	is	public	
attitudes	that	affect	media	coverage	and	not	the	other	way	around	(Meltzer	et	al.,	2017).			
The	propensity	to	rely	on	personal	accounts	and	to	distrust	economic	statistics	about	immigration	
presents	challenges	for	society,	for	example	in	hostility	towards	migrants.	Combined	with	possible	
misconceptions	about	migrants’	access	to	benefits	and	impact	on	services	such	as	health,	education	
and	housing,	there	is	also	a	challenge	for	policy	makers	aiming	to	address	public	concerns.	Many	
participants	felt	they	did	not	have	enough	opportunity	to	discuss	immigration	and	that	the	current	
debate	is	polarised.	They	enjoyed	taking	part	in	the	focus	groups	and	said	they	welcomed	the	
opportunity	to	hear	others’	views.	While	there	is	clearly	a	selection	effect,	it	may	indicate	a	more	
general	public	interest	in	discussing	immigration	in	some	form	of	public	setting,	and	in	improving	the	
quality	of	the	debate.	While	the	public	is	to	some	degree	sceptical	about	statistical	evidence	on	
immigration,	our	earlier	research	found	that	they	also	have	an	interest	in	understanding	the	broader	
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impacts	(Rolfe	et	al,	2016).		Therefore,	if	used	carefully,	statistical	evidence	may	have	a	valuable	role	
to	play.		
5.6.2.	Reconciling	public	attitudes	on	immigration	with	the	needs	of	the	economy	and	employers		
It	is	often	assumed	that	the	preferences	of	the	public	are	at	odds	with	the	needs	of	the	economy	and	
employers,	in	that	the	public	would	like	a	substantial	reduction	in	immigration	to	the	extent	that	
would	damage	the	economy,	while	employers	want	much	more	immigration	than	is	strictly	
necessary	to	meet	the	needs	of	businesses	and	services.	However,	when	taken	in	conjunction	with	
our	research	on	post-Brexit	policy	preferences	of	employers,	carried	out	before	and	after	the	
referendum	vote	(Rolfe	and	Hudson-Sharp,	2016;	Rolfe,	2016;	Davies	and	Rolfe,	2017;	Dolton	et	al,	
2018),	our	focus	groups	suggest	that	employers	and	the	public	might	not	be	as	far	apart	as	is	often	
assumed.		
Firstly,	employers	are	fairly	confident	that	new	systems	will	allow	for	the	recruitment	of	highly	
skilled	workers,	although	employers	in	sectors	such	as	health	are	not	necessarily	satisfied	with	
current	visa	arrangements	for	recruiting	non-EU	migrants	and	would	not	wish	for	these	to	be	used	
more	widely.	Employers	are	less	sure	that	adequate	provision	will	be	made	for	lower	skilled	roles,	
partly	because	they	believe	the	referendum	outcome	was	interpreted	as	a	vote	against	low	skilled	
immigration.	The	available	evidence	therefore	suggests	that	employers	would	like	a	new	
immigration	system	with	the	following	features:		
• policies	 which	 allow	 for	 the	 recruitment	 of	 lower	 skilled	 workers,	 rather	 than	 those	 with	
professional	or	high	level	qualifications,	and	jobs	at	low	pay	levels;		
• policies	 which	 are	 responsive	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 and	 which	 can	 therefore	
respond	quickly	to	labour	and	skills	shortages;		
• visas,	or	other	arrangements,	which	enable	migrants	to	remain	in	the	workforce	on	a	long-
term	basis	to	develop	skills,	experience	and	company-specific	knowledge.		
Our	focus	group	research	findings	suggest	that	these	conditions	might	also	be	broadly	acceptable	to	
the	public,	given	that	they	recognise	the	need	for	lower	skilled	as	well	as	highly	skilled	workers.	
Employers	also	express	some	concern	over	temporary	visas	since	they	provide	only	short-term	
labour	and	are	hard	to	regulate.	And	focus	group	participants	shared	employers’	concerns	about	
immigration	systems	which	are	hard	to	police	and	might	lead	to	irregular	migration.	On	the	issue	of	
whether	EU	migrants	should	have	priority,	the	range	of	views	among	employers	is	mixed,	as	was	also	
the	case	within	our	focus	groups,	with	arguments	presented	for	and	against	EU	preference	or	what	
some	call	a	‘level	playing	field’,	or	arrangements	linked	with	trade.		
Our	research	on	employers’	policy	preferences	found	that	employers	would	accept	a	requirement	to	
prove	that	they	cannot	meet	their	labour	and	skills	needs	from	the	resident	labour	market.	They	
would	also	accept	a	requirement	to	make	a	job	offer	to	a	migrant	before	entry.	Our	focus	groups	
suggest	that	this	might	also	be	welcomed	by	a	public	who	are	concerned	that	migrants	might	be	
given	preferential	access	to	jobs.	Along	similar	lines,	our	focus	group	participants	also	wanted	to	see	
the	quality	of	low	skilled	jobs	improved	to	make	them	more	attractive	to	British	workers,	and	this	is	
something	that	employers	in	some	sectors	have	said	they	aim	to	do	(Davies	and	Rolfe,	2017).	
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5.6.3.	But	there	are	three	sides	to	consider…	
Findings	from	our	Brexit-related	immigration	research	suggests	that	the	needs	of	the	economy,	
employers	and	the	general	public	might	not	be	as	far	apart	as	is	often	assumed,	at	least	on	some	
general	principles.	But	in	drawing	conclusions	from	our	research	there	is	a	further	viewpoint	to	
consider,	and	one	which	is	often	left	out	of	the	picture:	that	of	EU	migrants	themselves.		
Our	research	with	employers	has	found	some	awareness	that	systems	which	place	restrictions,	for	
example	in	length	of	stay,	may	not	be	attractive	to	prospective	migrants.	And	while	focus	group	
participants	did	not	voice	such	concerns,	they	were	aware	that	the	UK	may	not	be	attractive	in	other	
respects.	Some	participants	talked	of	the	anti-immigration	image	projected	by	the	Brexit	vote	and	
treatment	of	groups	of	migrants,	for	example	the	Windrush	generation.	They	were	aware	that	EU	
migrants	have	a	choice	of	countries	in	which	to	live	and	work	and	may	not	wish	to	come	to	the	UK	in	
future,	unless	conditions	are	right.		
This	is	an	important	reminder	to	policy-makers	that	there	are	three	key	stakeholders	in	future	
immigration	policy	–	the	public,	employers,	and	migrants	themselves	–	and	that	the	needs	of	all	
three	must	be	taken	into	account.	Reconciling	the	preferences	of	all	three	will	be	challenging,	but	
there	is	some	shared	ground	on	which	future	policy	may	be	built.		
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APPENDICES	
Appendix	1.	Evidence	review	of	the	economic	impact	of	immigration	on	the	UK	
This	chapter	reviews	existing	evidence	on	the	economic	impacts	of	immigration	including	EU	
immigration	specifically.	It	will	review	evidence	mainly	but	not	exclusively	from	the	UK.	The	
following	type	of	economic	impacts	of	immigration	will	be	explored	in	turn:	
• Labour	market	impacts	(employment	and	wages)	
• Productivity	and	growth	impacts	
• Fiscal	and	public	service	impacts	
• Impacts	on	prices	and	housing	
	
For	this	chapter,	we	broadly	define	the	economic	impacts	of	migration	to	include	impacts	on	
availability	and	quality	of	public	services.	This	study	does	not	review	other	type	of	potential	impacts	
such	as	cultural	or	social.	Our	review	methodology	is	outlined	in	Appendix	2.		
A1.1.	Labour	market	impacts	
According	to	economic	theory,	the	impact	of	immigration	on	native	workers’	wages	and	
employment	outcomes	critically	depend	on	whether	migrants	have	similar	or	different	skills	to	
natives;	that	is,	in	economics	jargon	to	what	extent	migrants’	skills	are	complements	or	substitutes	
to	the	skills	of	the	existing	workforce	(see	Dustmann	et	al.,	2005;	Ruhs	and	Vargas-Silva,	2017;	Devlin	
et	al.	2014;	Migration	Advisory	Committee	2012).	The	similarity	of	skills	is	expected	to	determine	
how	immigration	affects	the	demand	for	workers	in	the	labour	market:	if	migrants	and	natives	
possess	similar	skills,	immigration	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	competition	in	the	labour	market,	
which	would	be	expected	to	drive	down	wages.	Depending	on	natives’	willingness	to	accept	a	
reduction	in	wage	levels,	this	may	lead	to	an	increase	in	unemployment	or	inactivity	among	existing	
native	workers.	Alternatively,	if	the	skills	of	migrants	are	different	and	complementary	to	those	of	
the	existing	native	workforce,	economic	theory	would	suggest	that	all	workers	experience	an	
increase	in	productivity	leading	to	an	increase	in	wages	for	natives.	However,	this	is	only	true	if	
migrants	are	able	to	put	these	skills	into	use.	If	skilled	migrants,	for	instance,	end	up	working	in	
unskilled	roles,	there	will	be	a	negative	impact	on	the	unskilled	native	workforce	(McGuinness	and	
Hawkins,	2016).	Economic	theory	would	suggest	that	effects	may	differ	in	the	short	and	long	run,	as	
the	economy	have	time	to	adjust	to	the	new	circumstances	(see	Constant,	2011;	McGuinness	and	
Hawkins,	2016).	
Another	critical	theoretical	economic	hypothesis	is	that	contrary	to	the	often	held	misconception	
that	immigration	inevitably	leads	to	increased	competition	between	jobs	as	migration	increases	the	
number	of	workers	looking	for	jobs,	immigration	may	increase	the	demand	for	labour	as	there	are	
not	a	fixed	number	of	jobs	in	the	economy	(the	lump	of	labour	fallacy).	As	migrants	expand	
consumer	demand	for	goods	and	services,	immigration	can	be	expected	to	lead	to	more	investment,	
which	in	turn	leads	to	greater	demand	for	labour	and	as	a	result	potentially	higher	wages	and	
employment	(Ruhs	and	Vargas-Silva,	2017).	As	such,	economic	theory	predicts	that	impacts	on	
employment	and	wages	will	crucially	depend	on	how	investment	and	labour	demand	responds	to	
immigration,	which	will	typically	depend	on	a	number	of	characteristics	of	the	labour	market	and	the	
economy,	and	it	may	vary	in	the	short	and	long	term.	
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In	addition	to	employment	and	wages,	there	are	at	least	two	other	adjustment	mechanisms	
(Dustmann	et	al.,	2008).	Immigration	may	lead	to	a	change	in	the	mix	of	goods	and	services	in	the	
economy.	This	may	affect	the	industrial	and	occupational	structure	of	the	economy,	and	therefore	
the	balance	between	different	types	of	skills,	which	may	impact	on	wages.	Similarly,	the	economy	
may	adjust	by	changing	the	technology	used	for	production,	which	may	again	affect	labour	demand	
and	wages.			
Overall,	economists	argue	that	the	labour	market	impacts	of	immigration	are	ultimately	an	empirical	
issue:	
‘To	 summarise,	 economic	 theory	 shows	 that	 a	 range	 of	 labour	 market	
outcomes	 may	 result	 from	 policies	 that	 facilitate	 or	 allow	 (or	 deter,	 or	
prevent)	particular	 types	of	migration.	The	actual	 labour	market	 impacts	of	
migration	are,	therefore,	an	empirical	issue	and	are	likely	to	vary	over	time.’	
(Migration	Advisory	Committee,	2012).		
The	next	two	sub-sections	will	review	this	empirical	literature,	for	the	impacts	on	employment	and	
wages,	respectively.	Broadly,	it	finds	little	impact	on	employment	outcomes	and	a	small	impact	on	
wages	with	differences	among	the	wage	distribution,	with	high-paid	workers	gaining	and	low-paid	
workers	losing	out,	but	still	these	effects	are	very	small.	Overall,	the	evidence	highlights	that	the	
employment	and	wage	impacts	depend	critically	on	context,	in	particular	the	local	labour	market	
characteristics,	the	composition	of	net-inflows	including	skill	composition,	and	the	scale	of	net	
migration	inflows	compared	to	the	national	labour	market	(Devlin	et	al.,	2014).					
The	majority	of	the	reviewed	literature	is	quantitative,	where	the	key	aim	is	to	compare	the	labour	
market	outcomes	of	the	existing	population	after	immigration	has	taken	place	with	the	
counterfactual	outcome	if	migration	had	not	taken	place.	The	former	outcome	is	observed,	but	the	
latter	must	be	constructed	using	economic	assumptions.		As	such,	the	reviewed	literature	is	based	
on	three	types	of	methodological	approaches:	spatial	correlation,	skill-cell	correlation	and	a	factor	
proportions	approach.	The	spatial	correlations	approach	slices	the	national	labour	markets	into	sub-
markets	by	regional	area,	and	then	analyses	wage	and	employment	changes	in	areas	with	different	
levels	of	immigration.	The	skill-cell	correlation	approach	divides	the	national	labour	market	by	skills	
groups	and	assumes	that	workers	within	each	cell	are	perfect	substitutes.	The	factor	proportions	
approach	involves	the	simulation	of	the	impact	of	immigration	on	the	supply	of	labour,	and	the	
impact	on	wages	and	employment.	These	approaches	are	discussed	in	more	detail,	as	well	as	the	
strengths	and	limitations	of	each,	in	various	papers	(see	Devlin	et	al.,	2014;	Ruhs	and	Vargas-Silva,	
2017,	Vargas-Silva	et	al.,	2016).	These	papers	also	discuss	other	methodological	issues,	such	as	
general	problems	with	data	on	migration	and	the	tendency	to	use	the	Labour	Force	Survey	as	the	
main	data	source	due	to	its	collection	of	information	on	both	migrant	stock	and	labour	market	
characteristics	in	contrast	to	better	measures	of	migration	flows	such	as	the	International	Passenger	
Survey	though	this	has	its	own	flaws	as	well	(see	ONS,	2018).	Finally,	this	review	also	includes	some	
references	to	qualitative	evidence,	particularly	studies	with	focus	on	whether	employers	prefer	
migrants	for	certain	jobs.							
A1.1.1.	Employment	impacts	
Overall,	the	evidence	suggests	that,	even	in	the	short	term,	there	is	no	statistically	significant	impact	
of	overall	migration	on	employment	outcomes	(see	Devlin	et	al.	2014	and	MAC,	2018	for	a	review).	A	
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large	number	of	studies	have	generally	failed	to	find	any	significant	association	between	migrant	
flows	and	changes	in	employment	or	unemployment	for	native	workers	in	the	UK	(see	Dustmann	et	
al.,	2003;	Dustmann	et	al.,	2005;	Gilpin	et	al.	2006;	Lemos	and	Portes,	2008;	Lemos,	2010;	Lucchino	
et	al.,	2012;	Migration	Advisory	Committee,	2012,	2018;	Devlin	et	al.,	2014,	Wadsworth	et	al.,	2016;	
Becker	and	Fetzer,	2018).	
However,	some	of	the	literature	found	evidence	of	displacement	including	Nathan	(2011)	and	the	
Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2012).	Nathan	(2011)	found	this	negative	impact	to	be	strongest	
among	the	low-skilled.	While	Dustmann	et	al.	(2005)	found	no	impact	on	overall	employment	
outcomes	of	native	workers,	they	found	statistically	significant	and	adverse	impact	on	employment	
outcomes	on	those	with	intermediate	education	such	as	GCSE	and	a	positive	impact	on	those	with	
advanced	education	such	as	A-levels	or	university	degrees.	In	addition,	some	cross-national	studies	
confirm	the	prediction	from	economic	theory	that	unemployment	increases	in	the	short	run	for	
those	with	skills	most	similar	to	immigrants	while	immigration	has	no	significant	impact	in	the	longer	
run	as	the	economy	adjusts	(Jean	and	Jimenez,	2010).					
The	employment	impacts	are	likely	to	depend	on	the	type	of	migrants	in	question.	In	particular,	
some	studies	have	examined	whether	the	impact	is	different	for	EU	and	non-EU	migration.	This	is	
theoretically	plausible	as	EU	migrants	have	different	characteristics	as	they	enjoy	rights	of	full	access	
to	the	UK	labour	market	and	are	geographically	closer	which	may	make	them	more	likely	to	return	
to	their	home	country	in	the	event	of	deteriorating	economic	prospects	in	the	UK	(Devlin	et	al.,	
2014).	Using	data	from	1975	to	2010,	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2012)	found	that	while	
overall	migration	had	no	impact	on	employment	outcomes	for	native	workers,	non-EU	migration	
was	associated	with	a	reduction	in	employment	for	UK	native	workers	between	1995	and	2010.	This	
analysis	was	replicated	in	a	joint	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills	(BIS)	and	Home	
Office	analysis	which	still	found	the	negative	association	for	non-EU	migrants	(Devlin	et	al.,	2014).	
The	Migration	Advisory	Committee	study	found	a	similar	sized	effect	for	EU	migration,	but	this	was	
not	statistically	significant,	though	this	may	be	due	to	a	higher	variation	in	the	data	due	to	the	
smaller	sample	sizes	of	EU	migrants.	In	addition,	a	number	of	the	studies	cited	previously	examined	
the	impact	of	migration	from	recent	EU	accession	countries	(A8	and	A2)	and	found	no	statistically	
significant	effects	on	employment	(Gilpin	et	al.,	2006;	Lemos	and	Portes,	2008;	Lemos,	2010;	
Lucchino	et	al.	2012).			
Existing	studies	vary	in	their	assessment	of	how	the	impacts	are	affected	by	the	economic	
conditions.	Lucchino	et	al.	(2012)	found	that	migration	had	no	impact	on	claimant	count	rates	(a	
proxy	for	unemployment)	even	during	low	growth	periods	or	recessions.	In	contrast,	the	Migration	
Advisory	Committee	(2012)	found	that	the	strength	of	the	economy	affected	its	ability	to	absorb	
new	migrant	workers	without	adversely	affecting	employment	prospects.		
Evidence	from	other	high-income	countries	suggests	that	low-skilled	migration	leads	to	a	re-
allocation	of	native	low-skilled	workers	into	occupations	and	tasks	that	make	more	use	of	local	
cultural	knowledge	and	communication	skills	(Peri	and	Sparber,	2009;	D’Amuri	and	Peri,	2014,	Foged	
and	Peri,	2015).	This	can,	for	instance,	happen	when	there	is	an	increased	inflow	of	immigrants	
doing	manual	tasks,	which	generate	a	need	for	more	supervisors	or	sales	representatives	(Vargas-
Silva	et	al.,	2016).	However,	this	review	and	other	reviews	(see	Vargas-Silva	et	al.,	2016)	have	not	
identified	any	quantitative	evidence	for	the	UK	that	demonstrates	this	effect.										
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Finally,	qualitative	studies	have	examined	whether	employers	prefer	migrant	workers	for	certain	
types	of	jobs.	Some	papers	based	on	interviews	and	surveys	with	employers	suggest	that	some	
migrant	workers	are	more	attractive	employees	due	to	their	perceived	work	ethic,	especially	in	low-
paid	jobs	that	offer	unattractive	working	conditions	and	irregular	working	hours,	and	their	higher	
literacy	and	numeracy	skills	for	low-skilled	jobs	as	many	migrants	tend	to	work	in	lower-skilled	jobs	
despite	high	levels	of	qualifications	(Ruhs	and	Anderson,	2010;	Migration	Advisory	Committee,	2014;	
Scott,	2013;	McCollum	and	Findlay,	2015).	However,	similar	studies	have	found	that	employers	don’t	
discriminate	between	natives	and	migrants	based	on	perceived	skills,	but	that	low-skilled	jobs	simply	
attract	fewer	applications	from	British	natives,	and	that	employers	recruit	simply	to	fill	vacancies	
(Green	et	al.,	2013;	Rolfe,	2017;	Migration	Advisory	Committee,	2018).				
A1.1.2.	Wage	impacts	
The	evidence	on	wage	impacts	is	less	conclusive.	The	emerging	evidence	suggests	that	migration	has	
had	little	or	no	impact	overall	on	average	wages	of	UK	natives,	but	they	differ	in	their	assessments	of	
whether	this	small	impact	is	positive	or	negative.	This	is	similar	to	evidence	from	the	US	(Card,	1990,	
2005;	Borjas,	2003;	Ottaviano	and	Peri,	2012).	The	available	evidence	suggests	that	there	are	some	
impacts	along	the	wage	distribution,	particularly	with	negative	impacts	on	the	wages	of	low-paid	
workers	and	positive	impacts	on	medium	and	high-paid	workers	(Ruhs	and	Vargas-Silva,	2017).	
Similarly	to	the	average	wage	impacts,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	magnitude	of	the	impacts	are	very	
small,	even	if	they	are	statistically	significant	(Portes,	2016;	2018).			
The	studies	that	have	found	a	small	impact	on	average	wages	have	used	different	approaches	and	
explored	different	time	periods.	For	the	period	1997-2005,	Dustmann	et	al.	(2008,	2013)	found	that	
an	increase	in	the	number	of	migrants	equal	to	1%	of	the	UK-born	working-age	population	led	to	a	
small	increase	in	average	wages	of	0.1%	to	0.3%.	Similarly,	Nathan	(2011)	found	that	an	increase	of	
one	percentage	point	in	the	migrant	share	in	the	population	was	associated	with	a	0.5%	increase	in	
native	wages.	In	another	paper	using	data	for	2000-2007,	Reed	and	Latorre	(2009)	found	that	a	1%	
increase	in	the	share	of	migrants	in	the	UK’s	working	population	reduced	average	wages	by	0.3%.	
However,	while	the	impacts	are	statistically	significant,	they	are	very	small.	The	Migration	Advisory	
Committee	(2012,	2014)	calculated	that	the	results	from	these	studies	suggest	that	an	increase	of	
10,000	migrants	in	the	UK	affect	average	wages	for	native	workers	by	between	–£2	and	+£2	per	
year.	Meanwhile,	other	papers	have	found	no	statistically	significant	impact	on	average	wages	for	
native	UK	workers	(Lemos	and	Portes,	2008;	Manacorda	et	al.,	2012).	Recent	analysis	by	the	MAC	
(2018)	support	these	findings,	and	concludes	that	‘immigration	is	not	a	major	determinant	in	the	
wage	growth	experienced	by	existing	residents.’		
The	evidence	suggests	that	there	is	a	larger	effect	of	immigration	on	workers	in	specific	occupations	
or	across	different	wage	ranges,	with	the	greatest	wage	effects	for	low-waged	workers	even	though	
these	are	still	relatively	small	(Ruhs	and	Vargas-Silva,	2017;	Portes,	2018).	Dustmann	et	al.	(2013)	
found	that	each	1%	increase	in	the	share	of	migrants	in	the	UK	working-age	population	led	to	a	0.6%	
declines	in	the	wages	of	the	5%	lowest	paid	workers	and	conversely	to	an	increase	in	the	wages	of	
high-paid	workers.	Similar	findings	have	been	found	for	Eastern	European	migration	after	2004	
(Becker	and	Feltzer,	2018).	In	addition,	Nickell	and	Salaheen	(2008)	examined	the	wage	effects	at	the	
occupational	level	between	1992	and	2006	in	the	UK	and	found	that	a	1%	rise	in	the	share	of	
migrants	led	to	a	reduction	in	average	wages	by	almost	0.5%	in	the	unskilled	and	semi-skilled	service	
sector.	In	an	updated	Bank	of	England	paper	on	the	period	between	1992	and	2014,	they	found	the	
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same	effect	but	with	a	lower	wage	reduction	of	0.2%	(Nickell	and	Salaheen,	2015).	This	wage	
reduction	is	equivalent	to	estimating	that	overall	immigration	to	the	UK	since	2004	have	reduced	
wages	for	UK	natives	in	the	semi/unskilled	service	sector	by	about	1%	over	the	entire	period,	which	
is	equivalent	to	reducing	annual	pay	increases	by	around	£0.01	an	hour	(Portes,	2018).	This	means	
that	while	migration	may	have	had	a	small	negative	impact	on	wages	for	low-paid	workers,	other	
factor	such	as	technological	change,	policies	on	tax	credits	and	the	National	Minimum	wage	are	
more	important	determinants	of	changes	in	wage	growth	(ibid.).		
With	the	UK	national	minimum	wage	set	to	rise	considerably	until	2020,	a	recent	report	notes	that	
previous	studies	have	not	systematically	studied	how	minimum	wages	affect	migration	and	its	
impacts	(Vargas-Silva	et	al.,	2016).	On	the	one	hand,	this	may	make	the	UK	labour	market	more	
attractive	for	low-skilled	immigrants,	particularly	EU	immigrants	who	can	currently	still	freely	access	
the	UK	labour	market.	On	the	other	hand,	the	higher	minimum	wage	may	facilitate	a	transition	to	an	
economy	less	reliant	on	low-skilled	workers	including	migrants.	At	the	same	time,	a	higher	minimum	
wage	could	restrict	the	options	for	employers	to	adjust	wages	as	a	response	to	migration	flows,	
impacting	the	wage	and	employment	impacts	of	immigration.	In	any	case,	the	authors	acknowledge	
that	the	complex	dynamics	make	it	difficult	to	assess,	and	the	relationship	between	minimum	wages	
and	migration	may	in	any	case	change	as	a	result	of	the	UK’s	future	exit	from	the	EU	(Vargas-Silva	et	
al.,	2016).	
Finally,	the	existing	research	suggests	that	any	negative	effects	of	immigration	are	likely	to	be	felt	
more	by	migrants	who	are	already	in	the	UK.	Manacorda	et	al.	(2012)	analysed	data	from	1975-2005	
and	found	that	the	main	impact	of	immigration	was	on	the	wages	of	resident	migrant	workers	in	the	
UK.	This	is	because	their	skills	are	typically	closer	substitutes	to	the	incoming	migrants	than	those	of	
UK	native	workers.				
A1.2.	Productivity	and	growth	impacts	
The	impact	of	immigration	on	productivity	and	growth	is	methodologically	harder	to	estimate	than	
labour	market	effects.	Theoretically,	there	are	a	number	of	mechanisms	by	which	migration	could	
increase	or	decrease	productivity	(Portes,	2018;	MAC,	2018).	Firstly,	individual	migrants	may	be	
more	or	less	productive	compared	to	the	average	productivity,	leading	to	a	rise	or	fall	in	average	
productivity,	or	there	may	be	spillovers	that	affect	the	productivity	of	residents	workers	either	
positively	or	negatively.	It	is	often	argued	that	EU	migration	could	reduce	productivity	growth	
because	EU	migrants	are	paid	less	than	the	average	UK	workforce,	or	because	the	availability	of	a	
large	pool	of	relatively	low-paid	and	flexible	workers	reduce	employers’	incentives	to	invest	in	
productivity	improvements	such	as	labour	saving-technology.	These	claims	are,	however,	not	backed	
up	by	any	empirical	evidence	(Portes,	2018).	On	the	other	hand,	immigrants’	skills	may	complement	
those	of	native	workers.	A	number	of	studies	in	the	US	found	that	immigration	of	low-skilled	workers	
increased	the	labour	force	participation	of	higher	skilled	native	workers,	increased	specialisation	in	
the	economy,	or	increased	the	wages	of	low-skilled	native	workers	who	are	‘pushed’	into	higher-
paid	occupations	in	which	they	can	make	greater	use	of	their	local	cultural	knowledge	and	
communication	skills	(Peri	and	Sparber,	2009;	Foged	and	Peri,	2016;	Peri,	2012).	Immigration	may	
also	contribute	positively	by	increasing	the	level	of	human	capital	in	the	domestic	economy.	A	
number	of	studies	in	the	US	have	shown	that	this	can	happen	either	directly	by	increasing	skills	in	
the	economy	(Keer	and	Lincoln,	2010;	Hunt	and	Gauthier-Loiselle,	2010),	or	indirectly	by	
incentivising	natives	to	acquire	higher	levels	of	skills	and	qualifications	(Hunt,	2017;	McHenry,	2015).	
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Immigration	is	also	thought	to	play	an	important	role	as	vehicles	of	transferring	knowledge	between	
countries,	leading	to	higher	productivity	and	export	diversification	(Bahar	and	Rapoport,	2018).			
Until	the	recent	MAC	publication,	the	empirical	evidence	for	the	UK	was	still	limited,	but	generally	
positive.	Ottaviano	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	a	1%	increase	in	the	proportion	of	immigrants	in	local	
areas	is	associated	with	a	2-3%	rise	in	labour	productivity.	The	study	attributes	this	increase	mainly	
to	cost-cutting	dynamics	as	well	as	reduction	in	the	import	of	intermediate	inputs	and	an	increase	in	
exports	to	immigrants’	home	countries.	Looking	at	the	UK	services	sector,	Ottaviano	et	al.	(2018)	
found	that	immigrants	lead	to	an	increase	in	firm	productivity.	Similarly,	Rolfe	et	al.	(2013)	found	a	
positive	impact	in	specific	industries	with	high	immigrant	concentration	though	the	impact	was	
small.	Cross-national	evidence	also	tend	to	find	an	increase	in	productivity	across	countries,	but	by	
varying	amounts;	the	UK’s	productivity	boost	is	higher	than	most	other	advances	economies,	
probably	reflecting	the	relatively	high	skill-level	of	migrants	into	the	UK	(Boubtane	et	al.,	2015;	
Jaumotte	et	al.,	2016).	
The	recent	MAC	report	included	three	studies	on	the	migration	impact	on	productivity.	Campo	et	al.	
(2018)	found	that	the	share	of	immigrants	in	the	local	area	was	associated	with	higher	productivity	
and	growth,	both	over	the	short	and	long	term,	and	this	was	driven	by	high-skilled	migrants	with	at	
least	tertiary	education.	Costas-Fernandez	(2018)	used	a	different	methodology	and	found	that	both	
migrants	in	high-	and	low-skilled	occupations	were	more	productive	than	UK-born	workers.	Finally,	
Smith	(2018)	focuses	on	firm	productivity	rather	than	labour	productivity	and	found	that	higher	
migrants	share	leads	to	higher	firm	productivity.								
A1.3.	Impact	on	public	finances	and	services	
Like	everyone	else	in	any	given	economy,	an	immigration	population	contributes	to	public	finances	
through	the	taxes	they	pay	and	other	public	finance	contributions,	but	also	costs	something	as	they	
use	public	services	and	claim	benefits.	This	section	will	review	the	evidence	on	the	net	fiscal	impact,	
i.e.	whether	migrants	make	sufficient	contributions	through	taxes	to	finance	the	required	expansion	
of	public	services,	as	well	as	more	general	evidence	on	the	impact	of	public	service	quality	and	
availability.	
A1.3.1	Impact	on	public	finances	
There	are	two	main	methodological	approaches	to	estimate	the	net	fiscal	impact	of	immigration:	the	
static	approach	and	the	dynamic	approach	(Vargas-Silva,	2017).	The	static	approach	zooms	in	on	a	
specific	year	with	available	data	and	simply	compares	the	contributions	and	costs	of	existing	
migrants	for	that	year.	The	dynamic	approach	computes	the	net	present	value	of	contributions	and	
costs	over	the	entire	lifespan	of	any	migrant,	and	in	some	cases	their	children	depending	on	
definition.	This	approach	moves	beyond	the	snapshot	in	time	provided	by	the	static	approach	by	
providing	a	forward-looking	perspective,	but	it	requires	strong	assumptions	about	factors	such	as	
migrants’	fertility	rates,	return	migration,	productivity,	labour	market	participation,	tax	rates,	
government	spending	etc.	(ibid.).	Even	the	static	approach	requires	assumptions	about	how	
migrants	use	public	services,	with	most	studies	simply	assuming	that	migrants	use	public	services	in	
the	same	way	as	UK-born	nationals	with	similar	characteristics	(Vargas-Silva,	2017).					
In	a	UK	context,	only	the	recent	study	by	Oxford	Economics	(2018)	for	the	Migration	Advisory	
Committee	uses	a	dynamic	lifecycle	approach.	Looking	at	the	2016	cohort	which	consist	of	515,000	
EEA	migrants,	it	found	that	they	make	a	discounted	net	contribution	of	£26.9bn	over	their	lifetime	in	
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the	UK.	This	is	equal	to	an	average	fiscal	contribution	of	£78,000	for	each	EEA	migrant,	compared	to	
non-EEA	migrants	who	were	estimated	to	make	a	smaller,	but	still	positive,	contribution	of	£28,000	
over	their	lifetime	(Oxford	Economics,	2018).				
The	remaining	studies	on	the	topic	in	the	UK	uses	a	static	approach.	The	Oxford	Economics	(2018)	
report	estimated	that	in	2016/17,	EEA	migrants	paid	£4.7b	more	than	they	received,	compared	to	a	
£41.1b	deficit	of	the	UK-born	population	and	a	£9b	deficit	for	non-EEA	migrants.	In	average	fiscal	
contributions	compared	to	the	average	UK	residents,	this	equals	a	yearly	surplus	of	£2,310	for	each	
EEA	migrants,	a	yearly	deficit	of	£840	for	non-EEA	migrants	and	a	small	yearly	deficit	of	£70	for	UK-
born	adults.	The	report	notes	that	the	most	important	causes	for	the	positive	contribution	is	that	
EEA	migrants	tend	to	have	higher	employment	rates	and	higher	earnings,	and	they	tend	to	be	
relatively	young	so	health	expenditures	and	pensions	are	lower	(ibid.).				
Previous	studies	based	on	the	static	approach	have	also	shown	largely	positive	results.	The	first	UK-
based	study	estimated	that	for	the	fiscal	year	1999-2000	the	net	fiscal	impact	of	migrants	was	
positive	at	around	£2.5b,	as	migrants	contributed	£31.2b	and	cost	£28.8b.	An	updated	version	of	the	
analysis	covered	the	2003/04	fiscal	year	and	found	a	negative	net	contribution	of	around	£0.4b,	as	
migrants	contributed	£41.2b	and	cost	£41.6b	(Sriskandarajah	et	al.,	2005).	Another	way	of	stating	
these	results	is	as	the	net	annual	fiscal	contribution	(NAFI),	i.e.	the	ratio	of	contributions	to	costs,	
which	can	then	be	compared	between	natives	and	immigrants.	In	the	1999/00	fiscal	year,	this	ratio	
was	higher	for	immigrants	(1.06)	than	for	natives	(1.01).	In	the	2003/04	fiscal	year,	while	the	
negative	net	contribution	meant	that	the	ratio	was	below	one	for	immigrants	(0.99),	this	was	still	
higher	that	the	UK-born	population	(0.88)	(ibid.).	A	study	by	Rowthorn	(2008)	for	the	same	fiscal	
year	2003/04	adopted	a	slightly	different	approach	estimating	what	the	migrant	contribution	would	
be	with	a	balanced	budget	and	adjusted	for	a	number	of	factors	such	as	the	cost	of	asylum	support	
and	the	exclusion	of	defence	spending	which	is	largely	unaffected	by	migrant	flows.	This	study	found	
a	small	but	positive	net	contribution	of	£0.6b.		
Recent	research	shows	that	the	net	fiscal	impacts	vary	by	types	of	migrant	groups,	with	more	
positive	contributions	from	recent	and	EEA	migrants.	Dustmann	and	Frattini	(2013,	2014)	found	that	
the	net	fiscal	impact	from	European	migrants	is	more	likely	to	be	positive	while	it	is	more	likely	to	be	
negative	for	non-European	migrants.	For	the	period	1995-2011,	their	most	recent	study	estimated	
an	annual	average	fiscal	contribution	of	£0.3b	for	EEA	migrants	while	non-EEA	migrants	cost	on	
average	£6.9b	per	year	(Dustmann	and	Frattini,	2014).	During	the	same	time-period,	the	UK	
population	cost	on	average	£34b	per	year	(ibid.).	The	same	study	found	that	it	was	particularly	
recent	migrants	who	had	arrived	since	2000	who	mad	a	positive	fiscal	contribution.	They	explained	
that	while	EU	accession	(A10)	migrants	worked	mostly	in	low-paid	jobs,	this	was	offset	by	
comparatively	high	employment	rates	(ibid.).					
In	a	number	of	reports,	Migration	Watch	UK	(2006,	2014)	have	criticised	a	number	of	the	
assumptions	in	previous	studies.	They	challenged	that	some	of	these	studies	ascribed	the	cost	of	
services	used	by	children	born	to	a	UK	and	non-UK	parent	only	to	the	native	group	rather	than	
splitting	it,	and	generally	argued	that	academic	studies	overstated	the	migrant	contributions	and	
understated	the	costs	(ibid.).	Their	most	recent	calculations	show	a	negative	net	fiscal	impact	of	
immigration	for	all	type	of	migrants	(EEA,	non-EEA,	recent	EEA	and	recent	non-EEA),	but	their	
findings	are	nevertheless	consistent	with	Dustmann	and	Frattini	in	estimating	that	recent	migration	
has	had	a	less	negative	impact	(Vargas-Silva	et	al.,	2016).			
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Rowthorn	(2014)	provides	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	differences	between	the	Dustmann	and	
Frattini	(2014)	and	Migration	Watch	UK	(2014)	estimates.	While	most	studies	on	the	impacts	on	UK	
employment	have	not	found	statistically	significant	effects,	as	described	in	a	previous	section,	
Rowthorn	(2014)	notes	that	if	immigration	does	have	a	negative	impact	on	employment,	for	
instance	during	periods	of	recessions	as	some	studies	indicate,	the	displacement	effect	would	mean	
that	net	fiscal	impacts	would	be	more	negative.	More	broadly,	most	of	the	reviewed	studies	do	not	
take	into	account	any	potential	effects	of	migration	on	the	contributions	and	costs	of	native	workers,	
such	as	impacts	on	employment,	wages,	housing	prices	etc.	(Vargas-Silva,	2017).				
Another	source	that	provides	an	indication	of	the	balance	between	contributions	and	costs	of	
immigrants	is	official	data	released	by	HMRC,	which	suggest	that	foreign	nationals	pay	more	in	taxes	
and	National	Insurance	contributions	than	they	receive	in	benefits	and	tax	credits	(HMRC,	2016a,	
2016b;	2018).	The	most	recent	publication	show	that	EEA	nationals	who	arrived	within	the	previous	
4	years	received	tax	credits	and	child	benefits	worth	£0.75b	in	the	2015/16	fiscal	year,	but	paid	
£4.72b	in	income	taxes	and	National	Insurance	contributions	(HMRC	2018).	Note	these	estimates	are	
not	compatible	with	the	other	studies	as	it	excludes	a	number	of	contributions	such	as	VAT	and	
council	tax,	and	a	number	of	costs	such	as	housing	benefit	and	JSA	(Vargas-Silva,	2017).	Generally,	
while	it	is	difficult	to	assess	how	many	people	migrate	to	gain	access	to	the	benefit	system	in	the	UK,	
what	can	be	established	from	the	available	data	is	that	migrants	including	those	arriving	from	the	EU	
are	underrepresented	among	out-of-work	benefits	and	those	receiving	tax	credits	(Sumption	and	
Allen,	2015).	The	data	shows	the	divisions	between	migrants	from	Eastern	Europe	(the	2004	
accession	countries	and	Romania	and	Bulgaria),	Southern	Europe	(Greece,	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain)	
and	Northern	Europe	(everyone	else	in	the	EU14)	(O’Connor,	2018).	In	particular,	Eastern	European	
taxpayers	average	around	£2,000	in	income	tax	each,	with	Southern	European	taxpayers	averaging	
three	times	that	amount,	and	Northern	European	taxpayers	over	seven	times	(ibid.).			
A1.3.2	Impact	on	public	services	
Whether	there	is	a	positive	or	negative	net	fiscal	impact	does	not	preclude	potential	negative	or	
positive	impacts	on	the	quality	and	availability	of	public	services	such	as	health	and	education,	both	
on	the	national	and	local	level,	particularly	if	funding	allocations	are	not	adjusted	or	other	policy	
decisions	are	not	made	to	reflected	the	increased	pressures	resulting	from	the	population	expansion	
(George	et	al.,	2011,	MAC	2018).				
However,	overall,	there	are	no	strong	evidence	that	higher	immigration	is	associated	with	negative	
impacts	on	public	services,	though	it	should	be	said	that	there	is	not	a	large	evidence	base	on	this,	
particularly	compared	to	the	impact	on	wages	and	employment.	This	is	the	case	for	the	NHS	where	
there	is	a	lack	of	reliable	data	on	the	use	of	health	services	by	immigrant	status.	Residents	of	the	UK	
including	EU	immigrants	have	free	access	to	the	NHS.	This	had	led	to	speculation	among	the	public	
whether	immigrants	increase	the	demand	for	NHS	services	disproportionately,	and	whether	some	
move	to	the	UK	with	the	purpose	of	abusing	the	freely	accessible	health	care	system	(Giuntella	et	al.,	
2018).	The	few	studies	that	have	looked	at	this	found	that	immigrants	generally	use	hospital	and	GP	
services	at	the	same	rate	as	natives	(Wadsworth,	2013)	and	that	immigrants	do	not	use	more	
secondary	care	than	natives	as	is	sometimes	assumed	(Steventon	and	Bardsley,	2011).	A	recent	
empirical	study	looked	at	waiting	times,	which	is	often	used	as	a	proxy	for	quality	of	the	health	care	
system.	It	shows	that	higher	immigration	is	not	associated	with	higher	NHS	waiting	times	in	accident	
and	emergency	departments	(A&E)	and	elective	care,	and	in	fact	immigration	led	to	reduced	waiting	
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times	for	outpatient	referrals	because	immigration	increases	natives’	internal	mobility	and	
immigrants	tend	to	be	healthier	than	natives	(Giuntella	et	al.,	2018).	The	study	did	find	some	
localised	impacts	with	a	rise	in	waiting	times	for	outpatient	referrals	in	more	deprived	areas	outside	
London	though	this	is	concentrated	in	the	years	following	the	2004	EU	enlargement	(ibid.).		
Research	by	the	Department	of	Health	on	the	cost	of	providing	services	to	immigrants	in	2013	
estimated	the	total	gross	cost	to	be	around	£2b	per	year	(including	with	countries	where	the	UK	has	
a	reciprocal	agreement),	compared	to	the	annual	NHS	budget	of	around	£113b	(Prederi,	2013).	The	
report	estimated	the	cost	per	head	for	EEA	migrants	to	be	£588	which	was	lower	than	the	estimated	
average	expenditure	of	£736	for	non-EEA	migrants.	In	any	case,	the	average	use	of	the	NHS	by	
immigrants	appears	to	be	lower	than	for	the	native	population,	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	
immigrant	population	are	on	average	younger	(Steventon	and	Bardsley,	2011).	Based	on	this	
assumption,	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2018)	recently	calculated	that	EU13+	and	new	
member	states	migrants	each	represented	2%	of	health	expenditure,	with	citizens	from	the	UK	and	
Ireland	accounting	for	89%.	Of	course,	the	impact	of	immigration	is	not	limited	to	the	cost	of	
providing	health	care	to	immigrants,	but	immigrants	also	account	for	a	large	proportion	of	the	NHS	
workforce.		The	most	recent	employment	figures	from	NHS	Digital	for	March	2018	shows	that	
workers	from	new	EU	member	states	account	for	1.6%	of	the	NHS	workforce	and	EU13+	nationals	
account	for	2.6%,	in	addition	to	6.6%	non-EEA	nationals.	The	proportion	of	nurses	and	midwives	
from	EU/EEA	countries	have	increased	in	recent	years,	reaching	5.1%	in	the	most	recent	data	for	
2017/18	(MAC,	2018).	Given	their	age	composition,	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2018)	
concludes	that	‘the	share	of	expenditure	estimated	to	be	on	EEA	migrants	is	much	less	than	their	
share	of	the	healthcare	workforce	so	that	they	contribute	more	to	the	supply	of	healthcare	than	the	
demand	(ibid).	With	some	staff	groups	in	very	short	supply,	this	contribution	to	fill	British	skill	gaps	
may	be	very	significant.				
In	primary	and	secondary	education,	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2018)	recently	calculated	
the	family	composition	of	school-aged	children	in	the	UK,	showing	that	5.1%	of	children	are	‘EEA	
born	only’,	2.2%	are	‘mixed	UK	born	and	EEA-born’	while	72.6%	are	‘UK	born	only’.	In	comparison,	
the	share	of	EEA	school	teachers	is	lower	than	the	proportion	of	pupils	as	it	accounts	for	2.6%	and	
3.0%	in	primary	and	secondary	schools,	respectively	(ibid.).	There	are	also	a	number	of	UK-based	
studies	in	education	that	shows	that	an	increase	in	the	number	of	pupils	with	English	as	a	second	
language	is	not	associated	with	negative	impact	on	attainment	outcomes	of	native	pupils	(Geay	et	
al.,	2013).	If	anything,	pupils	in	schools	with	many	non-native	speakers	do	slightly	better	(Strand	et	
al.,	2015).	The	Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2018)	recently	updated	these	analyses	and	found	no	
impact	of	migration	on	reduced	school	choice	or	on	educational	attainment	of	UK-born	pupils.			
In	higher	education,	foreign	nationals	and	particularly	non-EEA	students	generate	significant	
revenue	as	they	pay	higher	tuition	fees,	and	as	such	can	be	considered	to	be	cross-subsidising	
education	for	natives	(Hajela	and	Sumption,	2017;	OECD,	2015;	Universities	UK,	2017).	Oxford	
Economics	has	estimated	an	average	net	fiscal	contribution	of	EEA	students	to	be	around	£3,300	and	
the	contribution	of	non-EEA	students	to	be	£5,100	higher	than	that	of	UK	native	students	(Migration	
Advisory	Committee,	2018b).	On	the	other	hand,	international	students	can	also	put	additional	
pressures	on	existing	public	infrastructure	(OECD,	2015)	though	their	demographic	characteristics	
suggest	their	usage	would	be	less	than	the	average	UK	resident	(George	et	al.,	2011).	In	addition,	the	
share	of	EEA	workers	at	17%	is	higher	than	the	share	of	students,	meaning	the	EEA	migrants	
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contribute	more	to	supply	than	demand.	There	is	little	specific	evidence	on	the	impacts	of	
international	students	who	remain	in	the	UK	after	their	studies	(Migration	Advisory	Committee,	
2018a).								
More	broadly,	Portes	(2018)	notes	that	recent	years’	increased	immigration	inflows	have	coincided	
with	a	general	deterioration	of	public	services	amid	on-going	fiscal	consolidation.	The	evidence	
suggests	that	those	immigrants	make	a	positive	net	fiscal	contribution	to	the	UK.	This	could,	in	
principle,	be	used	to	expand	and	improve	public	services	such	as	health	and	education	to	cope	with	
the	increased	demand	on	public	services.	However,	Portes	(2018)	points	out	that	the	fiscal	
contribution	typically	has	been	used	for	other	purposes	such	as	tax	cuts	or	deficit	reduction.	The	
Migration	Advisory	Committee	(2012)	explain	that	‘if	public	spending	does	not	increase	in	response	
to	a	rise	in	migration,	consumption	of	public	services	will	rise	and	so,	all	else	equal,	the	quality	of	
those	services	will	fall.’	Portes	(2018)	argues	that	this	may	have	caused	people	to	associate	
immigration	with	the	failures	of	public	services.	In	reality,	the	failure	should	be	attributed	to	poor	
planning	and	poor	policy	decisions	by	the	government.		The	recent	MAC	report	noted	that	at	present	
only	the	education	funding	formulae	explicitly	incorporates	migration	into	its	funding	mechanism	
through	the	English	as	an	Additional	Language	(EAL)	factor	which	accounts	for	1.2%	of	the	total	
formula	spend,	and	recommends	that	the	most	recent	measures	of	population	and	demographics	
growth	are	taken	into	consideration	to	ensure	that	funds	are	distributed	accordingly.			
A1.4.	Impacts	on	prices	and	housing	
Since	migration	affects	both	the	demand	for	and	supply	of	goods	and	services,	in	theory	migration	
flows	can	affect	prices	in	the	economy	(Vargas-Silva	et	al.,	2016).	For	instance,	an	increase	in	
migration	will	lead	to	an	increase	in	demand	for	certain	goods	such	as	houses	and	a	subsequent	
increase	in	the	prices,	but	at	the	same	time	there	would	also	be	an	increase	in	the	supply	of	workers	
in	specific	sectors	which	may	reduce	the	cost	of	production	and	decrease	prices	for	goods	produced	
in	those	industries	(ibid.).	Empirically,	few	studies	have	examined	the	balance	between	these	effects	
for	the	UK.	Using	data	from	1995-2006,	Frattini	(2008)	found	a	reduction	in	the	growth	of	prices	of	
non-tradable	goods	and	services	in	industries	dominated	by	low-paid	workers	but	not	in	other	
sections.	An	updated	analysis	with	data	from	1997-2012	found	no	significant	impact	on	price	growth	
of	non-tradable	goods	and	services	(Frattini,	2014).	However,	migration	led	to	a	reduction	in	price	
growth	in	the	pre-recession	period	for	low-skilled	dominated	sectors	similar	to	the	original	analysis,	
but	the	study	found	no	effect	on	price	growth	for	the	post-recession	period	(ibid.).	In	their	recent	
report,	MAC	(2018)	found	that	migration,	particularly	from	new	EU	member	states	and	non-EEA	
migration,	had	reduced	prices,	particularly	in	the	middle	and	lower-skilled	personal	services	and	
occupations.			
There	are	more	evidence	on	the	impact	of	immigration	on	housing	prices	and	rents	in	the	UK	
economy,	though	this	research	remains	inconclusive.	In	theory,	positive	net	migration	leads	to	
population	growth	which	may	be	expected	to	increase	housing	prices	and	rents	in	the	UK	economy	
(Vargas-Silva,	2017b).	The	magnitude	depend	on	how	housing	supply	adjusts	to	the	changes	in	
demand,	but	given	that	the	UK	supply	of	housing	has	increased	more	slowly	than	demand	for	a	
number	of	years	(Barker,	2004),	any	population	growth	may	be	expected	to	increase	housing	costs.	
Indeed,	MAC	(2018)	recently	found	that	the	impact	of	migration	on	housing	costs	are	higher	in	areas	
with	high	refusal	rates	on	major	housing	developments	(used	as	a	proxy	for	the	difficulty	of	
expanding	supply),	indicating	that	the	impact	of	migration	–	similarly	to	the	impact	of	public	services	
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–	cannot	be	seen	in	isolation	from	other	government	policies,	in	this	case	on	housing	construction	
(MAC,	2018).		
Generally,	establishing	the	contribution	of	migration	on	changes	in	housing	costs	is	a	complex	
exercise	as	housing	costs	can	take	many	different	forms	such	as	prices,	rents	and	social	housing,	and	
is	not	only	affected	by	demographic	factors	and	housing	supply,	but	also	income	growth	and	
availability	of	mortgage	credit	(Vargas-Silva,	2017b).	There	are	also	substantial	data	limitations	on	
the	price	of	houses	out	of	the	market,	which	means	that	if	immigration	leads	to	an	increase	in	sales	
of	low-quality	and	inexpensive	houses,	this	may	incorrectly	be	interpreted	as	a	reduction	in	average	
house	prices.	Another	data	limitation	is	the	limited	knowledge	of	the	impact	of	a	number	of	foreign	
nationals	owning	properties	at	the	top	end	of	the	housing	market	particularly	in	London.	Finally,	the	
more	general	methodological	problem	is	that	housing	prices	may	affect	immigrants’	decision	to	
migrate	in	the	first	place,	and	particularly	impact	on	their	decision	on	what	area	to	move	to	(Vargas-
Silva,	2017b).	The	Ministry	of	Housing,	Communities	and	Local	Government	(MHCLG)	(2018)	recently	
estimated	that	an	increase	in	housing	demand	from	immigration	had	raised	housing	prices	by	20%	
over	the	period	1991-2016	in	the	UK,	but	this	study	highlighted	another	number	of	limitations	as	it	
assumed	that	housing	supply	was	unaffected	by	immigration	though	some	migrants	work	in	
construction,	and	they	may	not	consume	housing	services	to	the	same	extent	as	UK	natives	(MAC,	
2018).			
International	studies	tend	to	find	different	effects	depending	on	the	level	of	geographical	
disaggregation	used	and	whether	the	examine	the	short	or	long	term	effects	(Sá,	2015).	Papers	that	
examine	broader	regions	tend	to	find	that	higher	immigration	flows	are	related	to	an	increase	in	
house	prices	(Saiz,	2007;	Degen	and	Fischer,	2009;	Gonzalez	and	Ortega,	2013)	though	studies	
examining	the	effects	in	the	longer	run	tend	to	find	smaller	effects	as	the	housing	supply	have	an	
opportunity	to	adjust	(Akbari	and	Aydede,	2012;	Stillman	and	Mare,	2008).		
At	the	local	level,	however,	studies	based	in	the	US	have	tended	to	find	a,	perhaps	counterintuitive,	
negative	association	between	changes	in	local	immigration	flows	and	house	prices	(Saiz	and	
Wachter,	2011).	Similarly,	studies	in	England	and	Wales	have	compared	the	change	in	house	prices	
with	the	changes	in	migration	inflows	in	different	geographic	areas	and	found	that	higher	levels	of	
migration	inflows	leads	to	a	reduction	house	prices	(Sá,	2015;	Braakmann,	2013).	The	empirical	
evidence	suggests	that	this	reduction	in	house	prices	can	partly	be	explained	by	subsequent	out-
migration	of	UK	natives	(Saiz	and	Wachter,	2011,	Sá,	2015).	This	phenomenon	is	observed	especially	
in	areas	where	migrants	are	less	educated,	and	among	natives	at	the	top	of	the	wage	distribution	
(Sá,	2015;	Saiz	and	Wachter,	2011).	This	creates	a	negative	income	effect,	which	means	that	even	if	
the	native	out-migration	is	complete	so	the	local	population	size	remains	constant,	housing	demand	
and	therefore	prices	may	still	be	affected	due	to	an	income	effect	if	the	composition	of	skill	and	
income	levels	are	different	for	the	new	local	population	(Sá,	2015).	The	literature	also	explores	
whether	increased	immigration	flows	could	lead	to	a	reduction	in	housing	prices	due	to	increased	
crime	levels	or	reduced	quality	of	locally	provided	goods	such	as	schools	through	overcrowding,	but	
finds	no	evidence	for	this	in	the	empirical	literature	(Sá,	2015;	Saiz	and	Wachter,	2011).	Recently,	the	
Migration	Advisory	Committee	expanded	Sa’s	study	to	include	more	Local	Authorities	and	a	longer	
time-period,	and	found	that	migrants	put	an	upward	pressure	on	house	prices,	with	a	1	percentage	
point	increase	in	the	population	due	to	migration	leading	to	1%	rise	in	house	prices.	
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Finally,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	finding	of	reduced	housing	process	at	the	local	level	is	not	
inconsistent	with	the	finding	of	increased	housing	prices	across	broader	geographical	areas.	The	
reason	for	this	is	that	native	out-migration	may	lead	to	house	price	increases	in	other	areas	of	the	
UK	and	subsequently	a	potential	increase	in	the	average	house	prices	across	the	UK	(Migration	
Advisory	Committee,	2014).	
Another	part	of	the	housing	literature	examines	the	potential	effect	of	immigration	on	natives’	
access	to	social	housing.	While	only	migrants	with	general	settlement	status	or	EEA	nationals	are	
eligible	for	social	housing,	non-eligible	migrants	may	still	increase	demand	for	social	housing	if	they	
displace	the	native	population	or	eligible	migrants	from	the	private	rented	sector	(Vargas-Silva,	
2017b).	Generally,	there	is	an	excess	demand	for	social	housing	in	the	UK,	so	positive	net	migration	
may	lead	to	a	further	shortage	of	social	housing.		
Provision	of	social	housing	can	be	considered	part	of	the	welfare	state,	but	it	is	unlike	more	
traditional	benefits	(Battiston	et	al.,	2014).	Unlike	traditional	benefits,	provision	of	social	housing	
places	natives	and	immigrants	in	a	‘direct	and	visible	conflict	over	access	to	resources’	(ibid.).	Due	to	
the	inability	of	current	and	past	UK	housing	policies	to	adjust	supply	to	demand,	one	can	say	crudely	
that	‘one	more	immigrant	household	in	social	housing	is	quite	likely	to	be	one	less	native	household’	
(ibid).	Similar	to	the	broader	impact	on	prices	and	availability	in	the	private	rented	sector,	the	
magnitude	of	any	potential	increase	in	shortage	of	social	housing	depends	on	the	adjustment	to	the	
supply	of	social	housing	relative	to	the	increased	demand.	The	interaction	between	supply	and	
demand	factors	can	vary	locally	across	different	housing	markets	with	different	scale	of	migrant	
inflows.		
The	most	recent	figures	show	that	a	roughly	equal	proportion	of	UK-born	(16%)	and	foreign-born	
individuals	(17%)	live	in	social	housing	(Vargas-Silva,	2017b).	However,	once	you	control	for	
demographic,	economic	and	regional	circumstances,	immigrants	are	less	likely	to	be	in	social	housing	
compared	to	natives	(Battiston	et	al.,	2014,	Wilson,	2016).	Overall,	immigrants	are	overwhelmingly	
housed	in	the	private	rental	sector,	particularly	those	who	have	arrived	recently	in	the	UK	(Rutter	
and	Latorre,	2009).	The	existing	evidence	also	shows	that	at	the	point	of	arrival,	migrants	are	less	
likely	than	UK	natives	with	similar	characteristics	to	live	in	social	housing,	then	this	likelihood	
increases	yearly	to	reach	a	level	above	natives	after	10	years	before	finally	falling	back	to	a	similar	
level	to	natives	(Battiston	et	al.,	2014).		
It	is	commonly	asserted	that	migrants	‘jump	the	queue’	and	receive	priority	status	in	the	allocation	
mechanism	of	the	social	housing	stock.	The	Citizenship	Survey	(see	Battiston	et	al.,	2014)	found	that	
more	than	20%	of	white	Britons	think	they	are	treated	worse	than	ethnic	minorities	in	social	
housing,	which	is	higher	than	similar	numbers	for	education	and	health	services	as	well	as	private	
housing.		Examining	data	on	waiting	lists	and	allocation	of	new	tenancies	as	well	as	analysing	social	
housing	allocation	policies,	a	number	of	studies	have	found	no	evidence	of	systematic	discrimination	
in	favour	of	immigrants	in	social	housing	(Battiston	et	al.,	2014;	Rutter	and	Latorre,	2009;	Robinson,	
2010).	Rather,	the	studies	point	out	that	often	migrants	are	unaware	of	the	possibilities	and	the	
rules	of	the	social	sector,	and	as	such	are	less	likely	to	take	advantage	of	it	(ibid.).	However,	these	
studies	point	out	that	there	are	a	number	of	reasons	why	white	Britons	may	feel	that	they	are	being	
unfairly	treated.	Most	importantly,	the	combination	of	changes	to	allocation	procedures	that	have	
reduced	discrimination	against	ethnic	minorities,	a	rising	immigration	population	and	a	decline	in	
social	housing	stock	have	led	to	a	reduced	probability	of	native	Britons	gaining	access	to	social	
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housing	(Battiston	et	al.,	2014).	Battiston	et	al.	(2014)	estimate	that	the	reduced	probability	of	
natives	living	in	social	housing	can	be	attributed	about	two-thirds	to	the	reduction	of	social	housing	
stock,	and	one-third	to	the	higher	migrant	population	and	reduced	discrimination	in	allocation	
mechanisms	(ibid.).	In	addition,	Rutter	and	Latorre	(2009)	notes	that	in	some	areas	the	sale	of	social	
housing	stock	and	its	subsequent	use	as	private	rental	housing	for	migrants	have	led	to	a	
misperception	among	locals.			
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Appendix	2:	Evidence	review	protocol	
Literature	searches	were	undertaken	using	a	predetermined	protocol	and	a	wide	range	of	databases	
and	search	engines.	This	was	supplemented	by	manual	searches	of	key	organisations’	websites.	
Bibliographies	of	publications	identified	to	be	relevant	were	also	searched	to	ensure	maximum	
coverage.		
The	review	covered	published	and	unpublished	literature	from	the	year	2000	and	onwards.	Sources	
included	published	quantitative	and	qualitative	analyses	in	the	form	of	academic	papers,	reports	
produced	for	government	departments,	papers	by	research	teams	in	universities,	research	institutes,	
think	tanks	and	large-scale	survey	studies	and	commercial	pollsters.	
Three	separate	types	of	evidence	was	collected:	
1.	Evidence	on	the	economic	and	social	impact	of	immigration	and	EU	immigration	in	the	UK		
Primary	Search	Terms:	‘immigration’	OR	‘EU	immigration’	OR	‘migrants’	OR	‘EU	migrants’	OR	‘EU	
migration’	OR	‘migration’	AND	‘impact’	OR	‘economic	impact’	OR	‘social	impact’	OR	‘distributional	
impact’	AND	‘labour	market’	OR	‘employment’	OR	‘productivity’	OR	‘growth’	OR	‘fiscal’	OR	‘public	
services’	OR	‘wages’	OR	‘low-skilled’	AND	‘England’	‘United	Kingdom’	‘Britain’	‘Great	Britain’	‘British’	
Broad	Inclusion	criteria:	
Geography	 UK			
Timescale	 Published	(or	disseminated)	from	2000	onwards		
Publication	Status	 Published	or	pending	publication,	including	working	papers.	Search	
focus	on	existing	literature	reviews.		
Language	 English	
Research	Method	 None	prescribed.	
	
2.	Evidence	on	attitudes	towards	immigration	(including	EU	immigration)	and	its	impact	in	the	UK	
Primary	Search	Terms:	‘immigration’	OR	‘EU	immigration’	OR	‘migrants’	OR	‘EU	migrants’	OR	‘EU	
migration’	OR	‘migration’	AND	‘attitudes’	OR	‘opinion’	OR	‘public	opinion’	OR	‘beliefs’	OR	
‘perception’	AND	‘England’	‘United	Kingdom’	‘Britain’	‘Great	Britain’	OR	‘British’	
Broad	inclusion	criteria:	
Geography	 UK			
Timescale	 Published	(or	disseminated)	from	2000	onwards		
Publication	Status	 Published	or	pending	publication,	including	working	papers		
Language	 English	
Research	Method	 None	prescribed.	
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3.	Evidence	on	how	information	and	economic	evidence	affect	the	attitudes	towards	immigration	
and	its	impact	(UK	and	international	evidence)	
	Primary	Search	Terms:	‘immigration’	OR	‘EU	immigration’	OR	‘migrants’	OR	‘EU	migrants’	OR	‘EU	
migration’	OR	‘migration’	AND	‘attitudes’	OR	‘public	attitudes’	OR	‘opinion’	OR	‘public	opinion’	OR	
‘belief’	OR	‘perception’	OR	‘public	perception’	AND	‘information’	OR	‘evidence’	OR	‘economic	
evidence’	OR	‘facts’	OR	‘data’	OR	‘statistics’		
Broad	inclusion	criteria:	
Geography	 UK	and	abroad	
Timescale	 Published	(or	disseminated)	from	2000	onwards		
Publication	Status	 Published	or	pending	publication,	including	working	papers		
Language	 English	
Research	Method	 None	prescribed.	
	
Search	engines/databases:	
International	Bibliography	of	Social	Sciences	
JSTOR	
EBSCO	
DawsonEra	
Google	Scholar	
Academic	Search	Complete	
Informaworld	
IngentaConnect	
Public	Information	Online	
Sage	Journals	Online	
Scopus	
Social	Policy	and	Practice	
Web	of	Science	
Social	Science	Research	Network	(SSRN)	
UKOP	
Web	of	Knowledge	
	
Specific	academic	journals:	
Migration:	
International	Migration	Review	
International	Migration	
Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies	
Ethnic	and	Racial	Studies	
IZA	Journal	of	Migration	
Migration	Studies	
Population,	Space	and	Place	
Migration,	Mobility	and	Displacement	
Journal	of	Refugee	Studies	
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Journal	of	International	Migration	and	Integration	
Journal	of	Immigrant	and	Refugee	Studies	
Journal	of	Comparative	Migration	Studies	
International	Journal	of	Migration	and	Border	Studies	
European	Journal	of	Migration	and	Law	
Crossings:	Journal	of	Migration	and	Culture	
Nordic	Journal	of	Migration	Research	
Migration	Letters	
Journal	of	Identity	and	Migration	Studies	
	
Public	opinion:	
Journal	of	Public	Opinion	Research	
International	Journal	of	Public	Opinion	Research	
Public	Opinion	Quarterly	
Journal	of	Elections,	Public	Opinion	and	Parties	
	
Research	Institutes/Departments:		
Migration:	
COMPAS	(Oxford)	
Migration	Policy	Institute	
NIESR	
British	Future	
Migration	Observatory	
	
Public	Opinion:	
NatCen	
Ipsos	MORI	
YouGov	
Gallup	World	Poll	
Eurobarometer	
PEW	Research	Center	
European	Social	Survey	
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Appendix	3:	Demographic	features	of	the	district	of	Swale	in	Kent	
The	estimated	population	size	of	Swale	in	2017	was	around	146,700,	60.9%	of	which	was	working	
age	(16-64).	In	2017	Swale	had	an	unemployment	rate	of	4.5%,	compared	to	3.4%	in	the	South	East	
and	4.3%	nationally.	Economic	inactivity	was	at	22.3%,	compared	to	18.7%	in	the	South	East	and	
21.6%	nationally.	As	shown	by	Figure	11,	a	greater	proportion	of	Swale’s	working	population	are	in	
Soc	2010	Major	Group	8-9	jobs15,	compared	to	both	the	South-East	and	the	UK	generally.	
Correspondingly,	only	36.3%	of	Swale’s	working	population	are	in	Major	Group	1-3	jobs	compared	to	
50.8%	in	the	South-East	and	45.8%	in	the	UK	as	a	whole.	As	outlined	by	the	UK	Business	Register	and	
Employment	Survey	(2016),	Swale’s	industrial	structure	is	significantly	weighted	toward	
manufacturing	(14.1%)	and	transportation	and	storage	(9.6%)	when	compared	to	the	rest	of	Kent.	
	
Figure	11.	Employment	by	Occupation	(April	2017	–	March	2018)	
Source:	ONS	Annual	Population	Survey	–	Standard	Occupational	Classification	
As	shown	by	Figure	12,	general	qualifications	levels	for	Swale	are	lower	than	those	found	in	the	
South-East	and	the	UK.	8.3%	of	Swale’s	population	have	no	qualifications,	compared	to	5.2	in	the	
South	East	and	7.7%	in	the	UK.	
																																								 																				
15	Soc	 2010:	 Group	 1-3	 are	 Managers,	 Directors	 and	 Senior	 Officials,	 Professional	 Occupations,	 Associate	
Professional;	 Group	 4-5	 –	 Administrative	 &	 Secretartial,	 Skilled	 Trades	 Occupations;	 Group	 6-7	 are	 Caring,	
Leisure	And	Other	Service	Occupations,	and	Sales	and	Customer	Service;	Group	8-9	–	Process	Plant	Machine	
Operatives	and	Elementary	Occupations.	
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Figure	12.	Qualifications	(January	2017	–	December	2017)	
Source:	ONS	Annual	Population	Survey	
In	July	2018,	2.8%	of	Swale’s	population	were	in	receipt	of	out-of-work	benefits.	This	compared	to	
1.3%	of	the	South-East	and	2.2%	of	the	UK.	As	shown	by	Figure	13,	Swale	has	higher	proportion	of	its	
population	claiming	Jobseekers	Allowance	in	November	2016	compared	to	the	South-East	and	the	
UK.	Estimates	place	Swale’s	job	density	(i.e.	the	ratio	of	total	jobs	to	population	aged	16-64)	at	0.67,	
compared	to	0.88	and	0.84	in	the	South	East	and	the	UK	respectively.	Hourly	rates	of	pay	for	full-
time	employees	Swale	in	2017	averaged	at	approximately	£12.37.	This	compared	to	£14.56	in	the	
South	East	and	£13.99	in	the	UK.		
	
Figure	13.	Working	Age	Client	Group	–	Main	Benefit	Claimants	(November	2016)	
Source:	DWP	benefit	claimants	
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In	2015	Swale	was	ranked	as	the	2nd	most	deprived	part	of	Kent	(out	of	12),	and	77th	nationally	(out	
of	376)	(DCLG,	2015).	In	2014	23%	of	children	in	Swale	were	considered	to	be	in	poverty.	This	is	
compared	to	17.9%	in	the	Kent	County	Council	area,	and	19.9%	in	England.	
2011	census	data	identified	96.6%	(135,835)	of	Swale’s	population	as	white,	compared	to	85.4%	of	
England	as	a	whole.	Swale	has	the	second	smallest	BME	population	within	Kent	and	Medway	at	
3.45%	of	the	resident	population,	followed	only	by	Dover	(3.23%).	Surrounding	areas	are	identified	
to	have	a	much	higher	proportion	of	BME	residents,	including	Medway	(10.36%)	and	Gravesend	
(17.2%).		
As	shown	in	Figure	14,	Swale	has	seen	an	increase	in	the	proportion	of	resident	population	born	
outside	of	the	UK,	much	like	the	rest	of	Kent	and	England.	Most	recent	data	shows	that	net	
international	migration	to	Kent	accounted	for	the	majority	of	the	area’s	total	population	growth	in	
2017	(Business	Intelligence	Statistical	Bulletin,	2017).	During	mid-2015/16	net	international	
migration	(as	opposed	to	internal	UK	migration)	accounted	for	36.7%	of	Kent’s	total	population	
growth	(+6,300).	
	
Figure	14.	Proportion	of	resident	population	born	outside	of	the	UK	(2008-2017)	
Source:	Annual	Population	Survey	
In	mid-2015	to	mid-2016	Kent	saw	a	net	increase	of	14,300	migrants,	6,300	of	which	originated	from	
outside	of	the	UK	(KCC,	2017).	As	shown	by	Figure	15,	between	2006	and	2016	Swale	experience	an	
overall	net	increase	in	the	number	of	long-term	international	migrants16,	going	from	600	in	2006/07,	
to	a	low	of	100	in	2010/11,	to	a	high	of	800	in	2015/16.	In	2015/16,	Swale’s	net	increase	in	
international	migrants	was	ranked	the	3rd	highest	amongst	Kent	Local	Authority	Districts,	behind	
Maidstone	(+1000)	and	Canterbury	(+1500).	
																																								 																				
16	‘Long-term	migrant’	is	defined	by	the	ONS	as	someone	who	intends	to	stay	for	12	months	or	more.	
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Figure	15.	In-flow,	Out-flow	and	Net	Effect	of	long-term	International	migrant	to	Swale	
Source:	KCC,	2017a.	Figures	estimated	to	the	nearest	100.	
There	were	an	estimated	300	short-term	migrants	in	Swale	in	Mid-2014	year	to	Mid-year	2015,	
equivalent	to	2.4	to	every	one	thousand	resident	population	for	that	year.	This	rate	is	lower	than	
that	of	the	South	East	(2.6)	and	England	(2.8),	but	equivalent	to	that	of	Kent	generally.	During	this	
period	Swale	had	the	third	highest	rate	of	short-term	international	migrants	per	thousand	
population,	behind	Maidstone	(3.3)	and	Canterbury	(6.5).	
	
Figure	16.	Short-term	international	migrant	rate	per	thousand	resident	population	in	Swale	
Source:	KCC	(2017)	using	International	Passenger	Survey.	Figures	estimated	to	the	nearest	100.	
Furthermore,	as	shown	by	Figure	17,	estimates	suggest	that	the	vast	majority	of	short-term	migrants	
in	Swale	between	Mid-2014	to	Mid-2015	were	there	for	employment,	as	opposed	to	study.	
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Compared	to	the	rest	of	Kent,	Swale	has	consistently	had	the	largest	proportion	of	short-term	
migrants	seeking	employment	as	opposed	to	study.		
	
Figure	17.	Short-term	international	migrants’	reason	for	migration	to	Swale	
Source:	KCC	(2017)	using	International	Passenger	Survey.	Figures	estimated	to	the	nearest	100.	
Small	sample	sizes	make	obtaining	detailed	aggregate	data	on	the	composition	of	Swale’s	short-	and	
long-term	migrant	population	difficult.	2011	Census	data	suggest	56	per	cent	Swale’s	migrant	
population	had	been	resident	in	the	UK	for	10	years	of	more.	This	is	compared	to	16%	who	had	been	
resident	between	5	and	10	years,	16%	between	2	and	5	years,	and	12%	less	than	2	years.	These	
proportions,	however,	have	likely	changed	considerably	since	then.	As	shown	in	Figure	18,	2011	
Census	data	identified,	the	majority	of	non-identifying	‘White:	English	/	Welsh	/	Scottish	/	Northern	
Irish	/	British’	self-report	as	‘other	white’	(3,515),	followed	by	African	(913)	and	White	Irish	(780)	
	
Figure	18.	Swale	Population	by	Ethnicity		
Source:	Census	2011.	
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Figure	19	provides	Census	2011	for	Swale	passport	holders	(excluding	those	with	a	United	Kingdom	
and	‘No	Passport),	and	shows	the	largest	proportion	of	non-UK	passport	holders	to	be	from	‘EU	
countries’	(2685),	followed	by	‘Africa’	(584)	and	then	‘Middle	East	and	Asia’	(426)	
	
Figure	19.	Swale	Population	by	Passport	Held	
Source:	Census	2011.	
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Appendix	4:	Summary	analysis	of	changes	in	responses	over	time	
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Appendix	5:	Survey	questions	at	focus	group	
	
About	you	
	
Full	Name	
	
	
	
Views	on	the	impact	of	EU	immigration	
	
1. On	a	scale	of	1-10,	do	you	think	EU	migration	has	had	a	positive	or	negative	impact	on	
Britain?	
	
Very	negative																																																											Neutral																																																												Very	positive	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	
	
2. To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statements	about	EU	
immigration?	
Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neither	agree,	
nor	disagree	
Agree	 Strongly	agree	
	
There	are	too	many	EU	immigrants	in	Britain	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
There	are	too	many	EU	immigrants	in	my	local	area	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
I	am	concerned	about	too	many	cultures	coming	into	the	country	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
3. To	what	extent	do	you	think	the	following	groups	of	migrants	are	good	or	bad	for	the	
UK	economy?	
Very	bad	 Bad	 Neutral	 Good	 Very	good	
	
High-skilled	EU	migrants	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
Low-skilled	EU	migrants	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
Students	from	the	EU	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
 
Asylum	seekers	and	refugees 
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
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4. To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statements	about	the	
impact	of	EU	immigration	on	jobs?	
Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neither	agree,	
nor	disagree	
Agree	 Strongly	agree	
	
EU	migrants	take	jobs	away	from	British	workers	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
EU	migrants	drive	down	wages	of	British	workers	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
EU	immigration	has	helped	to	create	jobs	in	the	UK	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
 
The	UK	should	grow	its	own	skills	rather	than	rely	on	EU	immigration 
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
	
	
5. To	what	extent	do	you	agree/disagree	with	the	following	statements?	
Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neither	agree,	
nor	disagree	
Agree	 Strongly	agree	
	
EU	migration	contribute	more	than	they	cost	to	public	services	through	the	taxes	they	pay	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	NHS	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	schools	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
 
EU	migrants	have	a	negative	impact	on	housing 
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
	
	
6. To	what	extent	do	you	agree/disagree	with	the	following	statements?	
Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neither	agree,	
nor	disagree	
Agree	 Strongly	agree	
	
The	Government	should	use	Brexit	as	an	opportunity	to	cut	down	EU	immigration	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
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7. For	each	of	the	sectors,	please	tell	us	whether	you	would	prefer	the	number	of	EU	
migrants	coming	to	live	in	the	UK	to	be	increased,	reduced	or	remain	about	the	same.	
Reduced	a	lot	 Reduced	a	little	 Remain	about	the	
same	
Increased	a	little	 Increased	a	lot	
	
Health	and	social	care	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
Agriculture	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
Hotels	and	restaurants	
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
 
Packing	and	distribution 
¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	 ¨	
	
	
	
8. Imagine	there	was	an	easy	way	to	cut	EU	immigration	to	the	UK,	but	that	it	came	with	
a	cost.	What	is	the	maximum	amount	you	would	personally	be	prepared	to	pay	to	cut	
EU	immigration	in	half?	
	
¨	 Nothing.	EU	migration	stays	the	same	
¨	 £10	per	year	
¨	 £50	per	year	
¨	 £100	per	year	
¨	 £500	per	year	
¨	 I	would	be	willing	to	pay	more	than	£500	per	year	
¨ Don’t	know	
¨ Other	(please	specify)	
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Appendix	6:	Materials	for	defence	proposal	treatment	
Hand-out:	
	
	
A	Proposal	for	Government	Funded	Legal	Aid	for	EU	Citizens	in	the	UK	
	
A	working	group	at	the	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research	(NIESR)	is	
considering	a	proposal	that	EU	citizens	currently	living	in	the	UK	be	given	access	to	a	free,	
one-hour	phone	consultation	with	an	immigration	solicitor.	Advice	would	be	given	on	how	
to	secure	their	right	to	stay	and	work	in	the	country	post-Brexit,	in	the	manner	they	
currently	are	under	EU	rules.	The	service	would	be	government	funded.	The	estimated	cost	
of	an	hour’s	consultation	with	an	immigration	solicitor	is	£200.	There	are	currently	around	3	
million	EU	citizens	currently	in	the	UK	who	would	be	eligible	for	this	free	service.	
	
Your	defence	of	the	proposal:	
Your	Name:	________________________________________________	
	
	
Your	Signature:	_____________________________________________	
	 	
	
PLEASE	WRITE	AND	SIGN	YOUR	NAME	AT	THE	BOTTOM	OF	THIS	PAPER	TO	CONFIRM	THAT	YOU	
VOLUNTARILY	GIVE	YOUR	CONSENT	TO	TAKING	PART	IN	THIS	EXERCISE.	
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Appendix	7:	Materials	for	devil’s	advocate	treatment	
Hand-out:	
	
	
I	share	this	concern:	
	
Here	are	three	(or	more)	reasons	why	I	might	be	wrong	in	thinking	that	I	should	be	
concerned	about	this:	
	
	
	 	
	
	
Your	Name:	
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Appendix	8:	Analysis	of	treatment	compliance	
A8.1.	Proposal	defence	treatment	
A	total	of	26	participants	across	four	focus	groups	were	exposed	to	the	proposal	defence	treatment,	
in	which	they	were	asked	to	consider	a	pro-immigration	proposal	(see	Appendix	6).	The	analysis	of	
their	answers	show	that	13	people	complied	with	the	exercise,	8	people	complied	in	a	very	narrow	
sense	by	suggesting	modifications	to	the	proposal,	and	5	people	did	not	defend	the	proposal.					
The	most	common	defence	of	the	proposal	was	to	acknowledge	that	migrants	contribute	to	the	UK	
economy	and	public	services	as	workers	and	taxpayers,	and	that	it	could	be	beneficial	if	they	were	
supported	to	stay	in	the	UK.	Another	main	defence	of	the	pro-immigration	proposal	was	to	stress	
the	importance	of	providing	clarity	to	how	migrants	can	address	their	residential	and	legal	issues,	
acknowledging	that	this	can	be	a	difficult	task	especially	during	a	potentially	distressful	period.	The	
last	main	defence	used	was	to	acknowledge	the	injustice	of	deporting	migrant	families	and	to	stress	
the	principles	of	fairness	and	equal	rights.		
In	addition	to	this,	there	was	a	large	group	whose	only	defence	of	the	proposal	was	to	suggest	
modifications	to	the	proposal,	specifying	under	what	conditions	migrants	should	be	allowed	to	
receive	the	legal	support.	Usually,	participants	argued	that	only	migrants	who	had	made	a	
contribution	to	the	British	economy	through	working	and	living	in	the	UK	for	a	number	of	years	
should	be	allowed	the	service.		
The	group	who	were	not	deemed	to	be	compliant	either	refused	to	write	an	answer	or	focused	on	
the	need	to	deport	migrants,	or	suggested	to	spend	the	money	on	UK	public	services	instead.	
In	many	responses	across	all	categories	of	compliance,	people	noted	their	concerns	about	the	cost	of	
the	service,	demonstrating	that	the	exercise	worked	as	intended	as	participants	acknowledged	that	
it	would	be	a	costly	proposal.	Invariably,	people	suggested	ways	to	reduce	this	cost.	Suggestions	
included	providing	the	money	as	a	loan,	making	their	origin	country	or	the	EU	pay	for	the	support,	or	
only	provide	the	service	at	a	discounted	cost	rather	than	as	a	free	service.	
A8.2.	Devil’s	advocate	treatment	
A	total	of	27	participants	across	four	focus	groups	were	exposed	to	the	‘devil’s	advocate	treatment’,	
in	which	they	were	first	asked	to	list	a	number	of	concerns	about	immigration,	and	then	attempt	to	
play	‘devil’s	advocate’	with	them,	by	providing	reasons	for	why	they	might	be	wrong	about	these	
concerns	(see	Appendix	7).	The	analysis	of	their	answers	show	that	25	people	complied	with	the	
exercise	and	two	people	didn’t	comply.	Compliance	was	defined	narrowly:	if	a	respondent	at	any	
point	during	his	or	her	answer	demonstrated	any	reflection	on	why	their	concerns	might	have	been	
wrong,	it	was	recorded	as	compliance.		
There	were	four	different	types	of	immigration	concerns	that	participants	played	‘devil’s	advocate’	
with.	These	will	be	explored	in	turn	below.	
Overcrowding/housing	crisis	
Participants	were	concerned	about	how	immigration	had	caused	overcrowding	leading	to	a	housing	
crisis	and	homelessness	among	UK	nationals	as	well	as	pressure	on	public	services.	The	most	
common	way	participants	played	devil’s	advocate	with	this	concern	was	to	acknowledge	that	they	
may	have	overestimated	the	problem	in	the	first	place.	This	focused	on	the	fact	that	people	often	
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stay	for	short	periods	and	eventually	return	to	their	home	countries,	that	British	people	are	also	
leaving	as	part	of	freedom	of	movement,	and	that	the	UK	have	plenty	of	space.		
Another	common	theme	was	to	acknowledge	that	migrants	are	often	used	as	scapegoats	for	
overcrowding	and	the	housing	crisis	rather	than	acknowledging	that	these	problems	are	likely	
complex	and	caused,	at	least	partly,	by	other	factors.	In	this	context,	several	respondents	noted	that	
the	housing	crisis	was	ultimately	caused	by	Governments’	consistent	failures	to	build	more	houses	
including	social	housing.	
The	third	main	aspect	that	was	brought	up	was	to	acknowledge	migrants	as	contributing	to	the	
economy	and	public	services	as	workers	and	taxpayers,	including	the	fact	that	EU	workers	formed	a	
large	part	of	the	construction	workforce	which	meant	they	could	contribute	to	solving	the	housing	
crisis.	
Finally,	there	were	a	number	of	arguments	that	were	only	brought	up	once	across	the	responses.	
These	included	the	acknowledgement	that	overcrowding	is	not	a	problem	in	all	areas	of	the	UK,	to	
refer	to	the	principles	of	fairness	and	equal	rights	of	immigrants	to	have	somewhere	to	live,	and	to	
express	sympathy	with	immigrants	fleeing	violence	in	their	home	countries.				
Impact	of	public	services	
Participants	were	also	concerned	about	immigration’s	impact	on	public	services,	particularly	the	NHS	
and	schools.	The	first	main	argument	used	against	this	concern	was	to	acknowledge	that	migrants	do	
not	only	use	public	services	but	also	contribute	through	filling	skill	gaps	in	the	public	sector	and	
paying	taxes.	The	other	main	argument	was	to	acknowledge	that	migrants	are	often	used	as	
scapegoats	for	existing	problems	that	are	caused	by	other	factors,	primarily	policy	failures	by	the	UK	
government.	Another	argument	was	to	acknowledge	the	effort	and	experiences	of	many	immigrants	
who	have	sometimes	fled	violence,	and	that	they	have	an	equal	right	to	support	and	help	regardless	
of	nationality	and	ethnicity.	Other	less	common	arguments	included	acknowledging	that	
immigration	could	bring	benefits	due	to	multiculturalism	and	diversity	as	well	as	social	capital;	and	
that	they	may	be	overestimating	the	problems.	
Integration	
Most	participants	who	were	concerned	about	the	lack	of	integration	and	limited	English	language	
skills	of	immigrants	argued	against	their	concern	by	acknowledging	that	often	immigrants	made	an	
effort	to	integrate,	but	that	this	may	be	hard	and	may	take	time.	Some	participants	noted	that	they	
may	be	overestimating	the	problem	and	recognised	that	it	was	not	all	immigrants	who	hadn’t	
successfully	integrated	into	Britain.	Some	participants	also	argued	that	the	difficulties	of	integrating	
and	learning	the	English	language	could	be	compounded	by	the	failed	support	systems	in	the	UK,	
and	some	said	that	maybe	Brits	including	themselves	could	make	more	of	an	effort	to	help	
integration.		
Taking	jobs	away	from	British	people	
Participants	were	also	concerned	about	how	immigration	impacted	the	labour	market,	and	in	
particular	that	immigrants	take	jobs	away	from	natives.	The	two	main	arguments	used	against	this	
concern	was	that	migrants	are	willing	to	take	jobs	that	are	deemed	undesirable	by	UK	workers	and	
that	migrants	contribute	to	the	economy	as	workers	and	taxpayers.	The	most	common	argument	
was	the	former,	with	people	arguing	that	migrants	take	up	work	in	agriculture,	hospitality	and	
distribution,	including	seasonal	work,	unskilled	work	and	work	at	the	minimum	wage.	Another	
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argument	was	to	accept	the	negatives	of	EU	immigration	as	it	allowed	UK	workers	to	enjoy	the	
advantages	of	freedom	of	movement	by	making	it	easier	to	relocate	to	Europe.	
Other	less	used	arguments	was	to	acknowledge	that	unemployment	didn’t	appear	to	be	increasing	
amid	high	migration;	that	it	was	ultimately	UK	employers	who	decided	to	hire	immigrants	rather	
than	immigrants	themselves;	and	that	it	was	important	to	maintain	the	UK	tradition	of	free	
enterprise	in	which	all	people	are	treated	equally	in	the	labour	market.		
	
